Pitfalls of over-enthusiasm

This is of particular concern to Pakistan because of Osama bin Laden’s latest pronouncements declaring India and the US as major enemies of Islam, against whom he wouldexpand his terrorist operations. His connections with the Taliban and its connections with the Pakistan government have put Pakistan on the defensive.

The fifth objective could be to convey some conciliatory messages on non-proliferation issues, with a view to persuading the US to influence the IMF and the IBRD to dilute their strict stipulations and recent negative decisions affecting financial flows to Pakistan. The sixth aim could have been to generate influences from the US to prevent the Pakistani military establishment and Islamic groups from destabilising the Nawaz Sharif government.

There were repeated reports that the Pakistan army high command as well as extremist Islamic parties were unhappy about Nawaz Sharif’s succumbing to US pressure on the Kargil issue and about rumours that Sharif, through back-channels (Niaz Naik-R.K. Mishra talks), had negotiated some sort of a compromise with India on the Kashmir issue. There were rumours, too, that Sharif might be overthrown by the Army with thesupport of Islampasand parties. There have also been general indications that some kind of a cautionary message was sent by the US government to the Pakistani armed forces between September 17 and 21 not to overthrow an elected government.

Nawaz Sharif’s younger brother Shahbag Sharif was in Washington for high-level discussions around the middle of August. So was former President Zia-ul-Haq’s son, Eizaz-ul-Haq. The Chief of the ISI, Lt General Zia-u-ddin, was also in Washington for discussions. Muddying the waters for the Pakistan government was the former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, who held discussions with Assistant Secretary of State Rick Inderfurth.

Two non-resident Pakistani groups — the Association of Pakistani Physicians for National Action (AP-PNA) and the Pakistan Political Action Committee (PAKPAC) — have also been lobbying to persuade the US delegation at the UN to support Pakistan’s raising the Kashmir issue in the General Assembly. Other contributors to this effort were Chairman ofPakistan Senate Foreign Relations Committee Akram Zakki and cricketer Imran Khan.

The apprehension in Pakistan is that US perceptions about it as a valuable strategic ally and regional partner may be undergoing a change because of three factors. First, Pakistan’s involvement with the Taliban and its support to the activities of Osama bin Laden is a major concern of American foreign and security policies. This concern is not rooted in the direct terrorist threat that bin Laden and his associates posed for the US and the West alone. Equally important is the apprehension that bin Laden and the Taliban school of extremist Islam will destabilise Central Asia, a region in which the US has vital emerging economic interests.

Another problem is Pakistan’s inability or unwillingness to control the flow of narcotics from Pakistan to the US. The Congressional Research Service of the US has assessed that, though Pakistan cooperates with the US narcotic authorities in implementing the international narcotics controlprogrammes and has received about 7.5 to 8 million dollars as assistance to control narcotics smuggling, the Pakistan-Afghan border region has supplied 40 per cent of the heroin consumed in the US, and about 70 per cent of the narcotic substances consumed in Western Europe. The Pakistan-Afghan border region is the second highest supplier of smuggled narcotics to the international market after South-East Asia’s Golden Triangle.

The osmosis of these developments has resulted in a certain convergence of interests between the US and India which is viewed with concern by Pakistan. It found itself somewhat on the defensive in recent discussions on the subject of international terrorism in various fora, like the ARF, the Almati conference (in which Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh participated) and at the United Nations. There could, therefore, be an emerging change in the chemistry of US-Pak relations. Pakistani worries, however, seem to be exaggerated. Pakistan remains an important factor in US strategicthinking.

It is the declared policy of the US to ensure that no single country in any region (including South Asia) should emerge as an hegemon disturbing regional or global strategic equations. Pakistan, therefore, remains a relevant counter-balancing factor against Indian power potentialities. The US feels that Pakistan is more amenable to its non-proliferation agenda. It is Pakistan’s worries about India which delays its falling in line with the US agenda. India is a comparatively difficult customer to deal with.

The basic elements of the defence cooperation arrangement between Pakistan and the US, initiated by the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement of May 19, 1954, and strengthened by subsequent agreements of 1959, 1981, 1986 and 1998, st-ill underpin the US-Pak relations. All that has happened is that post-Cold War developments have changed the partisan US attitude to subcontinental affairs. The US now deals with India with some realism, and accepts that there are possibilities of betterrelationship with India. This does not and need not dilute US relations with Pakistan. “Being even-handed” is the orientation of US policies.

A Congressional Research Service briefing of July 28 sums up the US attitude towards Pakistan precisely when it says: “The nuclear issue aside, US interests strongly support a stable Pakistan, as a model for the volatile and newly independent countries of West and Central Asia.”

India, therefore, should not predicate its policies towards Pakistan and the US on the expectation that the US is going to turn anti-Pakistan or Pakistan in Islamic enthusiasm would move away from the US.