Peace is not a posture

Islamabad presumes that the government in New Delhi has only to show courage to make its people accept a solution which is distant from the Line of Control. Pakistan should have known by this time that any substantial change in the line, which India has considered its own for decades, is bound to be turned down. It may come to accept minor adjustments but nothing like River Chenab as the boundary. Again, the seven regions that President Musharraf has listed are primarily demarcated on the basis of religion. How can India accept a formulation which hits at the very roots of its pluralist ethos? Resurrecting the two-nation theory five decades later indicates a refusal to face the facts. You cannot argue today that the state of Jammu and Kashmir, its Valley or any other part, should be part of Pakistan because the two-nation theory demanded that. The state joined the Indian Union formally and legally. The then popular leader, Sheikh Abdullah, endorsed the maharaja’s action. It is another matter that we messed things up subsequently.

Even Pakistan’s founder, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, repudiated the two-nation theory when he said after Partition that Hindus in Pakistan ceased to be Hindus and Muslims in India, Muslims, not in the religious sense but otherwise, and that they were either Pakistanis or Indians. If Pakistan were to insist on the Muslim angle, the Hindutva elements, which are in disarray today, may get another lease of life. India cannot risk opening the issue of Partition, which saw so much violence and rendered 20 million people homeless.

Somehow, this argument does not resonate with even the Hurriyat leaders, liberal or religious. I wish they would focus their attentions on reviving Kashmiriyat, the Valley’s secular temperament which terrorists from across the border were able to change. The Hurriyat has also not made any concrete effort to bring back to the Valley Kashmiri Pandits who have been staying in refugee camps for more than a decade now. Their plight is a clear violation of human rights which people in the Valley justifiably decry. My suspicion is that the Hurriyat is against the Pandits’ return till the Kashmir issue is sorted out. Two Hurriyat leaders told me so a few years ago.

Just as Pakistan is wrong in assuming that India can make territorial adjustments in the Valley, New Delhi is unjustified in thinking that Islamabad has only to blink and cross-border terrorism would stop. After declaring jehad on Kashmir — it was primarily Zia-ul Haq’s doing — Islamabad cannot smother the Frankenstein-like fanaticism which stalks the land. The majority of the Pakistani population has come to be jehadi. A big chunk is present in the military itself. Although General Musharraf is fighting against such elements, he cannot plug the entry of terrorists, the Al-Qaeda type, who are presently all over Pakistan.

As regards demilitarisation, sending troops back to the barracks is what should be happening in a democratic society. The use of the army to tackle political situations, as our experience in the Northeast indicates, makes them still more complicated. Prime Minister Singh has taken a positive step while ordering cuts in troop deployment in Kashmir. This may not match up to General Musharraf’s idea of demilitarisation. Still New Delhi’s initiative will have a long-term effect. It is not tokenism. Some 9,000 jawans are being withdrawn. Still, the point to keep in mind is that demilitarisation presupposes a level of confidence. As of today, the two countries look askance at each other’s proposals. Any move made by the other is suspect. Yet both sides know how they have acted on suspicion in the past. New Delhi occupied Siachen, till then a no-man’s land, because it feared Pakistan would move in. Islamabad captured posts at Kargil from which India had withdrawn at the height of winter. Pakistan’s assumption was that it would get away with what it did. The situation almost escalated into a full-fledged war.

Such fears may well be behind New Delhi’s tardy response. It wants Islamabad to send in writing what Musharraf has proposed on Kashmir: demarcating the areas, demilitarising them and determining their status. The problem is that Musharraf has mentioned regions in general terms and he may still be groping for something definite. This is good from one point of view: mutual discussions. The general has reportedly suggested independence for the areas demarcated. Probably, he has the Valley and “Azad Kashmir” in view. But he was not in favour of independence as an option when I talked to him in Islamabad a few days before he addressed the Pakistani media. He told me that the Kashmiris would themselves step back from the demand for independence once concrete proposals were on the table. He may well turn out to be correct.

This is, however, the time to implement confidence-building measures which already have the concurrence of the secretary-level teams from the two countries. Musharraf has to give the green light. New Delhi is ready. India’s participation in the gas pipeline project may then become easier. Trade and travel are bound to generate understanding and goodwill which may make the Kashmir problem tractable.