The exception called India

It is necessary, therefore, to recall the past India/NSG interactions and the NSG’s objectives. Although it was formally established in response to the first nuclear test by India in 1974, after its rejuvenation in 1992, it has been intensively involved in efforts to contain proliferation. The first substantive amendment to its ‘guidelines for transfers of trigger list items’ was made in 1993 when fullscope safeguards requirements were introduced as a precondition for nuclear transfers. This effectively barred India from any fresh nuclear commerce with NSG members. It is this 1993 amendment that the new text seeks to modify.

While considering the draft text, NSG participating countries should consider the following. Even before 9/11 there was global concern about both nuclear proliferation and the entry of non-state actors in the global nuclear proliferation stage. It is very unlikely that the number of countries that have the additional protocol in force with IAEA will increase substantially in the coming years.

The NSG will find it difficult to amend its guidelines for nuclear transfer to include the additional protocol as a requirement for such transfers. In spite of repeated attempts during the past decade the NSG has found it difficult to adopt such an amendment because of resistance to such a move by many of the participating countries. In the absence of an additional protocol, it will be difficult for IAEA safeguards mechanism to keep track of all global transfers of dual use items from suppliers to recipients.

It would, therefore, be prudent if NSG was to initiate actions now to engage non-NSG members that have developed nuclear capability and possess all round nuclear technology and have sound nuclear industrial base and are potential suppliers in future. Currently, India is one of the few countries that fit these requirements. Actually it is the only such country.

India is not a signatory to the NPT, does not have fullscope safeguards and has a large number of nuclear facilities that are indigenous in design and development including fast breeder reactors. It is not required, therefore, to place any of these facilities under any IAEA safeguards. Nor is it required to report exports of any dual use items to any country, member or non-member of NPT. It would, therefore, be in NSG’s interests to actively involve India in both the NSG and global efforts to contain nuclear proliferation India’s nuclear weapon state status is an undeniable fact. It is equally undeniable that there is very little that NSG members, individually or collectively, can do to persuade India to give up its strategic nuclear program in the absence of global nuclear disarmament. So while considering the draft amendment the current NSG participating countries should ask themselves the following questions: Do they think or believe that nuclear proliferation would be a serious subject in the coming years? Do they believe that cooperation from India, the only country outside of both NSG and NPT regime today that operates full nuclear cycle activities would assist or help them in their non-proliferation goals or that it would not have any impact?

Now it is recognised that the primary factor in the minds of some NSG members is the Indian reluctance to commit formally to a no-test promise. The simple fact is that the CTBT is not in force with two nuclear weapon states not having ratified it — including one with whom India had some military conflicts in the past.

Neither can India formally declare a moratorium of fissile material production for strategic purposes with China deliberately and consciously having decided not to announce such a moratorium. On the other hand India having voluntarily forsaken nuclear tests for a long time and voluntarily declaring a moratorium on testing has very little incentive to test any more unless compelled by supreme national security interests, which primarily means a nuclear test by one of its neighbouring nuclear weapon states.

India for its part realises the abhorrence many NSG members have about nuclear tests and their reluctance to commit themselves permanently to even civil nuclear cooperation with countries that conduct nuclear tests. Under the circumstances, the present draft does the following. It ensures that no transferred nuclear material or facilities will be diverted by India for any nuclear explosive related activities. It commits India to an additional protocol with reporting requirements of its exports of nuclear material and related dual use items and technologies. It places many of its unsafeguarded nuclear facilities under safeguards now and promises to place even many more in the future. It permits such countries as those might be reluctant to engage in civil nuclear trade with India if India were to conduct a test, to act according to those wishes.

Such a draft affords the best option for NSG, and the global community, to prepare for the coming campaign against nuclear proliferation, and the campaign for global disarmament. It would be a pity if NSG participating countries were now to deny themselves and the international community such an opportunity.

The writer is visting fellow at IDSA and National Maritime Foundation