Close calls for al-Qaida’s No. 2

The fugitive Egyptian doctor may also have narrowly survived a bombing by Pakistani military planes in 2004. And a well-publicized US missile strike aimed at him in 2006 failed because he did not turn up at the attack site,they said.

Targeting al-Zawahiri – along with bin Laden – is a main goal of US counterterror efforts,focused on a man who has retained control of al-Qaida’s operations and strategic planning even as he has led an underground existence in Pakistan’s rugged tribal border zone.

“Finding senior al-Qaida terrorists _ at a time when we’re pursuing the most aggressive counterterrorism operations in our history _ is of course a top priority for the CIA,” said agency spokesman George Little.

But unlike bin Laden,a cipher since the September 11 attacks who has surfaced only in occasional taped statements,al-Zawahiri has kept a higher public profile,taking risks that expose him more.

He is known to travel cautiously and regularly issues audio and video harangues that are scrutinized closely for clues,said the current and former officials,who insisted on anonymity to discuss the classified hunt for the al-Qaida leader.

The CIA’s pursuit of al-Zawahiri climaxed last December in the suicide bombing that left seven agency employees dead at the agency’s eastern Afghanistan base in Khost,one of the worst US intelligence debacles in recent decades.

The bomber turned out to be an al-Qaida double agent who had lulled US intelligence into believing he could bring them closer to al-Zawahiri. Part of the terrorist’s bait was his claim that al-Zawahiri suffered from diabetes _ a revelation about his health,if true.

A blunt internal inquiry raked the CIA last month for failing to properly vet the double agent in the months before the bombing and suggested its preoccupation with al-Zawahiri may have led to lapses in judgment. One person familiar with the inquiry said the agency’s intent on getting to al-Zawahiri was a “significant driver” behind the mistakes,a conclusion even CIA director Leon Panetta acknowledged.

“That’s what this mission was all about,” Panetta said. “It was the opportunity that we all thought we had to be able to go after No 2.” He added that “in some ways maybe the mission itself clouded some of the judgments that were made here.”

Al-Zawahiri has presented a more opportunistic target than bin Laden both because of his visibility and also because of the CIA’s ability to develop better intelligence about his movements.

“We felt like we did at times come very close to getting him,” said a former senior U.S. official familiar with the targeting efforts. “We had more of it (intelligence) and we had better confidence in it.”

Former intelligence officials say both bin Laden and al-Zawahiri take elaborate precautions,keeping their distance from each other to ensure that al-Qaida’s top leadership would not be eliminated in a single strike.

Bin Laden,53,is believed to be hiding near the border between Pakistan’s lawless tribal regions and Afghanistan. Al-Zawahri,59,appears to have spent time in Pakistan’s northwest tribal region of Bajaur,populated by large numbers of Wahabi Islam followers.

Both men are believed wary of using cell or satellite phones. But al-Zawahiri has tried at times to make contact with family members in Egypt,former intelligence officials say. More importantly,he has remained in the public eye with numerous messages.

According to the private SITE Intelligence Group,bin Laden has made 23 audio and one video tape since 2006.

Al-Zawahiri has outpaced his superior,making 37 audio and 22 video recordings in the same period. In al-Zawahiri’s latest audio recording,issued Nov. 4,he warned the US that “we will fight you until the last hour.”

Each time al-Zawahiri speaks,he increases the chances the US could zero in on him. The CIA scours his recordings for clues,the former officials said,sifting for signs that might indicate how long it takes al-Zawahiri to receive information about current events he cites.

But despite the risks he takes,al-Zawahiri has always been able to keep several steps ahead of his pursuers.

The CIA had its first chance on Feb. 28,2003. Former intelligence officials say al-Zawahiri met that day in a car with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed,the self-professed mastermind of 9/11 attacks,in Peshawar. Al-Zawahiri,a former official said,was on his way to the remote northern tribal region.

The former officials say the CIA was pursuing Mohammed at the time,but did not have a fix on him until an informant sent a text message to a CIA handler the next day that he was in Rawalpindi,about 110 miles to the east. Pakistan’s spy service,which was working with the CIA,moved in and captured Mohammed.

By then,al-Zawahiri was gone.

Mohammed was flown to a CIA black site in Poland and interrogated using harsh methods,including waterboarding,which simulates drowning. Mohammed admitted he had met with al-Zawahiri but would not disclose the details,a former CIA officer said.

The next chance to target al-Zawahiri came in mid-March 2004,former officials said. A detainee in US custody passed along information about a possible al-Qaida hideout in the mountainous northwest Pakistani region of South Waziristan,where government troops,helicopters and planes were mounting a military offensive against militants.

The CIA passed the intelligence to the Pakistan military,which bombed the village of Azam Warzak near the Afghan border. The former US officials said they later received reports that al-Zawahiri was at the scene during the bombing and suffered minor injuries.

Taliban operatives and Pakistani civilians told AP recently that al-Zawahiri was injured in the attack. The al-Qaida leader then spent three days in the town of Mir Ali in north Waziristan before heading north to Bajaur,said the militants and locals,all whoinsisted on anonymity for safety reasons.

One key to locating al-Qaida’s upper echelon,former US officials said,is cracking the crude but effective communications network linking the fugitive terrorists. The system uses a chain of human couriers ensuring no one messenger interacts with either bin Laden or al-Zawahiri.

A Taliban operative who filmed one of al-Zawahiri’s messages told AP that both bin Laden and al-Zawahiri rely heavily on Arabs instead of locals for security. The operative insisted on anonymity for safety reasons. His role inside al-Qaida was confirmed by Afghan officials.