Restoring Balance

The 1974 nuclear test and its aftermath are now history. While in 1961, the US Secretary of State Dean Rusk recommended, unsuccessfully, helping India to become a nuclear weapon state ahead of China in 1970s, the US attitude towards India in the aftermath of the Henry Kissinger visit to Beijing was hostile, especially after the Pokhran test.

During his visit to Beijing in November 1974, Dr Kissinger even discussed jokingly with Deng Xiao Peng arming Pakistan with nuclear weapons to check Indian hegemonism. It was therefore no surprise that the Chinese concluded an agreement with Bhutto in June, 1976, to proliferate to Pakistan.

Bush realised that a nuclear China, on the way tobecoming the second largest market, upset the balance of power in Asia unless the Indian nuclear weapon capability was legitimised. He also realized that India, with a billion people, growing at 8 per cent, would make enormous demands on world oil and gas and exacerbate the problem of emission of green house gases At that stage, China had not joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Against this background the US passed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 and warned Pakistan against nuclear proliferation with the clandestine acquisition of equipment from Europe for Plutonium separation. In April 1979, President Jimmy Carter imposed sanctions on Pakistan for its persisting with proliferation.

However, by 1982, the US agreed to turn a blind eye on Pakistan-China proliferation as a quid pro quo for Pakistani help to provide infrastructural support for Afghan Mujahideen campaign against the Soviet forces. Pakistan acquired nuclear weapons in 1987 with active Chinese support and the US looking away.

Faced with a Pakistani bomb produced with Chinese proliferation help and US looking away, Rajiv Gandhi decided to assemble the nuclear weapon in 1989. In the early 90’s, the US applied a lot of pressure on India to cap, halt and eliminate Indian nuclear weapon production even as it continued to turn a blind eye on China-Pakistan proliferation not only in respect of nuclear weapons but also in missiles. The recent disclosures of former Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers reveal that CIA was having close contacts with Dr A.Q. Khan.

There are valid reasons to believe the US also turned a blind eye to Pakistani proliferation to Iran and North Korea at that stage. Though China joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1992, it continued its proliferation to Pakistan. The US brought out into the open the supply of 5000 ring magnets by China to Pakistan but chose to accept the Chinese explanation of its being a deal without central government approval.

The US also shielded Chinese supply of missiles to Pakistan till just a few months before President Clinton demitted office. When India carried out its nuclear tests in 1998, President Bill Clinton joined China in condemning the Indian nuclear tests but also talked of China’s legitimate interests in South Asia.

China’s hostility towards India was exhibited not only through its nuclear and missile proliferation to Pakistan, but in the stand it took against India on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and in the formulation of the Security Council Resolution in the wake of Indian nuclear tests. The arch proliferator, China is now talking of India’s exceptionalisation from the NPT should be within its framework.

Ever since US made up with China in 1971, the US had been applying pressure on India to cap, halt and roll back Indian nuclear capability. This policy was consistently pursued from 1967, when US would not extend a nuclear security guarantee to India till the Bush administration took office in 2001.

The Deal Stage1 Agreement on Principles, July 18, 2005 • The US recognised India’s possession of nuclear weapons and offered full civilian nuclear energy cooperation. • India promised to separate its civilian and military nuclear programmes and place the former under safeguards. Stage2 Agreements on Separation and Safeguards, March 2, 2006. • India agrees to put 14 out of its 22 power reactors on the civilian list in a phased manner between 2006-14. • The remaining eight reactors will produce enough plutonium for India’s nuclear arsenal in the coming decades. • India will be the sole judge of which future reactors would go under safeguards. n India’s Fast Breeder Test Reactor and Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor would be out of the civilian list. • India would decide whether and which of its future commercial breeders would be placed under safeguards. n India would place the reactors on the civilian list under permanent safeguards. • In return the US will offer both national international guarantees on assured supply of fuel to the reactors placed under permanent safeguards. • India reserves the right to build future military nuclear reactors. • Enriched Uranium supplies to Tarapur would start flowing the moment the US Congress approves changes in non-proliferation law and the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group changes its guidelines on nuclear cooperation. Stage3 Next Steps • Bush Administration to introduce draft legislation before the US Congress. • Both the Senate and House will debate the Indo-US nuclear pact before approving or rejecting the legislation. • The US would also approach the NSG to modify rules on nuclear cooperation. The NSG guidelines are not a treaty and can be changed with majority support among the 45 nations. • New Delhi will talk to the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna about drafting India-specific safeguards arrangements that will be different from those that apply to either nuclear weapon states or non-nuclear weapon states. • India will also initiate discussions with the IAEA on an additional protocol for safeguards on the civilian reactors. • The US will set up a consortium of major powers who supply nuclear fuel. India would negotiate with this consortium, including US, Russia, France, and Britain, on fuel supply guarantees. • India would also negotiate a trilateral agreement with the US and IAEA on security of fuel supply. • Once the US Congress and the NSG approve cooperation with India, New Delhi would sign formal cooperation agreements with the US, France, Russia and whoever else is willing to enter atomic cooperation with India. For the nuclear non-proliferation ayatollahs in the US, proliferation by China to Pakistan was acceptable but not legitimate acquisition of nuclear weapons by India. It is to the credit of President George W Bush that he realised that a nuclear China, also the third largest market, on the way to becoming the second, upset the balance of power in Asia unless the Indian nuclear weapon capability was recognised and legitimised.

Secondly, he realized that India, with a billion people, growing at 8 per cent, would make enormous demands on world oil and gas and exacerbate the problem of emission of green house gases.

Therefore, in the interest of global environment, lessening of pressure of demand on oil and, at the same time, ensuring the fast economic growth of India, necessary as the engine of growth in the industrialised world, India should be exceptionalised from the Non-Proliferation Treaty to enable it to have access to civil nuclear energy. In terms of norms of Non-proliferation Treaty India’s acquisition of weapon was more indigenous than that of China and its proliferation record spotless compared to China’s.

Unless there is an understanding of the radical change in US policy towards nuclear India under George Bush, there is bound to be misunderstanding about what the new US strategy towards India is. There can be no doubt that the new policy is intended to further US national interests. Even so, it happens to be more friendly to a nuclear India than that of any other President since John F Kennedy.

Secondly, it has a strong component of collective energy security for the world. Since both these are new concepts both for traditional US thinking (including those of the ayatollahs) and the Indian thinking conditioned by six decades of Cold War, there are problems of adjustment to Bush’s views. People also find it difficult to reconcile to the reality that a President whose views may be unacceptable in some respects may come out with policies in other areas beneficial to the Indians.

Winston Churchill’s reactionary views on India need not detract from his merit as a great war-leader. Roosevelt was a great liberal in many respects but did little by way of extension of civil liberties for the Blacks. Similarly, George Bush should be evaluated in India not by what he did in Iraq but what his policies are doing for India in rectifying the imbalance in this part of the world.

This rectification of imbalance is not unfriendly to China. India did not take a hostile attitude towards China’s rise to power. In a larger sense, such a restoration of balance of power is good for China too and help in its progress towards democracy, which is inevitable.

The author is Chairman, national task force on Global Strategic Developments