RAW incompetence

The country was shocked to learn in May that the joint secretary in the Research & Analysis Wing (RAW), Rabinder Singh, had managed to quietly flee the country despite being under official surveillance for passing on sensitive information to the CIA. But what is more shocking, perhaps, is that despite the serious implications of Rabinder Singh’s disappearance, there appears no discernible movement on the part of the government to trace him, declare him a proclaimed offender and bring him to justice or, at the very least, assess the damage the man has done to the country’s interests and that of the organisation he was supposedly working for. It appears that the authorities are more keen on a damage control exercise than in setting their intelligence operations in order. RAW’s quiescence indicates its own fear of exposure.

Nobody disputes the fact that intelligence agencies have necessarily to operate in the world of shadows, but when its incompetence becomes public knowledge — as in its ham-handed handling of the Kargil intrusions in the summer of 1999, or in the disappearance of one of its key operatives five years later — trotting out the old line about national security interests in order to justify its opaqueness just does not wash. The US Senate Intelligence Committee thought nothing of publicly putting the CIA through the wringer for its shoddy handling of intelligence on the 9/11 attacks. Why then should the Indian government be pussyfooting its way through this mess?

The investigations of The Sunday Express have highlighted another dimension of the Rabinder Singh story. The fact that the man could have acquired or controlled no less than 15 properties over some 27 years in Delhi, UP and Punjab, should surely have rung an alarm bell somewhere in New Delhi’s vast power apparatus? The fact that these properties continue to remain in his name; that there has been no attempt to impound them and turn the heat on their owner, where ever he may be, indicates a disturbing apathy on the part of the administration even by its own standards. In the early 1980s, the spy ring, comprising the Larkins brothers and two others, was busted precisely through effective counter-intelligence and quick response. The moment it was learnt that K.H. Larkins was planning to emigrate to Australia, the authorities moved in. Today, over six months after Rabinder Singh’s exit, the issue remains in limbo. The signals are clear, both intelligence and counter-intelligence in India demand comprehensive reform in terms of personnel and their handling and in terms of restructuring of operations. Perhaps a tautology best sums that up: better intelligence demands better intelligence.