Target Rumsfeld: knives out as war machine sputters

‘‘The civilians in (Rumsfeld’s office) vetoed the priority and sequencing of joint forces into the region — as it was requested by the war fighters — and manipulated it to support their priorities,’’ said an officer who asked not to be quoted by name. ‘‘When they did this, it de-synchronized not only the timing of the arrival of people and their organic equipment but also the proper mix of combat, combat support and combat support units.’’

Retired Gen. Barry R. McCaffrey, who commanded the 24th Infantry Division during the 1991 Gulf War, said he told a senior member of Rumsfeld’s staff shortly before the war that the secretary’s office had to stop meddling in the deployment process and let army commanders have the units they believed they needed to fight the war. Rumsfeld, McCaffrey said, ‘‘sat on each element for weeks and wanted an explanation for every unit called up out of the National Guard and Reserve and argued about every 42-man maintenance detachment. Why would a businessman want to deal with the micromanagement of the force? The bottomline is a lack of trust that these army generals knew what they were doing.’’

Responding to criticism, Rumsfeld and Air Force Gen Richard B Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said at a Pentagon news conference that US forces were following a war plan that was developed by Gen Tommy R Franks, commander of Central Command, and agreed to by leaders of all the military services. Myers called it ‘‘brilliant.’’ Aides close to Rumsfeld said any changes made were for the better. ‘‘The original war plan for Iraq was really awful,’’ a senior official said on Saturday. ‘‘It was basically Cold War planning, and we’re not in the Cold War anymore. Rumsfeld, like a lot of people, asked a lot of questions designed to produce the best, most flexible plan.’’

Briefing reporters yesterday at the Pentagon, Maj Gen Stanley McChrystal, deputy operations director for the Joint Chiefs, insisted that the move this week to send an armoured division, an armoured cavalry division and an armoured cavalry regiment to Iraq was not a reaction to battlefield conditions but part of the long-planned rolling start. ‘‘So, if anybody takes an inference that these are reinforcements based upon what’s happened in the first week of the war, that would be incorrect.’’

But many officers insist that the US would have had a much heavier force on the ground when the war began had Rumsfeld refrained from constantly changing Central Command’s troop deployment plan, known in military parlance as the Time Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD). One senior defence official said those changes delayed deployments by as much as 50 days and meant a slower start for three heavy divisions: the 4th Infantry, whose equipment is heading for Kuwait after being denied a base in Turkey; the 1st Cavalry, which has not started moving from its base at Ft. Hood, Texas, and the 1st Armored, which is at its base in Germany.

‘‘I know the 1st Armored Division was delayed,’’ an officer said. ‘‘They were scheduled in pretty early. I don’t know why, but I just know they were stood down. Otherwise, they would have been there by now.’’ The officer said he discussed the need to secure rear supply lines weeks ago with Army Lt. Gen. Scott Wallace, commander of the 5th Corps inside Iraq, and that Wallace wanted the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment assigned to that mission. The unit is moving from its base at Fort Polk, La.— a week after irregular Iraqi forces from Saddam Hussein’s Fedayeen began attacking supply convoys and other US forces from the rear.

Rumsfeld’s aides said there were legitimate reasons for not deploying the units sooner. ‘‘There were people with antiquated thinking and processes,’’ the senior defence official said, ‘‘who wanted to deploy people and wreck their lives and move them even before we knew there was going to be a war — because it’s easier that way.’’ (LA Times-Washington Post)