LANKA’S WAR ON MANY FRONTS

This is undoubtedly a defining moment in the history of Sri Lanka’s bitter ethnic conflict that has consumed thousands of people. For the Lankan government,the current military campaign and its success have given a rare hope of routing a repressive and brutal LTTE. But the victory on the battlefield has been accompanied by an iron-fist policy that has forced an eerie silence over the island nation. It is not just that there are no questions about the legitimacy of the military campaign—the government does not tolerate any criticism on the conduct of the war too. This is a war without witnesses. The government has enveloped the entire north by a strict security ring. Apart from the Red Cross,the battlefield is out of bounds to everyone,including the United Nations. In fact,around two lakh people from the north have been put in highly fortified camps which the government calls “welfare centres”.

According to Information and Media minister Anura Priyadharshana,there are 1,90,000 people in 15 such welfare centres set up at Vavuniya and Wengalawadikulam. The minister says there are 15,000 civilians trapped in the five-sq-km stretch of the coastline while UN estimates put it at 50,000. The government claims to have killed 20,000 LTTE cadres during this military campaign and does not give any specific civilian casualties,saying there is no way to distinguish LTTE cadres from civilians because the Tigers have asked their men to shed the uniform. The army puts its death toll at 4,200. A UN document circulated in Colombo’s diplomatic circles,however,reveals that 6,500 civilians have perished in the war already. The Tamil National Alliance—a conglomerate of Tamil parties who are deemed to be pro-LTTE—has put the number of civilians killed in last three months of the military campaign at 7,000.

But nobody knows the true extent of the tragedy. There are no independent statistics and no way to distinguish between speculation and truth. Other than guided tours by the military,journalists do not have independent access to camps for the internally displaced people or the battlefront. The control over information is absolute. In fact,the government has set up a Media Centre for National Security which oversees the government’s propaganda campaign and there is hardly anything other than their handouts even in Sri Lankan newspapers and broadcast media. The reason is clear as well. On January 8,Lasantha Wickramathunga,editor of the weekly Sunday Leader,was killed. Later,Vidhyadharan,editor of the Tamil newspaper Sudan Oli,was abducted by government agents. The government,however,later admitted that they had picked him up and accused him of being a terrorist. He was released after two months of captivity on a court order. Several top Lankan journalists have left the country because of the threats to their lives. Even newspaper editors who support the war admit that they have asked their reporters to be extremely careful in both their reportage and their conduct with officials. “This is the biggest story in the country and we don’t have access to it,” says Frederica Jansz,editor of Sunday Leader. “The government wants only sunshine stories. We have no options so we don’t cover the war at all.” The foreign media too has no independent access.

The rout of the LTTE,however,has come as a relief too. Considered the most lethal terror organisation in the world,the Tamil Tigers have been notorious for their disregard for civilian lives. The group invented the suicide belt and in the past 25 years attacked and killed almost everyone who disagreed with them. The Tigers dominated Tamil politics in the country for decades and that gave rise to a fascist cult that revolved around the whims and fancies of the LTTE’s elusive chief,Prabhakaran. In the process of achieving the sole representative character of Tamil aspirations,the LTTE silenced even the best of Tamil brains like Neelan Thiruchelvam and Kethesh Loganathan and decimated every voice of Tamil opposition. There have been scores of people who disagreed with the Tigers in the manner in which the ethnic conflict should be resolved and they paid with their lives and subsequently were dubbed as traitors—one of the most painful labels for members of a community who are engaged in a struggle for political rights. Then the way the Tigers forcibly evicted a hundred thousand Tamil-speaking Muslims from the north,giving them a 24-hour deadline in 1990,too,exhibited their fascist ways.

The entire country is pockmarked by tragic memories of carnages committed by the LTTE. Over the years,the Tigers had established themselves as a strong conventional army that had taken over the northern and the eastern provinces of the country. The 2002 ceasefire brokered by Norway had helped the Tigers consolidate their position and provided them a golden opportunity at the negotiation table. The over-confidence of Prabhakaran and his intransigence finally led to this current military standoff that began in August 2006.

Now as the LTTE has been defeated as a conventional force,its exit from the centrestage of Tamil politics here has given rise to hopes for a major shift in both Tamil as well as the larger political discourse of the country. For decades,successive Sri Lankan governments have tried to fight or negotiate—or both—with the Tigers and this new situation has provided a real opportunity for a peace process.

But the emerging political climate does not show any such reconciliatory moves from Colombo towards the Tamil minority. There is a serious possibility that the war may well become an end in itself,leaving the wounds to fester.

In the political discourse,the defeat of the LTTE is fast becoming the victory against the Tamil minority. And there are serious dangers that this new victory culture fed on an overwhelming popular support for the war may finally turn the Rajapaksa government into an authoritative and intolerant regime. Though the official rhetoric has been carefully centered around the war against terrorism,in Colombo’s power corridors,Buddhist Sinhalese nationalism has already started dictating the discourse.

“This government is inherently a Buddhist Sinhalese supremacist. It has no intention of finding a political solution to the ethnic problem,” erstwhile foreign minister in Rajapaksa government,Mangala Samaraweera,told The Sunday Express. “We have certainly done well against the LTTE in the jungles of Vanni. But despite military successes,we have never won a war—the problem remains as it was.”

Former army commanders,who insist that the government must not allow the military success to become the end in itself,feel the same. “We will never be able to wipe out the LTTE completely. They have been defeated in a conventional war. But remember they are primarily a terrorist organisation. They will come back,regroup and commit terrorist acts in our cities,” Gen Hamilton Wanasinghe says. “The success of our military operations must be immediately followed by a political solution.”

Why is there so much distrust that the endgame with the LTTE will never lead to a political negotiation?

The manner in which the ruling Rajapaksa government has been using the popularity of war for an absolute and authoritative control over the lives of people,the curbs on media and disregard for the democratic institutions are the major reasons for this suspicion. “In his journey to bringing Prabhakaran down,President Rajapaksa is becoming a dictator,” says Samaraweeara. “Everyone lives in fear. The government has decimated the Opposition through threats or favours.”

It is a fact that President Rajapaksa came to power primarily on a platform of Buddhist Sinhalese nationalism. Political observers in Colombo say that he promised the voters that he will “bring honourable peace for the majority (Sinhalese) and not the peace that was imposed first by India and then by Norway”.

The powers of the president are unbridled. He is directly elected by the people and is not answerable to parliament. Besides,he is almost unimpeachable. Rajapaksa belongs to the Sri Lankan Freedom Party,which he has taken complete control of,sidelining Chandrika Kumaratunga. Although he came to power through an alliance—the United Peoples Freedom Alliance (UPFA)—his alliance partners JVP and the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress later left him. With the help of his brothers—two are important ministers while the third,Basil Rajapaksa,an MP and a senior adviser to the President,is seen as the main political brain behind the government—Rajapaksa managed to break every opposition party,except the Tamil National Alliance. Though defections are constitutionally illegal,that did stop the government from assimilating major chunks of every party.

The Tamil National Alliance has been gripped by fear after its three MPs were assassinated—two among them in high security zones. The government is also accused of disregarding the Supreme Court directive on setting up the constitutional council,which would have put a check on the authority of the president. The constitutional council would have then appointed pivotal commissions like Judicial Commission,Public Service Commission,Human Rights Commission and Commission to Prevent Corruption,etc. The Rajapaksa Government has also put on hold the all-important 13th Amendment to the Constitution,which pertains to devolution of powers to the provincial councils.

“We don’t have an election commission. Our Election Commissioner has passed his retirement age. This is the story of every government body,” Samaraweera said. “People are sacked and appointed for their loyality to the government.” He said that India should be very careful. “They nurtured the LTTE and it stung them and killed Rajiv Gandhi. Now they are nurturing a dictator,” he said.

LTTE’s debacle

The defeat of the LTTE is seen as a product of a series of miscalculations by the terror group which once controlled the entire provinces of the north and the east. Experts believe that Prabhakaran had become supremely confident of himself,arrogant and extremely distrustful even within the LTTE. He sacrificed his key people to his suspicions. The defection of Col Karuna,Prabhakaran’s deputy and the commander of the eastern province,was pivotal. He defected along with his six thousand men,substantially weakening the LTTE’s control in the east.

The other strategic mistake,experts say,was the call for a complete boycott during the last elections,which helped Rajapaksa,who defeated UNP’s peacenik candidate Ranil Wickramasinghe. The questionable treatment of people in LTTE-controlled territory,too,is being put as a reason for the rout of the organisation. There is,however,another important reason. The unsuccessful assassination attempts made by the LTTE on army commander Gen Sarath Fonseka and Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa made the animosity personal and turned the war against the Tigers into a bitter war of revenge as well.

Then the Rajapaksa government had made a resolve to “fight till end’’ and made full preparations for a military victory. Unlike previous governments who would come under international pressure and abandon military campaign against Tigers,this government did not listen to anyone. As the Sri Lankan army advances slowly to recapture the last 5 sq km of the coastline where the Tiger leadership is holed up along with 50,000 civilians,the future of this ethnic conflict is uncertain. Like the Tamil devotee in the Kathirsean temple,the people here can do nothing but pray for this tragedy to end.