After the enactment of the Punjab Termination of Agreements Bill of 2004, misinformation is being spread about its likely implications on the Indus Water Treaty (1960). This is creating a fear psychosis. Here are the facts on the Indus Water Treaty (1960):
EVENTS WHICH LED TO NEGOTIATION OF THE TREATY
The haste with which partition of Punjab was affected at the time of Independence did not allow sufficient time for division of assets between India and Pakistan. The division of the canal system, as caused by the Radcliffe Line, led to many problems. A ‘Stand-Still Agreement’ for maintaining the pre-Partition allocation of water from the Indus Basin to West Punjab (Pakistan) was signed on December 18, 1947.
But the agreement expired on March 31, 1948. The next day, supplies to the canals—which were fed from the Madhopur headworks located on the river Ravi and the Hussenawala headworks located on the river Sutlej—‘‘ceased’’ to flow to Pakistan. This resulted in stoppage of water to about 5.5 per cent of Pakistan’s sown area at the most critical period of sowing in the Kharif season.
Pakistan dispatched a high-level ministerial delegation to New Delhi to negotiate restoration of water supply. After long deliberations, India made it clear that the waters of the three eastern rivers—i.e. Sutlej, Beas and Ravi—were considered to be assets of East Punjab (India).
On May 4, 1948, an agreement was signed in New Delhi under which West Punjab was required to deposit in the Reserve Bank of India a sum specified by India to cover the cost of the headworks. Thereafter, the flow to West Punjab resumed.
Although the Inter-Dominion Agreement of May 1948 did not settle anything, it did black out the arguments and provided a workable agreement, until it was replaced by the Indus Water Treaty.
INDUS WATER TREATY
After the signing of the Inter-Dominion Agreement, water supplies to canals of Central Bari Doab Canal System and Dipalpur Canal, offtaking from Hussenawala (Ferozepur), continued, but Pakistan was asked to search for ‘‘alternative’’ sources as India wanted to use the entire supply of the three eastern rivers.
Just at that juncture, Chairman of TVA (Tennessee Valley Authority) D Lilienthal, after a tour of the subcontinent, published an article highlighting the danger to peace in South-East Asia due to the water dispute between India and Pakistan. He requested international agencies, such as the World Bank, to use their good offices to end this dispute.
In response to the above, Eugene Black, President of IBRD (International Bank of Reconstruction & Development), an agency of the World Bank, offered its services. The talks started early 1952 in Washington.
After considering the ‘‘proposals’’ put up by India and Pakistan, the World Bank in February 1954 advanced these, and they came to be known as the ‘World Bank Proposals’. The proposals comprised the following:
1. Division of the Indus Basin, with Sutlej, Beas and Ravi reserved for use by India and Chenab, Jhelum and Indus (excluding some use by Jammu and Kashmir) for use by Pakistan.
2. Meeting Pakistan’s replacements by ‘Construction of Replacement Works’. India accepted the proposals but Pakistan carried out water studies to prove that ‘‘serious shortages’’ would result if the replacement works did not cover Jhelum and Indus.
The World Bank, in May 1956, submitted its ‘Aide Memoir Plan’, under which it recognised that ‘‘shortages’’ would also be considered while meeting the replacement use. The World Bank also asked both the parties to submit proposals for ‘Annual Mean Use Replacement’.
Pakistan submitted proposals in June 1958, which came to be known as the ‘London Plan’ and which took into account the Upper Link Canals, with transfers from river Indus. This plan was not accepted by India on account of ‘‘the excessive cost involved’’ and it instead submitted the ‘Marhu Tunnel Proposal’.
It proposed construction of Marhu Tunnel to transfer certain amount of supplies from river Chenab to river Ravi during the Kharif period, and release of a corresponding amount of water to the Sutlej Valley Canal System and CBDC System during the Rabi season when shortages were likely.
Pakistan rejected the Marhu Tunnel Proposal on the grounds that there was risk of ‘‘interference’’ by India in the flow of the western rivers, but indicated it was willing to accept the World Bank Proposals earlier accepted by India.
By this time, the World Bank had got around to the view that India alone should not be asked to pay for the replacement works. So Pakistan was asked to prepare a ‘‘realistic plan’’, considering India’s ability to pay.
The Indus Basin Advisory Board was set up and it prepared and presented the ‘Indus Basin Plan’ to the World Bank at the end of 1959. This Plan, after some modifications, finally became the ‘Indus Basin Settlement Plan-The Indus Water Treaty’. It was signed on September 19, 1960, at Rawalpindi (Pakistan), and with it the water dispute between India and Pakistan came to an amicable end.
The total cost of the Indus Basin Development Fund was worked out and the World Bank provided Rs 500 crore to Pakistan by raising money through donor countries like the UK, Canada, West Germany, Australia and New Zealand. The share of India towards meeting the replacement works was limited to £62 million (the rate at the time was approximately £1 = Rs 10).
The writer has written extensively on water disputes