
An American team is coming to Delhi to give a briefing to the Indian authorities on the Patriot missile system, which is an element in the basic missile defence, as part of a continuing exchange of information in this area. It may be recalled that this is part of the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) agreement between India and US.
There are controversies in India on missile defence and a number of related issues. There are disarmament fundamentalists who object to missile defence on the basis of obsolete Kissingerian arguments that missile defence will unleash an arms race. There are self-reliance fundamentalists who assert that India can develop its own missile defence technology and therefore does not need any US inputs. Thirdly, there are still veteran cold warriors who cannot forget the Enterprise mission of 1971 and continuing US support to Army-led Pakistani regime.
Ironically, this ancient civilisation is the inheritor of wisdom of Bhishma and Chanakya, who millenia before Lord Palmerston articulated his foreign policy framework that there are no permanent friends and permanent enemies but only permanent interests, told us that a King (read State) has no friends or enemies as such but only circumstances make them so. If we act on our own ancient wisdom, in this globalising and post-Cold War world, mindful of our own national interest and security, we should exploit every opportunity to augment them.
I for one, can remember the period when the US was unwilling to give India any combat equipment and even non-combat ones like the first generation C-130, Hercules Transport aircraft because of their fear of offending their Pakistani allies. Now, the American armament companies are competing with each other to sell arms to India and establish even co-production arrangements.
This does not mean the Americans have changed. But the circumstances have changed. Therefore, our assessment need not be on whether Americans will be reliable suppliers but whether the present circumstances will last and what India can do to make them last. Neither the virtues, nor absence of them, of Americans or Indians are relevant to development of stable arms relationship between US and India.
India particularly needs missile defence because we have adopted a ‘‘no-first-use’’ doctrine in respect of nuclear weapons. Therefore, a missile defence for our national decision-making centre and some part of our retaliatory forces would make our ‘‘no-first-use’’ posture more credible. It would enhance the uncertainties of our potential adversary and act as a disincentive to his ready resort to nuclear weapons.
Irrespective of the degree of effectiveness of missile interception (whether it is 100 per cent or not) the adversary’s uncertainty is bound to be enhanced and that should be welcomed. When Kissinger persuaded the Russians to give up missile defence or to limit it (as happened under ABM treaty), the nuclear war he was envisaging was one in which hundreds of warheads and missiles were to be used. No country today is thinking of that kind of nuclear war.
Secondly, Pakistan is not in a position to engage in such an arms race without technological inputs from countries like China and North Korea and largescale financial help from Saudi Arabia. In the present international strategic environment, the probability of these developments taking place is not high.
The US willingness to share information on the missile defence under NSSP is an indication of America’s recognition of the realities of the globalising world and India’s role in it. Even as India pursues its own national interests and national security, India also perceives increasingly the value in having the US on its side. The US stand on the Kargil war and the US reservations on Pakistan’s future would show the circumstances have changed beyond recognition compared to the Cold War period. The US is well aware that neither in civilian commerce nor in arms purchases can Pakistan compete with India. The US-Indian technology bridge has no analogue in respect of Pakistan.
There is no doubt that India should be cautious in its arms purchases from US and should ensure that it would have adequate reserves in terms of spares, components and munitions for six weeks of war so that no whimsical act of US will hamper India. If our Finance Ministry is liberated from expenditure-finance obsession and retrained to accept modern managerial culture, India can afford to purchase arms from US without undue worries about supply interruptions. Our foreign exchange reserve position gives us that capability which we lacked hitherto.
Missile defence falls neither in the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defence nor of the Ministry of External Affairs. Since it is related to the nuclear strategy, it has to be appropriately handled by the National Security Adviser.
We should have realistic assessment about our current technological capabilities. No doubt we have a pool of scientific and engineering talent which is being tapped by US and other European countries. But as organised activity, our scientific organisations will take a couple of decades more to level up with advanced developed countries. Just look at the time taken to develop Tejas aircraft, Arjun tank, Agni II, Akash and Trishul missiles and the nuclear submarine. Individually, our scientists or engineers are as good as any in the world. But the country’s capability taken as a whole is lagging behind US and other industrialised countries.
Therefore, there is nothing wrong in our trying to acquire as much technology as possible from other countries. Modern defence equipment has become so costly and its R&D so intricate that except for US, most of the European countries nowadays go in for joint R&D and joint production. Self reliance has acquired new dimensions. India is therefore in no position to reject information-sharing in technology. The time for decision-making on our missile defence is some distance off.
The writer is a defence analyst




