One of the strategic realities of the present period is that the balance of military capabilities between China and India is rapidly shifting to our disadvantage. And nowhere is this more noticeable than in air and space capabilities. There is no question that we must continue to improve relations with China and reduce the potential for disagreement and conflict. It would not be in our interest to think of China in any adversarial terms. But it would be less than prudent to ignore the changing realities of military power that would provide the capabilities on which altered intentions could be based. Factors beyond our control could propel the two countries into a possible conflictual situation. After all, the Chinese premier was reported to have told another head of state shortly after the war in 1962 that the war had not been about (disputed) territory! When things were sliding toward a conflict with China, the decision to expand the defence forces included increasing the size of the Indian air force from the existing 25-squadron force to a 64-squadron force. The government in its bureaucratic wisdom approved a force at the mid-point of 45 squadrons, of which 35 were to be combat squadrons while the remaining would have transport aircraft. And this force has been sustained except for the temporary sanction of another two squadrons in 1985. But we were to train pilots and other personnel on the planning basis of 64 squadrons. Many pilots, in fact, were even sent to the United States for fighter flying training in the expectation that aircraft would come sooner rather than later to build up to 64-squadron force. But we are well aware of the resource crunch since the late 1980s that has hit defence modernisation in general, and air force modernisation in particular. And during the past three years large sums budgeted for modernisation have had to be surrendered. We made a serious error in not using combat air power during the 1962 war although it would have made a significant difference to the battle on the ground. The reasons were never fully explained by anyone. But clearly this was a failure of higher defence command. We had a number of fighter squadrons deployed along the northern border for the previous three years who had trained well for action on the high Himalayas. Tragically, even the legendary Lt General B.M. Kaul, the de-facto theatre commander (and a son-in-law a fighter pilot), did not seem to have thought of calling in the air force. The lost opportunity cost the nation heavily, both in political-psychological as well as in military-strategic terms. A lot of water has flown down the Brahmaputra since then. But in essence we have had to keep the best of our combat force on the western sector to deal with Pakistan. Older aircraft in a few units used to be deployed in the east. This was adequate in view of the limitations that geography and terrain placed on the Chinese air force deployed on the Tibetan plateau. Their fighter aircraft had limited range and weapon-carrying capacity. Deployment on the plateau at an altitude of around 10,000-ft further reduced the actual weapon-carrying capacity. And there were few aircraft in the inventory to operate from beyond the plateau and still hit the border areas, leave alone anywhere in the interior of India, in case a war erupted again. Logistics problems for the Chinese military to operate on the Sino-Indian border were acute and this no doubt had forced it into a unilateral ceasefire and withdrawal from the areas across the border that it had captured during the 1962 war. But all this has been changing almost dramatically since the early 1990s. China is well on the way to a massive military modernisation that acquired new momentum after 1992 when it got access to Russian military technology. Before the end of this decade it would have close to 700 Su-27/30 long-range multi-role combat aircraft, nearly 800 of the newer F-7, a couple of hundred J-8/10 and a range of other new combat aircraft. The new FC-1 prototype of the China-Pakistan joint programme was tested two months ago. In short, the Chinese air force would have an inventory of upwards of 1,500 modern combat aircraft for deployment in the China-India theatre. The new railway line between Golmud and Lhasa would fundamentally alter the logistics parameters. But with aerial refuelling, its combat aircraft could operate from bases well beyond the Tibetan plateau and even the reach of IAF fighters currently deployed in the east. China’s space capabilities now enhance its air power substantively. My central conclusion is that the older paradigm of managing the air power balance, which has essentially been in our favour since the 1960s, is no longer valid. We would need to have high-performance aircraft also deployed in the eastern sector. More important, serious attention has to be paid to the question of numbers. There is no doubt that modern aircraft and combat support systems act as force multipliers. But force multiplication is no substitute for force! After all, the other side also goes in for force multiplication. Last week Jiang Zemin, head of the Chinese Central Military Commission, exhorted his senior military commanders to ‘‘actively push forward the strategic task of a revolution in military affairs with Chinese characteristics’’. What we need urgently is to increase the size of the Indian air force to at least the level of 50 combat squadrons as visualised four decades ago. Otherwise serious weaknesses would deepen, especially when the Sino-Pak strategic nexus is taken into account. This is not going to be easy or swift. But unless the process is started and pursued with vigour and resilience, we could end up with a situation reminiscent of the war four decades ago. Credible defence, in fact, is the best insurance for friendly relations that both countries need.
