The Saga of Zojila

When the Army landed at Srinagar airport in the wee hours of October 27, 1947, the Pakistani raiders were just a few kilometers away. If theydid not pause a day at Baramula on October 26 to whet their appetite for rape and loot, they could have been in Srinagar and the Maharaja’s accession would have come too late. From this back-to-the-wall position, the Army under the leadership of Major General K.S. Thimayya cleared the raiders from all of the Kashmir Valley in the few weeks left before the onset of winter.

The Pakistanis, however, were soon on the offensive. On May 10, Kargil fell. On June 6, Dras fell. The Srinagar-Leh route was blocked. The Pakistanis also came to control the heights dominating the Zojila defile. The Zojila garrison was besieged. In Ladakh, the Pakistanis were in Nimmu and controlled the Nubra Valley. Leh was less than 30 kms away and defending it was a puny force consisting of one platoon of Dogras and three platoons of J and K state forces. Less than 70 men supported by 300 newly raised Ladakhi home-guards faced a battle-hardened force of over 500 Pathans, Chitralis and deserters from J and K forces stiffened by a strongcontingent of Gilgit Scouts. The only access to Leh were foot-tracks from Manali via Keylong over the 17,000-foot-high Bara Lacha La and Taglang La passes, and another one from Jammu via Kishtwar and Zanskar.

The legendary Sonam Narboo had not yet built the airfield upon which Air Cdre Mehar Singh and Maj Gen Thimayya were too soon to make their historic and world-record-breaking landing. To save Leh, the Indian Army had to reopen the old Srinagar-Leh trade route to central Asia, a distance of 365 kms. This meant retaking Dras and Kargil and clearing the Pakistanis from their positions around Zojila before winter set in.

The saga of the northern campaign began on October 31, 1947 when there was something like a coup d’etat in Gilgit. It was led by the two British officers in charge of the Gilgit Scouts, Major W.A. Brown and Capt A.S. Mathieson, and was supported by renegades from the J and K state forces garrison. The coup also had the support of the locals with whom the Maharaja’s regime was never verypopular. Ignoring the sentiments of the local “Liberation Front” that favoured complete independence, Major Brown decided to opt for Pakistan.

Did the treachery of the British officers have London’s blessings? Not unlikely. The departing British saw in Pakistan a potential frontline state for the containment of Communism and a reliable ally who can be trusted to continue playing the “Great Game”. It possibly made sense for the British to have their ally in control of the strategic area that abutted the then USSR, the then Afghanistan and the then Tibet.

Pakistan next aimed for Skardu, a major center on the Gilgit-Leh road. On February 15, 1948, the siege of Skardu began. The Indian Army made two attempts to relieve Skard. Both failed. On August 14, as the country was preparing to celebrate the first year of independence, Skardu fell.The battle of Zojila is set against this backdrop. Maj Gen K.S. Thimayya issued his operational instructions to Brigadier K.L. Atal of the 77 Para Brigade on August 29. Itwas an ambitious plan. This was the first time the Indian Army would be operating at high altitudes. The brigade was entirely unprepared for warfare in extreme weather and on arduous terrain. Most of the troops in the five battalions comprising the brigade hardly had any time for acclimatisation and were in light clothing. Nevertheless the attack commenced on September 1. The enemy held firm and Operation Duck failed.The Army Commander, Lieutenant General K.M. Cariappa, ordered: “Change the name of the operation from Duck to Bison, but continue we must with our plan with Zojila and capture Kargil.” Thimayya realised that a mere change of names was not enough. The 77 Para Brigade needed firepower to blast the enemy from the positions he had strongly dug himself into on the Zojila heights. His solution was brilliant. He ordered the deployment of a squadron of Stuart Mk-VI tanks of the 7 Light Cavalry commanded by Lt-Col Rajinder Singh “Sparrow”. Accordingly its C company of the 11-ton tanks was ordered tomove to Baltal.

The tanks needed a road. An eight-km length of the track had to be widened and strengthened to take the width and the weight of the tanks. The engineers cut this path into the rockface in about 20 days. The road was completed on October 15 and the stage was set for the assault on Zojila. Because of the steep gradient the tanks had to be physically pushed up by the jawans on to the narrow track to position them for the final assault. Tanks had never been used at this altitude before.

The assault began on November 1 having been held up for about two weeks due to bad weather. The appearance of the tanks rattled the enemy. The ranks shot out the enemy’s high pickets while the infantry mopped up the slopes.Many of the bewildered Pakistanis were hunted out of the numerous caves and killed. The tanks were not to stop there. On November 12 they appeared further up the road to Kargil at Matayan. On November 24 Kargil was retaken and the linkup with Leh completed.

The 50th anniversary of thishistoric battle will soon be upon us. It is a sad commentary on the times that the nation, fighting to preserve Jammu and Kashmir’s integration for half a century now, did not commemorate the first war with Pakistan It is a sad commentary on the times that the nation, fighting to preserve Jammu and Kashmir’s integration for half a century now, did not commemorate the first war with Pakistan. We can make amends at least now.

The writer is adviser in the Finance Ministry