Question time, USA

This includes a conscious inclination to stabilise countries of the region and settle disputes between them within the framework of America’s own national security policies. The second aspect of US policy orientations is the anxiety to control the nuclear weapons environment in South Asia.

A third factor is its desire to structure political and economic linkages within the countries of the region to ensure USA’s long-term control over its energy and natural resources.

There is a fourth element, too, which is the evolving transformation of the geo-strategic architecture of security arrangements.

Till the regime change in Baghdad, Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan were the four pillars of the security edifice conceived by the US, constituting a quadrilateral within which security of the countries of West Asia and the Gulf under US guidance was ensured, along with the containment of nations like Syria and Iraq, which the US considers detrimental to its interests.

Now with Iraq and Afghanistan effectively under US influence and with the major Central Asian countries like Kazakistan and Uzbekistan participants in NATO’s ‘‘partnership for peace arrangements’’, the US has strengthened its influence as well as expanded its security umbrella in a large swathe of the world, stretching from Egypt and Turkey in the north to the Philippines in the Southeast.

Although there are undercurrents of apprehension about this among the countries in the region, the general attitude is one of reconciling themselves to Pax Americana. Russia and China, despite reservations, have had to adjust to this reality because of various compulsions.

India’s predicament is similar. Although the Indian public is quite articulate about its critical evaluation of the US, the government is drawing some satisfaction from the fact that Washington appears to consider India as an important factor in its foreign and security policy planning.

India has, in fact been described as a significant strategic partner ‘‘by name’’ in the National Security Paper put out by the White House in September 2002.

Mishra’s discussions in Washington and Armitage’s visit to India took place in the wake of many important developments having taken place in the region. Our Foreign Office has indicated that New Delhi’s discussions with US officials were not limited to Indo-Pakistan relations but covered a wide range of subjects.

President Bush meeting Mishra through the usual drill of a non-formal call indicates that, in Washington too, the exchanges went beyond Indo-Pakistan bilateral issues. Even if allowance was to be made for the confidentialities involved, some questions need to be answered if the Indian public is to support closer Indo-US ties.

For instance, what role does the US envisage for a country like India in the economic revival of Iraq? Keeping in mind the role the Indian government played in Afghanistan after the removal of the Taliban, the US should give some clear indications about India’s role in Iraq since it would impact its foreign policy.

What is America’s assessment about prospects in Afghanistan? Nearly 18 months have lapsed since the Taliban regime was removed but Afghanistan remains subject to civil strife as the Karzai government flounders.

Also, given the recent policy pronouncements by the US with reference to Syria, Iran and Palestine, India is curious about how the US plams to deal with these countries. Interventionist US assertiveness will create incipient tensions in Indo-US relations.

Then there are the other big questions: With the US troops and bases likely to move out of Saudi Arabia, is the US military presence headed for Bahrain, Qatar, Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan? How is the US going to handle differences of opinion which have emerged during the Iraq campaign between the US and France and Germany? What kind of a political and security role does the US envisage for the UN? These issues must certainly have been touched upon in the extensive discussions that Mishra and Armitage have had. One has a fair idea about India’s view on them, but the NDA government has not given us an inkling of how they were tackled. Some transparency is advisable in such matters.

As far as Indo-Pakistan ties go, Armitage was formally correct. But one has to read between the lines. On May 8 in Islamabad he said that infiltration and terrorist violence from Pakistan has come down, although the reality does not entirely confirm this assessment. In April, Armitage—in a speech at the National Defence University, Washington—had only one reference to Indo-Pakistan relations: He said that in America’s assessment, South Asia is the most dangerous region.

Given this, what is the US government’s assessment about the internal situation in Pakistan? How serious is Pakistan about resuming a purposeful dialogue with India? Going by the assessment that South Asia is the most dangerous place, what would USA’s policies be in dealing with the nuclear weaponisation of Pakistan and India? Will it be pre-emptive or will it be aimed at stabilising the existing security environment? These questions are pertinent because the Iraq war unequivocally underlined USA’s will to take any action required to safeguard its national interests unilaterally. The implications of such action create new security concerns for nations like India, which need to be addressed. America’s policies have the additional impetus towards supremacy. The very process of globalisation is becoming an instrumentality of US foreign and security policies.

Therefore, while a fruitful relationship with US is important for India, it will only be possible if there are clear answers to the questions raised.