The forces of insecurity

The National Security Guard is a specialised commando force. It is being used to guard VIPs.

The principal task of the Central Reserve Police Force is to combat insurgencies. In fact, found the Task Force:

‘‘Though 83 per cent of the Force is deployed in areas facing internal security situations, only 32 per cent is actually utilised for combating militancy/ insurgency. The remaining strength is assigned routine policing duties in the disturbed areas, and more often than not, utilised as ‘extra manpower’ by the district Superintendents of Police as per their perceptions, which are invariably in conflict with the pre-deployment operational priorities given to the Force Commanders who, anxious to be seen as ‘being helpful’, are unable to assert their mandate. Thus, the Force virtually places itself ‘at the disposal’ of the State Police. Lack of assertion by MHA and the ready acquiescence by the local Commanders also lead to deployments in disaggregated formations which result in the loss of effective control and monitoring of operations. CRPF deployments in penny packets in widely dispersed areas, under the command of a Naik/ HC, militate against the achievement of operational objectives and the lack of the guidance and control generates a variety of other problems.’’

As against the increasing sophistication of terrorists and criminals, as against the up-to-date arms and communication equipment at their command, the Task Forces found state police forces ill-equipped and ill-trained. As against the ever-new and changing character of crimes the police must tackle, as against the more and more inventive tactics of terrorists, only one per cent of the police budget is spent on training, the Task Force found. As a result, a policeman who is in theory to go for retraining every five years, the Task Force found, gets to look in on such a programme once every 20 years or so. As for the living and working conditions, a representative passage from the report of the Task Force will suffice:

‘‘The studies carried out by BPR&D (Bureau of Police Research and Development) in regard to the living and working conditions of State Police Forces reveal an alarming picture:

• 25 per cent of the police stations and 50 per cent of the police outposts do not have regular buildings.

• Over 37 per cent police districts work from makeshift police lines.

• Over 70 per cent police districts do not have a proper control room.

• Superintendents of Police in over 34 per cent police districts do not have official accommodation.

• 70 per cent of the constabulary is without residential accommodation whereas, according to the laid down norm, there should be 100 per cent satisfaction on this count.

• The mobility deficiency of Indian Police is approximately 43 per cent.

• The weaponry available with the police forces is outdated and inadequate.

• There is dire need for the upgradation of the obtaining communication systems.

‘‘On the other hand, the criminal and the mafia gangs are in possession of weapons and communication systems which are far more sophisticated than those available to the State Police, and even to the CPMFs (Central Para Military Forces). This has enabled the criminals to freely carry out their depredations. The mafia bosses, who live abroad, control and direct ‘operations’ in India and the terrorist groups mastermind IED explosions through remote-controlled devices. On the other hand, the police forces, which are required to tackle threats to internal security, are a hapless lot, whose essential requirements and welfare have been long neglected by the State Governments.’’

Anyone can transpose these observations into a list of ‘‘Things that must be done, and done forthwith.’’ Yet none of them gets done. Why not? Is there an ailment that accounts for both — that things have come to this pass as well as the fact that even the obvious things do not get done?

Indeed. And both Task Forces were explicit in pinpointing it.

‘‘While the failures of the civil police can be attributed to varied factors,’’ the Task Force on Internal Security observed, ‘‘the most vitiating among them is the persistent political interference in its functioning…’’

‘‘The foundation of administrative control in the police organisation is discipline,’’ it pointed out. ‘‘The disruption of the laid down chain of command and control by extra-constitutional factors and influences has had a debilitating effect on the supervisory echelons. During our interactions with the senior-most police officers in the States, most of them explained that undue political pressure in the matter of recruitments, transfers, postings, and promotions had most adversely affected discipline, efficiency, loyalty and morale in the police forces. Transfers are no longer governed by tenure policies. In most States, as per the standing orders, transfers and postings of subordinate staff up to the rank of DySP (Deputy Superintendent of Police) are to be made by supervisory officers within the department.

‘‘However, in actual practice, these are decided by the Chief Minister or one of his Ministers on the basis of political expediency and, worse, on considerations of caste and community. In some States, key and important positions, referred to as ‘lucrative posts’ are filled virtually through auction, the highest bidders being nominated to fill up the vacancies!

‘‘Officers are retained at their posts as long as they remain ‘loyal’ or ‘useful’ to their political patrons. What earlier used to be a ‘request’ from the political quarters has since taken the form of ‘desire’, which has the in-built element of unequivocal orders. Thus, decisions in regard to matters relating to recruitments, transfers, investigations, etc. are adversely influenced by political interference. In such an environment, subordinates flout the authority of their superiors and indiscipline permeates the entire force. No uniformed Force managed in this manner can be expected to remain a trustworthy instrument to enforce law and order.’’

And yet again — ‘‘Unceasing political interference has eaten into the very vitals of the police,’’ the Task Force warned. ‘‘The malaise is further compounded by poor leadership within the State police cadres. In the absence of a known promotion and tenure policy, the officers seeking to secure the top jobs resort to various unhealthy practices. The whole process thus gets further politicised and, in many cases, officers of inadequate standing, and even uncertain credentials, get appointed as the State Police chiefs.’’ What could be more explicit? Or more fraught with peril?

The rot begins right at the beginning. From recruitment at the lowest level to promotions to the highest level, the same virus has disabled security forces. As the Task Force put it,

‘‘The promotion policies have also been virtually liquidated by the continuing interference and the DGP’s proposals being brazenly rejected on political considerations. Resultantly, promotions are not invariably based on seniority, proven merit and integrity…

‘‘Recruitment of the constabulary is not a periodic exercise; it continues throughout the year. It is most unfortunate that for the past many years continuing political pressures and interference have liquidated the erstwhile time-tested procedures relating to recruitments. This has led to a situation where, in many States, the designated recruiting authority is given a list of the candidates who should be enlisted, irrespective of their falling short of the prescribed educational and physical standards.’’

And the nature of those doing the interfering is changing by the day.‘‘An extremely disturbing factor is that the organised criminal/ mafia elements have penetrated into our polity and society and, consequently, dangerous criminals enjoy the patronage and protection of the most influential persons in the country,’’ the Task Force on Internal Security observed. ‘‘Even our judiciary has been corrupted and tainted.’’

‘‘Information is invariably available about the involvement of the political executive and the bureaucracy with criminal and anti-national elements,’’ it continued, and we see evidence in what is happening in the Telgi case every week. ‘‘It is a matter of grave concern that action to promptly and ruthlessly deal with such cases is hardly ever taken. In most cases, the unwillingness to act arises largely from an exaggerated view of the ‘political fallout’ of effectively enforcing the Constitution and the rule of law.’’

This is the real problem. And it gets worse by the day. The sorts of persons the security forces used to be put to chase are the ones to whom they are today put to ‘‘provide security’’.

And when individuals in the security forces actually do their duty, they come to grief. Terrorists had taken over Punjab. Magistrates and judges would just not take up cases. Witnesses would not testify. Administration had broken down. Police were in complete disarray. A few brave individual policemen began to fight back. Eventually, inch by bloodstained inch, the State was wrenched out of the vice of terrorists. Result? Through a concerted campaign, over 2,400 writs were filed and entertained against the bravest of police officers. The very ones who had saved the country were put to running from court to court. Every policeman who stood up to Naxalite terror in Andhra is now in danger of the same fate.

It is this problem that decisions of the past six months are compounding. The Governments at the Centre, in Andhra, in Assam have fomented an atmosphere of permissiveness. As a result, even the security official who has not handled such tasks as are going to make him the instant target — of writs if not bullets — holds back.

The AGP Government had chased ULFA. ULFA had taken refuge in Bhutan. At great risk to himself and his family, His Majesty the King of Bhutan launched a campaign against them and drove them out of his country. And lo and behold! They now have a safe haven in Assam!

‘‘All options are open’’ on Kashmir, Government declares. Is giving up the Valley one of the ‘‘all options’’ that are ‘‘open’’? Is holding a plebiscite one of the ‘‘all options’’ that are ‘‘open’’? Is rescinding the unanimous resolution of Parliament one of the ‘‘all options’’ that are ‘‘open’’? Who will give up his life hearing such an ‘‘uncertain trumpet’’?

I would therefore urge:

• Publish the reports of the Task Force on Border Management and that on Internal Security.

• Implement the numerous and specific recommendations that they have given.

• Desist from steps and statements that compound the permissiveness that has already been fomented.

• Realise that the main sponsor of terrorism, that is Pakistan, has not changed its aim, it has not changed its conduct one whit. Accordingly,

• Do not be in a hurry when dealing with it.

• Do not think that the menace can be skirted just by clever drafting.

• Do not enter into a competition — ‘‘Yes, Vajpayee almost pulled it off, but in the end he did not succeed. We will work the miracle he couldn’t.’’

The writer is a BJP MP and former Union minister.

PART I

PART II

PART III

Concluded