The charm offensive

Most recently, Clinton showed us the difference an individual could make through the sheer power of his personality. The way our MPs and ministers fawned all over him may have been obscene. But in the way he conducted himself shaking a leg with Rajasthani women, the sentimental speech to Parliament, the body language at the Taj Mahal and Hyderabad he achieved something no US president had been able to do since Kennedy. For the first time since the days of warmth in the last years of the Nehru-Kennedy era, Clinton succeeded in convincing many Indians that Americans could even be friends. Given the history of Cold War suspicions, the bitterness over Washington’s hyphenated policy towards India (when everything was seen in the India-Pakistan context), the zero-sum game approach, this was no mean achievement. What was equally significant was the way he brought about the same change in the mindsets within the

policy-making structures in Washington which are still infested, at function levels, by cold warriors with nostalgia for old ally Pakistan and loathing for Indian “sophistry†and “hypocrisyâ€.

Only a president with a highly personalised style could wag his finger at Musharraf, one-on-one, in one of the coldest, sternest meetings between the two heads of states in a long time. He did this in the last year of his presidency, almost in his lame-duck months, and succeeded in turning around not just policy but even Indian public opinion. What can we now expect from his successor?In terms of their personal convictions on foreign policy or even the larger worldview, there seems as little to choose between Gore and Bush (Jr) as in terms of their votes. One (Bush) knows very little about the world, the other nurses truly woolly-headed Woodstock notions on changing the world. Neither commands the personal loyalty or following, or the magneticism of a Clinton or Reagan. It would, therefore, be reasonable to speculate that foreign policy in the next presidency will depend a great deal on the personalities of the aides the ultimate winner picks. The past has enough evidence to show that when a president has a low key, or inward-looking, personality, the more dominant aides take charge. Under Nixon, it was Kissinger and Bush was led by James Baker. Even under Reagan, Schultz looked much more like the architect of US foreign policy than Madeleine Albright ever did under Clinton or Dean Rusk under Kennedy.

Are we, therefore, heading for one more phase in US foreign policy that will be “secretarial†rather than presidential? If so, who are the people in the respective camps to make the difference? Which ones among them still carry the Cold War baggage and which have been converted by Clinton’s non-hyphenated newspeak? These calculations will have to begin the moment this election is decided. Hopefully, the homework would have begun already.

Postscript: On the issue of the personality of a leader influencing foreign policy, this page from diplomatic history makes for juicy reading. This March 23, 1955, letter from US President Dwight Eisenhower to his Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was declassified by the US and included in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-57, Vol VIII.

Eisenhower wrote:

‘‘Dear Foster,
In the Indian situation I am struck by the amount of evidence we have that Nehru seems to be often more swayed by personality than by logical argument. He seems to be intensely personal in his whole approach….

If this is true, I do hope that you will urge our new ambassador there to do everything possible to win the personal confidence and friendship of Nehru. I think he should study thoroughly any methods or practices that have apparently been successful in the past, and we, on our part, should avoid putting chores on our ambassador that would almost compel him to show an unsympathetic attitude toward the Premier. It seems to me that Cooper (the then US ambassador) should be particularly fitted to do this. He has a charming wife and between them we might build up a very much better position, not because of any greater ability on the part of our representative, but merely because he pursues one single general objective that could possibly pay off in big terms. Don’t bother to answer; this is something we can talk about at our leisure.â€

Vajpayee is not known particularly for writing notes to Brajesh Mishra or Jaswant Singh, at least not such naughty ones, but he must take into account the fact now that, irrespective of who wins, the next US president too will be someone whose personality rather than mere cold, state department logic would influence his foreign policy a great deal. Clinton, as Nehru in the past, has already shown us what a big difference that can make.