Relations after Raphel

Poor Raphel. The same ministry who she accuses of launching a “conspiracy” to oust her in tandem with her own State department pals, is only slightly bemused at her expression of sound and fury. Nobody’s articulating the obvious, but Raphel’s out, Inderfurth’s in. To vent spleen the morning after the long night afore seems a trifle over the top. Raphel could ask herself why as an ardent member of the FOB (Friend of Bill) club, she wasn’t asked to stay on as the South Asia point person in Clinton’s second term.

Still, to put the record straight: Raphel did enough damage to the bilateral relationship in 1993 by questioning the accession of Kashmir to the Indian union. Even if she’s right about the fact that it is the position Washington has held for the last 50 years, her undiplomatically put message set the tone for confrontation between New Delhi and Washington.

It didn’t help too when, for the best part of 1996, the two countries were on collision course over signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Public support for India to, indeed, block the treaty–not merely not sign–in no small part stemmed from the realisation that Washington has, since 1947, never been reconciled to the wholeness of the Indian nation-state. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union just years before, it was felt that Washington’s unseemly interest in Kashmir was not mere coincidence. Small wonder that all attempts at dialogue between the two governments in these years never got off the ground.

That jinx was broken last month when Minister of State for External Affairs Saleem Shervani led a team to the US to help bring back the dialogue on track. In Washington, he met a number of Congressmen and businessmen, and the resounding message he is believed to have come away with is that the US, especially in India’s 50th year of Independence, wants to continue with establishing a dynamic relationship. Foreign secretary-designate (now Foreign Secretary) K. Raghunath also met a large part of the State Department’s creamy layer, including Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott (Albright was out of town), and Undersecretary for Political Affairs Thomas Pickering.

It speaks volumes of the bilateral relationship that was before, that this long overdue visit to Washington is now being spoken of as one that successfully cleared the air. Both sides now agree that they have a much more “realistic” appreciation of the other’s foreign policy objectives and concerns. The newly restarted Indo-Pakistani dialogue was widely welcome, the Americans said, and the fact that the economic reform in India was staying its course. The officials, reiterated their regrets over the Prithvi missile “leak” in the American press. The Indians brought up their concerns over the widening of technology transfer controls, for example on Bharat Electronics Ltd. India reiterated that it could not sign the CTBT because it was discriminatory.

So even as both countries now continue to do commercial business, it seems fairly clear that the real differences will continue on the nuclear-strategic front. By all accounts, Washington seems to be pushing for the revival of a strategic dialogue with India–that ended so abysmally with the exposure of the so-called “secret” talks in London in the summer of 1994. Some reports say it is even willing to strike a “deal” with New Delhi if it agrees to relinquish its nuclear option. Meaning, Washington would be amenable to turning a blind eye to Delhi’s existing nuclear stockpile as long as India agrees not to conduct any nuclear explosions. Baits on offer are supposed to include, help on civilian nuclear power generation, dropping controls on technology transfer, and wonder of wonders, support for India on a permanent Security Council seat.

Some of those thoughts were articulated at a seminar in early May organised by Francine Frankel, a US strategic affairs specialist, in Pennsylvania. US officials present at the seminar unusually spoke in concrete terms of Washington amending its own nuclear legislation if India agreed to “formalise its nuclear restraint.” That tantalising “offer” has, meanwhile, been left vague enough not to have been pursued at any official level.

US officials also say that as such a “strategic understanding” between India and the US grows, Washington might also reduce pressure on New Delhi to sign the CTBT. But the officials are not willing to countenance India’s membership of the CTBT on its own terms. What if, for example, India conducted a series of nuclear tests and then signed the CTBT? The officials felt that New Delhi may as well not bother.

Indian officials say they are not averse to “dialogue” on any subject, including nuclear and strategic issues. But if Washington wants to simultaneously wield the carrot and the stick, India might have no option but to resist : for even as US State department officials makes offers on strategic talks, its Commerce department widens the list of export controls applicable on Indian research facilities.

Ironically, within days of Raghunath and his team returning from Washington, export controls were also slapped on the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC), the Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research and Indian Rare Earth Limited. The US reasoning behind the extension of these controls is that the Indian organisations are using them for producing dual-use items. The Indian reaction is one of quiet anger. Atomic energy commission sources admit to “delays and cost overruns” as a result, but reiterate that India will be able to overcome these hurdles.

On Kashmir, the sources say, if and when Albright makes a visit to India, she may not be as acquiescent as Derek Fatchett (British minister for Commonwealth affairs) on agreeing with New Delhi’s perceptions of the Valley. They point out that Albright is the daughter of Joseph Korbel, a former Czech diplomat who was a member of the 1948 UN commission on India and Pakistan set up by the Security Council. (Even though Korbel was nominated by India, his subsequent book Danger in Kashmir is not very complimentary about this country’s moves and motivations in Kashmir.) Under the circumstances, a stalemate on the nuclear question seems inevitable in the near future. Indian public opinion will not countenance any government relinquishing its nuclear option, even if holding on to it for 23 long years only increases its costs internationally. Indeed, there seems to be widespread support for India conducting a series of nuclear tests–when the US government imposes sanctions in accordance with domestic law and blocks multilateral funding, the feeling goes here, it will be interesting to see which countries toe Washington’s line.

Interestingly, US businessmen, taking a leaf from their experience in China, say they intend to continue to do business in India even if Washington applies sanctions. P. Chidambaram and I.K. Gujral could well do with some hard thinking on linkages between an open economy and nuclear independence.