
It is almost tragi-comic to watch Shiv Sena imploding. Exactly an year ago, it was threatening to come to power in Maharashtra with its ally,the BJP. The Congress and the Sharad Pawar-centric Nationalist Congress Party came to power almost by fluke. Despite the Maratha strongman’s charisma and Sonia Gandhi’s hurricane campaign, the Congress Front could not secure even a simple majority in the house. The NCP managed to win two more seats than the Congress, thereby pretending a sort of superiority of the Pawar faction, but their combined tally could not go beyond 140 in the house of 288. The Congress Front had managed a lame victory despite a disastrous non-performance. With a little bit of luck, the toss could have been won by the SS-BJP alliance.
Within months cracks appeared in the otherwise impregnable fort of the Shiv Sena. The blame game began. The state BJP leaders whispered loudly that infighting within the Sena was the main reason for the defeat. Then came the salvo from Narayan Rane, before he actually rebelled. He criticised the leadership (read: Uddhav Thackeray) for choosing wrong candidates and alleged that candidatures, like the party posts, were sold to the best “buyers”. The corruption, backstabbing and skullduggery was on such a massive scale, that the Sena candidates were defeated by their own activists. Though Rane had trained his guns on the Family, he had yet not directly named Uddhav. He thought that the Supremo would take notice and bring about discipline and order in the organisation.
Narayan Rane was not just another sainik or a shakhapramukh. He was an original rabblerouser, stormtrooper and streetfighter. He hails from Malwan in the Konkan, the region which had provided elan and militancy to the Sena. He had migrated to Mumbai, from the otherwise backward Sindhudurg district in the Konkan. Rane was not just a follower of the Shiv Sena. Balasaheb Thackeray was his icon. Rane built a fortress around Balasaheb. Indeed, without the protection that Rane and his streetfighters provided to the Sena supremo, it would not have been possible for Balasaheb to function.
The daredevil Rane also was a do-gooder, styling himself as Robinhood. He went out of way to keep activists happy. He rescued them from police custody, he supported their families, he paid lawyers to fight their cases, he also mobilised funds for elections. He did not have the middle class-brahminical finesse of Manohar Joshi. But Joshi did not enjoy the fierce loyalty of followers. He could smoothly manipulate people and the situation. Rane did not have that skill, preferring to gate crash. His stature rose when Balasaheb made him chief minister, forcing Joshi to step down. Even now Rane is grateful to Balasaheb for the honour showered on him. Rane took the chief ministership seriously. He knew that he did not have much time to prove his credentials because the elections were due within an year.
His performance as CM was impressive. The bureaucrats were awed by his decision making ability. The Shivsainiks were happy because an accessible activist had been made CM. The BJP leadership was pleased and the media was not too critical. Rane’s style was rough but result oriented.
It is necessary to understand Rane’s background to comprehend the crisis in the Shiv Sena today. Rane threw a gauntlet which Uddhav has failed to pick up. Uddhav is not a hardcore politician, nor has he risen from the ranks like his cousin Raj. Raj was active for over two decades, organising students, holding rallies, picking up issues and fights, dealing with the media. Uddhav used to keep away from the mayhem and murder. When he entered politics, he tried to give a sober image to the Sena. There was a distinct difference in style. Raj wanted militancy and Uddhav wanted management. Raj preferred confrontation, Uddhav preferred conciliation. Raj wanted to underscore the Marathi cause, Uddhav wanted cosmopolitan Mumbai.
But the most crucial factor was that Uddhav was Balasaheb’s son and Raj was his nephew. Uddhav was staying in Matoshree, Balasaheb’s residence and Raj was not part of that household. Everyone would pay their respects to Matoshree. The mafia style politics practised by the Sena forced the succession of Uddhav to the post of executive president. The decisions-be they about choosing candidates or generating party funds-had to come from Matoshree.
The marginalisation of Raj was thus inevitable. Last year’s election was coordinated by Uddhav, in a sort of management style. Almost all the candidates recommended by Raj were refused tickets. Rane’s recommendations were accepted but with reluctance. The Congress Front looked weak and on the defensive. Most Congressmen, including Sharad Pawar thought that their so called Progressive Democratic Front would be defeated. They began a rearguard action. The early opinion polls gave SS-BJP a slight lead. The only fear in the saffron alliance was that they had lost in the centre and that could have a snowballing effect in the state. But the utter non-performance of the Congress Front and the total disillusionment with the state government were the factors that boosted the otherwise sagging morale of the Shiv Sena and the BJP. It was at this point, the message was circulated that if the alliance secures more seats, Uddhav would become CM. Uddhav formally denied any such plan, but Rane and Raj were convinced that their time was up.
The Shiv Sena campaign was destabilised at that point of time. Results showed that the Sena had defeated itself and the Congress leadership was shocked at its victory. Ambitions rather than aims, power rather than prestige, glamour rather than goals had enveloped the Sena leadership. It is this vanity and philistinism that has finally caught up with the organisation.
In reality, Mumbai had lost its image and Maharashtra had lost its glory. The Congress governments had failed the state, but the Shiv Sena had also not given a new dimension to power. The alliance with militant Hindutva on the one hand and the so called sons of the soil politics on the other had confused the electorate. Balasaheb was getting older and rapidly losing his grip over the organisation. Uddhav had failed to create a new “management” within the Sena. Father and son together had failed in coopting Raj and Rane, or even in pacifying them.
With no ideology or even a programme for the state, the slogans were becoming shrill and the spirit had begun to evaporate. Perhaps Rane had realised that the Sena did not have future, and certainly not under the leadership of Uddhav, who had alienated the young and old activists. Rane’s rebellion has brought the Sena fort under siege. The Sena may or may not survive the Kalyan-Dombivili corporation election scheduled next week. Sena’s real test will be in the Mumbai Corporation election in early 2007. Most likely that election will be its nemesis.


