The Punjab Assembly legislation terminating all previous agreements and accords on river waters is a shocking and probably unprecedented development. The noise generated by it will surely reverberate in the media and in the political arena in the coming days and weeks. Before considering the implications of this development, let us take a brief look at the historical background. In the 1950s, while negotiations with Pakistan were still going on over the sharing of the Indus system, planning began towards the full utilisation of the eastern rivers Ravi, Beas and Sutlej. Through certain links the waters of all three rivers were sought to be pooled together over a period of time. In 1953, the Central Water and Power Commission prepared a preliminary report for a project that eventually became the Rajasthan Canal Project. In 1955 the Union Minister of Works and Power helped in securing an agreement on the allocations to Jammu and Kashmir (0.65 million acre feet or MAF), Pepsu (1.30 MAF), Punjab (5.90 MAF) and Rajasthan (8.0 MAF) of the surplus waters (after excluding the pre-Partition use of 3.13 MAF) of Ravi and Beas, then estimated as 15.85 MAF. The share of Punjab (7.2 MAF with Pepsu merged) had to be divided between Punjab and Haryana after the reorganisation of States. This ran into difficulty, but in 1976, the Government of India settled the dispute by a Notification under Section 78 of the Punjab Reorganisation Act 1966, allocating 3.5 MAF to each State, with the remaining 0.2 MAF going to Delhi. In order to help Haryana to make full use of its allocation, the construction of the Sutlej-Yamuna Link Canal was proposed. Punjab was not happy with the decision and filed a suit in the Supreme Court, and Haryana too filed a suit to compel Punjab to implement the decision. In 1981, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi brought about an agreement among the Chief Ministers of Punjab, Haryana and Rajasthan. Under that Agreement the allocations to Punjab and Haryana were 4.22 MAF and 3.5 MAF respectively (out of a total availability which had been revised from 15.85 to 17.17 MAF). Punjab and Haryana withdrew their petitions from the Supreme Court. However, the dispute continued and figured in the discussions between Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Sant Longowal. The Accord between them of 24 July 1985 includes a paragraph regarding the sharing of Ravi-Beas Waters, and it was in pursuance of that Accord that The Eradi Tribunal was set up. The Tribunal gave its award in 1987 allocating 5.00 MAF to Punjab and 3.83 MAF to Haryana, thus increasing the shares of both states. It was able to do this by taking into account some additional availability of waters “below the rim stations”. At that time, it was found politically difficult to gazette the Award because it was unacceptable to Punjab. A reference back to the Tribunal was made as provided for under the Inter-State Water Disputes Act 1956, and the outcome in the form of a clarificatory or supplementary report is still awaited. Moreover, Punjab has all along been stoutly opposed to the construction of the SYL Canal which was meant to enable Haryana to use its share of the waters, and it still remains incomplete. Haryana has been going to court over this, and the Supreme Court has been asking the Central Government to ensure the expeditious completion of the SYL Canal. It is against that background that we have to view the latest developments. Leaving aside the other aspects of the matter, the first question is whether an agreement to which there are two or more parties can be repudiated unilaterally by one party. Reference has been made to the sovereign rights of states, but do those rights extend to the repudiation of covenants entered into with other equally sovereign states? The legality of this would have been questionable even if fully independent sovereign states were involved; it seems even more doubtful in relation to states within a federal or quasi-federal structure. Such action seems to strike at the heart of federalism. Secondly, the Central Government has been deeply involved in these matters at every stage, and cannot now keep silent when all those agreements are sought to be annulled by the Punjab Government. Thirdly, both Punjab and Haryana have presented their cases to the Tribunal, and it has even given its Award, though that Award has not yet been notified; it seems wholly improper to change at this stage the entire history that has been presented to the Tribunal. Fourthly, the construction of the SYL Canal was an element in the 1976 and 1981 Agreements as also in the 1985 Accord. By terminating all those agreements and accords, the very basis of the SYL Canal, and therefore of the directions of the Supreme Court to the Central Government on the construction of the Canal, has been sought to be destroyed. Indeed, that is the objective of this action. The Chief Minister of Punjab, answering a question on TV, said that this action was intended to strengthen the legal case of the state! That is an extraordinary argument. The Rajasthan and Haryana Governments will now doubtless seek the intervention of the Supreme Court. The Central Government will also have to play its role, both under the ISWD Act and under the Constitution. Thus the recent developments in Punjab have serious implications of diverse kinds. Punjab may have a strong sense of grievance over the sharing of river waters. So has Haryana over the non-completion of the SYL canal. If Punjab asserts its claims to the totality of the Ravi-Beas waters, the large allocation of 8.0 MAF to Rajasthan is at risk, as is the small allocation of 0.2 MAF to Delhi. These are matters to be resolved by agreement, conciliation, mediation or adjudication and not by unilateral action. We shall doubtless be told that there were strong political compulsions behind the Punjab action, but can we accept the position that those compulsions justify actions that are unlawful, or contrary to the spirit of federalism or in defiance of the Supreme Court? So far, we have proceeded on the basis of claims made by the states. Punjab’s grievance arises from its conviction that it needs more water, but does it? Already irrigation in Punjab has over the years resulted in a significant incidence of water-logging and salinity. Should they ask for more water or learn to manage water better? One is not necessarily suggesting, as some have done, that Punjab should shift from wheat and rice to other crops. Such decisions are influenced by a number of economic factors. One can, however, suggest that they should try and grow whatever they want to grow with less water and get the maximum productivity per unit of water. That applies to Haryana too, and to Rajasthan as well: economic development in arid zones and desert areas should surely take forms that are not water-intensive. With proper water management all round, the dispute may disappear or become more manageable. In the case of the Cauvery dispute, a non-official initiative led by the Madras Institute of Development Studies has managed to bring a number of farmers from the contending states together, promote better mutual understanding, and build friendly, constructive and harmonious relations at that level. This may not immediately provide an answer to the dispute, but it will certainly facilitate that process. Perhaps there is little scope for such an initiative in the Punjab-Haryana case, but should not a group of eminent people respected in both states at least make an attempt? The author is former Secretary, Water Resources, and a leading expert on water resources issues
