As New Delhi and Washington explain the intricacies of the nuclear accord, opponents in both countries are feasting on presumed problems. That the 123 agreement is a delicate compromise is a given. The agreement, from all indications so far, was consciously drafted to stay within the bounds of US domestic legislation and political commitments Manmohan Singh had made to Parliament last year. But there is less than what meets the eye in contradictions found by nuclear critics.In New Delhi they say the agreement does not give India the ‘right’ to test. Their fellow travellers in Washington trying to kill the deal argue the exact opposite — the agreement does not sufficiently constrain a future Indian nuclear weapons test. The PM summed up the legal situation elegantly: “India has got the right to test and the US the right to react.” Nuclear paranoids in both capitals don’t understand the first rule of power politics that governs diplomacy. Although agreements between nations do codify a particular understanding at a given point in time, future interpretation and action by states are based on cold calculations of interests. If law was everything, there would be no basis at all for the Indo-US deal, which seeks to change nuclear rules in favour of New Delhi.The question of India’s testing in the future is not a ‘right’ to be conferred by the US or the rest of the world. New Delhi’s decision to test, as in 1974 and 1998, would be based on an assessment of the international context and the consequences. It would be a sovereign decision. Similarly, the US retains the ‘right’ to cease cooperation and demand the return of all equipment supplied as stipulated by its law. Whether the US exercises these rights or not will depend on the costs and benefits of those actions and on India’s standing in the world. While many at home will continue to pick the nits, New Delhi and Washington must now resolutely focus on the next step: an early international endorsement of the deal. This will not be easy, as China and Pakistan seem determined to undercut India’s new prospects for international nuclear cooperation. We do hope neither the CPM nor the BJP — they have reserved their judgments on the agreement — will, if only inadvertently, make it easier for Beijing and Islamabad.
