The air offensive against Iraq where nearly 10,000 strikes sorties have been carried out so far, mostly against targets in Baghdad, has undoubtedly played a crucial role in the war. But what would be studied with great care in future would be the degree to which the much promised ‘‘shock and awe’’ impact of massive air attacks, which were expected to rapidly destabilise Iraqi ability to hold together for any coherent military resistance, hasten Iraq’s surrender if not the remove Saddam Hussein, and expedite Anglo-American victory, achieved the publicly expected results. The basic doctrine of psychological shock effect and awe of combat air power relies heavily on a number of factors for success: surprise and suddenness of attack, concentration of destructive force both in time and space, the lethality of attack, a sense of helplessness among the victims exacerbated by absence of earlier experience, and so on.In this case the US gave up the advantage that surprise and suddenness would normally have provided by the strategy being debated publicly for weeks before the actual start of the massive strikes literally cautioning the Iraqis of what to expect and hence prepare them mentally and psychologically. This was further eroded by the change in plans dictated by the immediate small-scale (two F-117 aircraft strike with 40 Tomahawk missile) precision ‘‘decapitation’’ strike in an effort to hit Saddam Hussein even before the fighting started. This strike was worth attempting. But this also reduced the shock value of the main heavy air offensive which came after an inevitable long gap resulting from change of plans. Secondly, almost all attacks were carried out at night. This reduced the visibility of the air attacks, especially since all weapons used were precision guided. The shock effect of air attacks is enhanced by the visible impact of such strikes on those subjected to it. There has been little or no area attacks or ‘‘carpet bombing’’ even of the type we saw in the war in Afghanistan. From the US point of view this was essential strategy since the aim was the Iraqi establishment and civilian casualties were sought to be kept to the very minimum. The strikes also were carried out from higher altitudes than 12 years ago. On the other hand, the anti-aircraft artillery in Baghdad kept firing incessantly conveying an impression that serious counter-attack was being undertaken. This no doubt provided a certain level of assurance to the Iraqis that their military was defending them. It is a different matter that, contrary to Iraqi claims, the US does not appear to have lost any aircraft. The known losses have been to friendly fire or attack helicopters where battle was joined during daylight in central Iraq.Thirdly, the targets attacked by the Anglo-American air power were government buildings like the palaces of Saddam Hussein, key ministries, communication centres, most of which were situated in large compounds. Such buildings would be empty at night and the strategy of minimising collateral damage would have further reduced the shock effect even on Iraqi military, leave alone the population at large. It is interesting to recall the reaction of Pakistan Air Force leaders in Bangladesh when many of them admitted after the 1971 war that they were not worried about the strikes by IAF MiGs and Hunters since they would carry out very accurate strikes on specific military targets. They in fact, would stand in the open to take a grandstand view of such attacks without personal risk. But what worried, and scared many, were the random attacks at night.Fourthly, it is well known that acclimatisation to air attacks reduces their shock effect. Compared to the present rate of air effort, Iraq, including Baghdad, had been at the receiving end of nearly three-times the number of sorties during the 42 days of the Gulf War in 1991. We also know from history that sustained bombing of cities does not necessarily lead to break down of morale or resistance. Everyone in Baghdad above his or her teens would have witnessed the bombing of 1991. They would, thus, have been in a better position to withstand the shock effect compared to those few who were under attack for the first time. Above all, it seems that much of the projection of strategy was part of the Anglo-American information warfare. This process itself reduced the surprise effect of what to expect. As it happened, the extent of air strikes in the first 48 hours was much smaller than what everyone was led to believe. And as soon as some of the key elements of that information warfare started to unravel by contrary facts, the impact of the awesome air strike also started to reduce. All this is not to suggest that air power has not made a major contribution to the ongoing war. In fact it would be difficult to visualise Anglo-American victory without their superiority in the air. But it would be necessary to evaluate the concept of ‘‘shock and awe’’ strategy through massive air strikes to expedite surrender once full facts are available. Meanwhile Anglo-American air power is proving to be really effective in interdiction strikes.Air Commodore (retd) Jasjit Singh, editorial consultant to The Indian Express, will analyse the war daily. Readers can send their queries to him at jasjitsingh@expressindia.com
