The wages of peace

With the Indian Army formally issuing instructions to its personnel to halt combat operations against militants during Ramzan in Jammu and Kashmir, a nailbiting phase has begun in the state’s chequered quest for peace and tranquility. To be sure, dark shadows have already been cast, with militant organisations picking on the most vulnerable sections in the state — Sikh truckers, Hindu commuters — to register their disgust over any initiative aimed at delivering normalcy to Kashmir. For the administration and the security forces, this immediately underlines the obvious task at hand in coming weeks: to maintain communal harmony amidst pointed provocations, to step up their vigil and anticipate incendiary strikes. These terrorist manoeuvres are clearly aimed not just at averting any rapport between New Delhi and Kashmir’s militant groups, but at creating panic and unease in the state, thereby preparing fertile ground for rumour and mishap.

This, of course, is merely the strategic imperative; more important is the humanitarian challenge to address the insecurity ordinary denizens of Jammu and Kashmir would naturally harbour. Peace will be the first casualty if the people begin to automatically link ceasefire offers with heinous massacres — as happened this summer when the Hizbul Mujahideen’s olive branch was sought to be countered with the deaths of pilgrims and labourers, and as is happening now. Compassion, not cold logic, must dictate the government’s response to their grievances. If that explains the reason for caution, it also highlights the need for persistence. Were the current initiatives to come to naught, it is unlikely that the peace process will be resurrected in a hurry. That would be tragic. It would be instructive then for each of the key players to open their ledgers and determine what is at stake here. If the dividends of peace for the government and the Kashmiri people are too obvious to be stated, the equation is not thatsimple for two other key sectors: the separatists and the Pakistan government.

Divisions in the separatist camp are evident. The Hurriyat, which has been traditionally pro-Pakistan, has shown a welcome flexibility and empathy in its response to Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s Ramzan offer. JKLF leader Yasin Malik has been more than conciliatory in committing himself to exploring a solution; Abdul Ghani Lone has been wagging his finger at Islamabad; his colleagues in the Hurriyat have advocated a nuanced response whereby they conduct talks with New Delhi, with Islamabad, with militant groups, to arrive at some sort of understanding. It is this central role being advocated of the Kashmiri leadership that unnerves leading segments of what is sometimes termed Jehad International, Inc. Kashmiri leaders cannot afford to turn a blind eye to the emerging choice between jehadi unity and Kashmiri well-being. As for the powers that be in Islamabad, paternally providing patronage to jehadi groups and rejecting peace initiatives by the Hizbul and New Delhi alike, they too face aprincipal-agent dilemma. These groups may foment trouble across the border, to the Pakistan government’s immense delight, but these same groups are also involved in much of the sectarian violence threatening Pakistan’s stability. The implications of the Ramzan ceasefire extend well beyond the borders of Jammu and Kashmir.