The commando speaks

Pakistan claims to work against terrorism at three levels: co-operating with the United States in its war against terrorism, waging a counter-terrorist campaign against domestic terrorism, and controlling terrorism prosecuted by Pakistan across its borders.

All three phenomena have two characteristics in common. First, the differences in the three are dissipating and the reality of the similarity of the jehadi war through terror is increasingly clear.

Second, Pakistan has been dragging its feet in tackling jehadi terrorism, especially in the first two.

As regards the third, the reality is that incidence of terrorism has increased. Our aim, in the short and medium term, is to stop cross-border terrorism emanating from Pakistan and the occupied territories, and reduce the violence within J&K so that fair and free elections can be held by September-October this year.

At times like these it is even more important to remember that Pakistan’s integrity, stability and prosperity are in our national interest. We, therefore, have a stake in Musharraf’s war against domestic terrorism.

If the jehadi culture can be altered, we stand to gain in the long term. We also have a stake in the success of the US war against the jehadis even if they go under the flag of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. We obviously have a stake in the success of our own counter-terrorist strategy. Unfortunately, the commando in Musharraf seems to be pushing things in the wrong direction altogether, possibly because he is that much weaker now. What he said on television showed nothing really new. But what he conveyed to the Washington Post in an interview deserves closer attention.

In the interview to the US daily he asserted that if deterrence fails to prevent war, “We will take the offensive into Indian territory” emphasising that “these words are very important.” This was also threatened by the then army chief General Aslam Beg on the eve of escalation of terrorism in late 1989.

Musharraf spelt out the contours of that offensive by arguing that thousands of zealous (jehadi) volunteers and 150,000 “retired” soldiers launched across the borders could raise the cost of war to India dramatically. This would be an extension of the traditional strategy adopted by Pakistan since 1947, albeit at a massively expanded scale. This seems to be Musharraf’s alternative to nuclear weapons which he now realises India would not give him space to use, and if he were to use it, his country would face catastrophic destruction.

We need to remember that Pakistan had launched its aggression into J&K in 1947 largely with “retired” soldiers, many of them demobilised after World War II and unemployed in the Mirpur region of the state. There were also threats (by Nawaz Sharif as Punjab chief minister) of as many as 10,000 civilian “volunteers” being sent across the borders from Punjab in early February 1990 when Benazir Bhutto, as the prime minister, was crying hoarse for azadi. Nawaz Sharif as the prime minister did stop such attempts in 1994 by ordering the use of force.

Musharraf’s threat may be a lot of bluff and bluster. But the Pakistan army has been deeply involved in jehadi infrastructure and activities largely through its ISI. Musharraf may think he could strike two birds with one stone, that is, create a major crisis for India as well as push jehadi civilians and soldiers forward as cannon fodder. It would, therefore, be prudent to prepare contingency plans to deal with such situations while cautioning the world about the thinking of the head of state next door. Equally important, the international community needs to be alerted for what could be a bigger crisis to handle than nuclear weapons as a consequence of the distorted vision of the self-appointed president and CEO of Pakistan.

But there are more optimistic indicators also. The US has made it clear that the administration’s highest priority remains choking off the infiltration of militants into Kashmir. As a consequence, US pressures on Islamabad have been mounting and as a senior administration official said the other day, “We (the US) are looking for the Pakistanis to ensure that nothing gets across the line of control.”

The US media has also been quoting authoritative sources to indicate that orders were issued after the joint Cabinet and NSC meeting chaired by Musharraf on May 23 to Pakistan’s 10 Corps (that commands all military forces in Occupied Kashmir) to block the mountain routes traditionally used by militants to cross the borders. This is what should have been done a long time ago, but not carried out even after January 12. The mobilisation by both armies on the borders then would have served to avoid war and wind down terrorism.

A Pakistani minister was quoted after the NSC meeting that Pakistan was “re-aligning” its position on terrorist violence. This, however, even at the best of times, would take time. Whether it shows enough progress by September remains to be seen. But it is clear that the heightened military deployment has also led to an increased rate of terrorists being killed. Combined with choking off the infiltration, this could lead to the situation that India seeks, an environment free of the threat of violence for free and fair elections in J&K.