
In his Walk the Talk programme of November 13, the editor-in- chief of the Indian Express Shekhar Gupta elicited the following statement from Henry Kissinger. ‘‘First of all what Americans don’t know and Indians do know is that British policy east of Suez was not made in London, but in Calcutta and New Delhi. So this is not even something entirely learnt from Britain, this is something that is sort of in the Indian blood. And I think that this is correct that India wants, aspires to be, at least to prevent another dominant power to emerge between Singapore and Aden. And that is compatible with American interests.’’ This may be music to the ears of some sections of the Indian establishment. But the statement happens to be questionable when he refers to the British policy east of Aden being in the Indian blood. Apart from that, it implies Kissinger envisages India playing a role east of Aden totally compatible to the US interests just as the British Raj’s policy was designed to be compatible with that of the then sole superpower — Britain.
First of all, the policy made in Calcutta or Delhi by the Raj was formulated entirely by the British without any Indian participation, solely in the interests of the British Empire. At that stage there were no Indian officers in the army, navy and air force and no Indian ICS officer (G.S. Bajpai came in much later) had any input in the British Raj’s policy-making in those days.
A few Indians like K.M. Panicker thought of the Indian Navy playing a major role in the Indian Ocean with the support of the Royal Navy. What most people did not realise at that stage was that the East of Aden policy of the British Raj persuaded the British chiefs of staff and the Raj establishment in Delhi to recommend the partition of India so that, with a friendly Pakistan as the base, the ‘‘Wells of Power’’ of the Middle East could be guarded against the Soviet threat. The CENTO and SEATO made sure that Indians would not inherit the grand ideas of British Raj. Then came the US base in Diego Garcia and US naval presence in the Indian ocean. The central command and US V fleet are not likely to give up their control over the ‘‘Wells of Power’’ — the oil and gas resources of West and Central Asia.A few Americans no doubt think that the growing congruity in Indian and US strategic interests might enable the US to hive off part of its responsibility to India and the Indian Navy in the Indian Ocean area. This kind of thinking is totally outdated and belongs to the 19th century. In that century the Royal Navy and the British Indian Army had to deal with autocratic kings and sheikhs with armies of little competence and they had no difficulty in coercing them to accept the British supremacy from Aden to Singapore. Kissinger himself during the Vietnam war used to express his envy of the British of the 19th century who had at their disposal the well trained British Indian army for policing the area from Aden to Singapore.
But that came to an end with decolonisation and the rise of nationalism all over the world. Vietnam, Afghanistan and now Iraq prove that the kind of overlordship the Royal Navy and the British Indian Army exercised over the arc from Aden to Singapore cannot be repeated in the 21st century. Presumably Kissinger has lost sight of the fact that Singapore is now at the heart of a ten nation grouping — the ASEAN — which is wisely cultivating a multifaceted security relationship with all major powers of the world. Pakistan is a nuclear weapon power, thanks to help from China and western Europe and US permissiveness. Nuclear weapons are great equalisers and it does not look as if China is likely to break its relationship with Pakistan.
President Bush admits with regret that in the last five decades, western powers compromised on democracy in West Asian countries in the interest of Cold War exigencies. Now the US wants to advance democracy in West Asia by bringing about regime changes. Democratisation of West Asia would necessarily mean a rise in nationalist feeling. While in the 19th century and up to the 1920s the British could deal with the sheikhs and needed not to bother about the people, that would not work in a democratised West Asia.
The role of military force in international relations has undergone a revolutionary change. While armies can be defeated by superior military capability, nations with reasonable density of populations cannot be kept under occupation by the most powerful armies at acceptable costs. This was overlooked by the Americans when they invaded Iraq. Unfortunately large sections of politico-military establishments all over the world are still under the influence of the conventional wisdom that preceded World War II. In this century while the significance of military force as a component of power will decline, that of economy, technology and cultural contribution will increase. The US will continue to sustain its preeminence not because of its military power but because of its strength in all other aspects of power. So will be the case with India, China, European Union, Japan and Russia. So long as a majority of politico-military establishments persist in believing wrongly, as it happens, in the high utility of military power, India has to maintain its military preparedness. But there should be no illusion that in the 21st century military power will enable this country to dominate other populations or acquire additional territory.
In the arc from Aden to Singapore India will be a preeminent power because of its population and its skills and knowledge base, which will be the foundation of its GDP and the size of its market. There is no need for India to worry about any challenge arising in this area. In future, globalised national power will be proportionate to the size of the population, provided they are educated and the society is knowledge-based. A globalised international system is not likely to permit any nation or group of nations to challenge the existing international order by use of military force. When the Chinese talk of ‘‘rising peacefully’’ they are talking sense. That is the only way a nation appropriately endowed as China and India are, can rise.




