Not withstanding the logic of emerging international equations, the US is likely to launch its war against Iraq soon. Which way this war goes will greatly depend upon how it is fought. By all accounts, it will not be a replication of the 1991 Gulf War since the political and military goals are now quite different. Twelve years ago, the central objective was the reversal of Iraqi aggression and the liberation of Kuwait, not the capture of Iraq or even the defeat of its military power beyond that necessary for its retreat from Kuwait.Nor is the Afghanistan War a model for insight into the impending war. Iraq is still a functional state with all its institutions intact, if weakened by long years of wars and sanctions. The Saddam regime is disliked by all the neighbours, but it cannot be equated with Taliban rule.SCENARIO IDirect frontal attack, rolling back the weak Iraqi army, would involve urban combat where the US superiority in military technology would be eroded. Basra is the only major city where Iraqi resistance may be limited since Saddam would need to keep his elite forces for the defence of Baghdad. This is why the Republican Guards, unlike in 1991 when they were deployed around Basra, are now deployed on the approaches to Baghdad. Iraq might set the oil fields west of Basra on fire to delay US advance. A direct run from South beyond Basra may require splitting the advancing forces into two to advance north along the only road axis, which are on either side of the large marsh areas between the Tigris and the Euphrates. History tells us that because of terrain and other factors, strong resistance is possible even by a weak defender at Kut al Amara in the east. On the west, the holy cities of Karbala and An Najaf could create serious complications for the US forces. Fighting in the streets of Karbala and An Najaf would be politically disastrous and impose heavy military penalties. Iraqi forces in the region are sizeable and would delay US forces stretching the time-line. The US risks getting bogged down in urban battles and suffering high casualties (see box). Prolongation of such war would risk strengthening anti-US sentiment in Muslim countries. Meanwhile, Saddam Hussein may stay in power and continue to motivate strong opposition to the US. International pressure may limit Washington’s policy choices.If anything, the US is likely to seek replication of ‘Operation Cactus Lily’, which India executed in the lightning campaign for the liberation of Bangladesh in 1971, with inevitable variations due to technological and situational factors.Since much of the post-war judgement on a war rests with who the winner is and who the loser, at this point we may set aside the issue of legitimacy to try and examine the possible scenarios the war may produce. The US’s stated and un-stated possible political goals in the impending war may be summed up as follows:n Regime change in Baghdad, which may require physical occupation of Iraq, especially the core area around Baghdad.n Assured and permanent WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction) disarmament of Iraq.n Restructuring of the Middle-Eastern order, which would make Iraq more manageable and allow a possible different approach to Israel-Palestine conflict, even if the vision of a ‘‘democratic’’ Iraq remains unrealised.n Allow US influence and even control over energy resources of Central and West Asia in the coming decades.n Reduction of US dependency on Saudi Arabia, especially for stationing of troops in the holy land (which have triggered anti-US sentiments and terrorism against the US), and relocation of military presence in Iraq in the name of reconstructing Iraq. n Sustenance and reinforcement of the US doctrine of unilateralism, pre-emption and sustenance of the image and perceptions of US dominance and strategic supremacy in an apparently unipolar world even with reduced dependence on allies.The likely military goals of the war in pursuit of these political objectives, then, can be summed up as follows:n Demonstration of massive power through concurrent air and ground campaigns. n Causing strategic paralysis by applying accurate lethal air power concentrated in time, space and technological advances. Because of the tremendous advances in technology, the coming war is likely to witness reversal of the proportion of guided-to-unguided weapons as compared to the 1991 war. n Using air power and Special Forces to hit Saddam Hussein directly, pulverise the palaces with special weapon, including those like the MOAB (Mother Of All Bombs — an evident pun on Saddam Hussein’s description of the 1991 Gulf War!)n Support surface forces operations, especially those by Special Forces, a la Afghanistan, in locating and hitting the prime target: Saddam Hussein and his immediate supporters.Iraq’s military objective would be to get the US forces committed to street battles in major towns, especially in Baghdad, Mosul, Kirkuk, Kut Al Amara, Karbala and Basra. The US already enjoys near-total air superiority.Given the terrain, likely deployment of forces, US mastery of air, and the war aims, two possible scenarios for the war could emerge. Each of these would have their own after-effects. One thing is common to both — Iraq would be finally defeated by the US in the war. This will provide conditions for assured WMD disarmament and most of the political goals of the United States.SCENARIO II Adopt a strategy of indirect approach similar to India’s ‘Operation Cactus Lily’. Then, the Pakistan army (like the Iraqi army now) was expected to deploy itself in strong defensive points of main cities,so that the Indian army would get bogged down in urban battles. India instead used synergised army-air forces for rapid manoeuvres bypassing towns, de-stabilising the Pakistan army and quickly defeating elements that sallied out to engage in combat. The ‘Cactus Lily’ strategy would simply bypass towns and rapidly advance on the key objective of Baghdad,while continuing to pound it with highly accurate but massive offensive air power and Special Forces operations. The US forces’ initial objective would be to occupy the oil-rich areas of south (west of Basra), western Iraq stretching from Habbaniya westward, and north (Mosul-Kirkuk region). A large number of airfields would be available to build up forces further for a siege of Baghdad. Nearly 17 ordinary Divisions of the Iraqi Army could be isolated well outside the Baghdad zone and unable to provide support to each other or the Republican Guards around Baghdad. The armoured units of Republican Guards would be targeted by accurate strikes by UAVs and remote strike options. US would need to occupy the western region of Iraq to control the oil fields at an early date. The northern region could be problematic if Turkey does not finally agree to deployment of US forces through its territory. In this case, US forces would have to advance from western Iraq region to the north before fully investing Baghdad. The US under these circumstances would stand a high chance of an early victory with minimum casualties, even if it takes time to break down the final resistance in Baghdad region. The US would have meanwhile controlled the oil-rich areas of Iraq, the Kurdish region would apply additional pressures on Iraq, and Saddam Hussein would loose support in the face of increasing helplessness.
