Stability, the watchword

There is some validity in both these assessments, but neither is exclusively valid. An important consideration should be that Sino-Indian relations are subject to the overall orientation of the foreign policy and security concerns of China and India.

I had the opportunity of discussing these issues with some senior Chinese officials and academics late in August during a senior security seminar organised by the East-West Centre in Honolulu. The views expressed by Chinese colleagues about China’s foreign policy and security concerns and factors which would influence stability in the Asia-Pacific region provide a different perspective on Sino-Indian relations.

Matters of immediate concern to China include the revived assertiveness of the Taiwan regime regarding its claims to independence. Compounding this are general pronouncements by the President of Taiwan that he would not be averse to Taiwan becoming a nuclear-weapon state. As tensions with Taiwan heightened, Japan and the US signed preliminary agreements on Theatre Missile Defence in August, which China perceives as a hostile arrangement.

The Sino-US relations are recovering from the fallout of the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade during the Kosovo operations and the Cox Committee Report. It was declassified and published earlier this summer.

The US apologies for the bombing, President Clinton’s avoidance of any strong action on the Cox Committee proposals, and China’s own anxiety to sustain Sino-US relations for economic and strategic reasons have contributed to getting bilateral relations back on track. The mutuality of economic interests, based on trade and technology transfers and China’s desire to get into the World Trade Organisation, are proving to be more decisive influences on Sino-US relations than the antagonisms and anger generated by the bombing and the Cox Report.

India’s nuclear and missile weaponisation and the Dalai Lama’s presence in India make India a significant factor affecting China’s regional security perceptions. By extension, any major Indo-Pakistan military confrontation is not acceptable to China. China’s present top priority is to sustain an atmosphere of peace and stability in its neighbourhood so that it can continue to concentrate on its internal economic management and development.

Secondly, it seeks to sustain and nurture it relations with the US and Western Europe and with Japan (subject to political insecurity limitations), to ensure the requisite levels of investment flows, economic and technological cooperation. Thirdly, its attempt is to see that the equilibrium in its relations with the US is not disturbed by the political aspirations and ferment in Taiwan. Fourth, it would like to ensure that issues relating to Taiwan and the North Korean nuclear postures do not enhance the US nuclear military presence in the North Asian-Pacific region.

Interestingly, Chinese strategists express the view that American military presence in the North Asian region and the reach of American security arrangements into this region will contribute to stability in Asia, provided it is combined with a stable Sino-US relationship. Their view is that the American military presence will counter the rise of Japanese militarism and control North Korea’s destabilising nuclear and missile ambitions.

A substantive economic relationship with Russia and a non-confrontationist pattern of relations with the ASEAN countries are considered desirable by the Chinese, compared to the earlier Chinese assertive posture in relation to the South China Sea and the northern Indian Ocean. The expectation is that China would be able to achieve its economic and territorial objectives in the region through a process of consultation.

China would like to have a stable and cooperative relationship with the South Asian countries, specially India, so that China does not face political uncertainties and destabilisation in Tibet and Xinjiang. Sustaining good relations with Pakistan is related to the rise of Islamic extremism in Xinjiang, and other parts of China, as a friendly equation with Pakistan could temper the flow of disruptive Islamic impulses generated from Afghanistan. These considerations were summed up by Tang Jiaxuan in the conceptual part of his address to the ARF Foreign Ministers’ Conference in Beijing.

Applying these concepts to specific Chinese policies towards India, it can be concluded that China wishes a stable relationship with India. China is of the view that a solution to the Sino-Indian boundary dispute should be found through a gradual process of finding common grounds over a period of time. In its view, the boundary dispute need not stand in the way of expansion of Sino-Indian relations in substance and range in other fields which could be of mutual benefit.

China would be willing to discuss the implementation of further confidence-building measures with India, within the framework of 1993 and 1996 bilateral agreements. China does not and perhaps will not take a partisan view, one way or the other, on the Kashmir dispute. China insists on India and Pakistan resolving the problem by peaceful negotiations. China would firmly resist centrifugal and separatist forces generated from any neighbouring country against its territorial integrity.

Two points of China’s foreign policy on which India is bound to have reservations are China’s opposition to India’s nuclear and missile initiatives to ensure its own security and China’s continuance of its defence supplies cooperation with Pakistan. The two major foreign policy challenges that India faces in the coming years are the problems of relations with Pakistan and China. Structuring relations with China should be of greater concern and interest to India.