Still pie in the sky

However, much more needs to be done on other fronts as well before ISRO can become a major player in the launch of communication satellites (comsat). The US is a major supplier of a large number of systems, equipment and components used in the fabrication of comsats. These require export licences from the US.

The US strengthened its export licensing requirements in 1989 after congressional hearings revealed that the Chinese authorities had been given unauthorised technical information by some American companies after the failure of a US communication satellite launch by China. US licensing procedures often take a long time. After repeated complaints from US firms, and its allies as well, about the delays in licensing, the US Congress authorised the department of state to establish a regulatory regime for the expeditious licensing of commercial communications satellite technologies, their components and systems to the US, NATO and major non-NATO allies, whilst ensuring priority to “national security and US obligations under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)”.

The new regime’s main feature is its ability to use high volume licences for components and technical data for multiple shipments to any of the NATO and major non-NATO allies within an approved framework, without having to meet complex documentary requirements normally associated with such exports. Since India is neither a NATO nor a major non-NATO ally, it cannot be the beneficiary of these relaxed licensing procedures. Incidentally, Pakistan as a major non-NATO ally is entitled to these facilities although it does not have any launch or satellite fabrication capabilities.

In addition, the launch of US built communication satellites involves complex export control procedures.

If India is to leverage its competitive strengths in satellite fabrication (which are already there) and its competitive launch services (later when GSLV is successful) and bid for both fabrication and launch of communication satellites within a tight framework, it needs to be part of the new US comsat regime, as most communication satellites use US parts, etc. This would intensify government-to-government discussions and negotiations. Fortunately, after the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP), licensing procedures for ISRO have been relaxed as compared with earlier times when ISRO and its various units were sanctioned by the US government.

Indeed, after the US government licensed the export to Malaysia of MEASAT communications satellites, in late 2002, it also made an amendment to an already existing technical assistance agreement to add Antrix Corporation Ltd, the commercial and marketing arm of ISRO, and to export to Antrix technical data and defence services in support of marketing activities for the sale of communications satellites to the Malaysian firm, Binariang Satellite Systems, for the MEASAT programme. Subsequently, in late 2004, in the presence of the Indian and Malaysian prime ministers, Antrix corporation and MEASAT International signed an agreement for the joint marketing of satellite capacity and a letter of intent for the procurement, launch and putting into orbit of MEASAT-4 satellite from the Antrix Corporation.

In addition, for providing communications satellite services, fabrication with US components and launch of US communications satellites, the completion of a number of technical assistance agreements must be negotiated between the two countries.

Therefore, before ISRO can become a serious player in the international communications satellite launch business, a number of things need to be done on a priority basis. First, the GSLV needs to be successfully developed. Second, negotiations with the US to include India amongst the countries eligible for the comsat licensing procedures should begin. And third, technical assistance agreements need to be negotiated.

All these are complex operations, and the process of completion of these requires to be started now. Only then can ISRO leverage its technical strengths and cost effective programmes, to become a strong competitor to the other communications satellite fabrication and launch service providers. It can also suitably leverage the current improved Indo-US relations to forge collaboration with American firms to jointly offer these services to the US and third parties.

The writer is a visiting fellow, Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses and the National Maritime Foundation, Delhi