Smiles give way to hardball

“There has to be substantial progress on the goals set forth in several areas…what we would regard as sufficient to suspend sanctions provided we receive such authority from the Congress, which we do not have,” State Department spokesman James Rubin said at a briefing inWashington recently, revealing a welter of problems that belied the optimism generated by the UN speeches.

The immediate freeze on fissile material production is a no-no for Pakistan, which has exhausted much of its stockpile in the recent tests and is rushing to produce enriched uranium hand over fist to replenish its stocks before it is locked into a disadvantage. A discussion on what is formally known as the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty has already begun at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, but such a pact could take months, even years to materialise.

India — which believes it has sufficient stockpiles — is okay with an immediate fissile material freeze although it is not enthusiastic towards a bilateral framework. But the so-called restraint regime is anathema to it because the fundamental reason to go overtly nuclear was to build a credible deterrent force, ergo weaponise. On the other side, while seeking to lock the two subcontinental neighbours into lower-end nuclear capability, theClinton administration is not even ready to assure a lifting of sanctions.

Enervated by the sex scandal, the administration does not have a handle on the Congress, which is now not inclined to give any powers to the President. As things stand, an amendment sponsored by Senators Sam Brownback and Chuck Robb has passed through the Senate and is being considered by a conference committee comprising lawmakers from both Houses. It is expected to be cleared this week, perhaps with minor alterations, after which it will formally be voted through the two Houses again.

But the amendment gives the President a sanction-waiver power in only limited economic areas, primarily facilitating multilateral lending and US investment. It does not fully meet the expectations of both India and Pakistan, assuming of course the President chooses to use the discretion given to him. An attempt last week by a Senator to expand the scope of the waiver to allow arms transfer (to help Pakistan) and technology flow failed.

Moreover,three powerful Republican Senators have signalled to the administration that notwithstanding legislative passage, they are fundamentally opposed to the lifting of sanctions as a price for adhering to nuclear agreements. The Senators — which included Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee Jesse Helms and Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott — wrote to President Clinton last week that they opposed the export of high-technology goods to India and the sharing of scientific information that can be used in nuclear programmes.

Surprisingly, the letter was reaching the White House even as some key Indian community leaders facilitated a meeting between Helms and India’s special envoy, Jaswant Singh. The Senator himself was all milk and honey and those familiar with the situation say the letter was the handiwork of an overenthusiastic staffer. But Helms is said to be pathologically against the test ban treaty and has used the tests by India and Pakistan to argue that the CTBT is not verifiable and therefore theUS should not ratify it. He has said he will block the treaty in the Senate as long as he is alive.

The domestic boondoggle and the inflexibility of sections of the Clinton administration are now forcing India also to play tough. That hardball diplomacy was evident last week in the Prime Minister’s UN speech, which did not turn out to be an omnibus embrace of the non-proliferation regime that many expected but a more limited reiteration of India’s nuclear doctrine that he had stated in the Indian Parliament on August 4. In fact, Vajpayee notably dropped reference to the principle of no first use and credible minimum deterrence.

The scaled-down approach suggests the triumph of hardliners in the Indian establishment who believe that New Delhi has already given away too much to Washington without any perceptible softening in the American stand. Although India’s public position is that it is not into bargaining, it feels Washington has failed to appreciate unilateral commitments India has made the moratoriumon tests, offer to translate it into a de jure commitment and working on the export control regime aspects. In fact, how far India has come down the road was revealed in New Delhi’s unexpected acceptance of the CTBT’s Entry-into-Force clause, which it had opposed on principle as being legally untenable. The clause forces India to be a signatory to the treaty failing which the treaty itself will be null and void.

The US is using the same Indian argument to scupper a treaty on international crime and Indian officials say they have agreed to an unchanged CTBT having proved a point. New Delhi has also dropped its demand for a formal nuclear status and entry into the nuclear club. Not that there have been no changes in the US position. Indian officials say there is now a limited acceptance of India’s position that it needs a minimum credible deterrence. But Washington is trying to determine how minimum and how credible it should be. Moreover, even as it talks of easing sanctions, Washington is still putting intoplace even more stringent export control regimes on technology transfer.

Top administration officials like Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and her cohorts have also been remonstrative and censorious, jeopardising the negotiating track charted by Singh and Strobe Talbott. Last week, National Security Advisor Sandy Berger riled New Delhi by suggesting that President Clinton was meeting Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and not Prime Minister Vajpayee because the US had made greater progress in its talks with Islamabad.

New Delhi believes it is playing the game at a whole different level and resents being clubbed with Pakistan. The Indian nuclear doctrine is vastly different from the Pakistani exigencies, officials say. And as the Americans try to Shanghai New Delhi, there is a perceptible hardening of attitude beneath the smiles and talk of progress in talks. In fact, the joke in New York last week was that the Talbott-Singh talks, now into their sixth round, may well go to ten or twelve or fifteen — likea heavyweight boxing bout.

That India is not in a hurry to sign on the dotted line was indicated by Vajpayee, who said New Delhi would not delay the Entry-into-Force clause of the CTBT beyond the September 1999 deadline. That gives India a full year to chew on the matter even as the US Senate and the Russian Duma consider ratifying the treaty.