Think Tank Inc.

National security policy making has inevitably attracted the deep interest of policy-makers, opinion-shapers and students and practitioners of national security across the world. Every country evolves its apex national security policy-making apparatus based on its history, culture and the nature of its political system. Because of its pervasive influence on world events and even the fortunes of individual countries, the policies and the way decisions are made at the highest levels in the United States, naturally continue to be objects of great interest and value.

The need for better coordination of foreign and military policies was felt as far back as World War I. But it was not till WW II that the NSC was formally established under the National Security Act of 1947 to ‘‘advise’’ the President in respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military ‘‘policies’’ (and not of various departments, as some might imagine).

Interestingly, Admiral James F Forrestal, as the Secretary (Minister) of the Navy, had pushed for the basic format for an NSC, along with the separation of the air force from the army, in order to override the moves for the establishment of a civilian-led integrated higher defence organisation which, the US Navy feared, would undermine its independent role! President Truman set up the NSC, a civilian-led higher defence organisation, and also an independent air force.

The shape, size and functioning of the NSC has undergone remarkable changes over the decades and every President has designed its role and work as an extension of his own perceptions, interests and priorities as might be expected in a presidential system where only the president and the vice-president hold elected office. The NSC does not make decisions, which remains the prerogative of the President although, as may be expected, there have been numerous departures from this principle. The history of the NSC is replete with successes and failures, cohesion and contradictions, including ‘‘rogue’’ operations by its staff (the Iran-Contra affair being the most dramatic one). More often than not, there has been tension between the US State Department and the NSC, the former composed of ‘‘regular’’ career diplomats functioning in a hierarchical structure and outside experts operating as ‘‘irregulars’’ and far less tied to bureaucratic precedence in the latter.

The role of the National Security Adviser naturally has been crucial. Among the various styles of functioning, the most successful (and majority) model has been the one between a counsellor and a coordinator, while there have been some who operated at the extremes edges as administrators of policy or even pursuing insurgent activism.

The NSC Staff in the US is composed of professional experts in specific fields brought in from outside the formal system, and constitute the core that produce policy options based on virtually unlimited access to intelligence and other sources of information. The CIA director, who sits atop all the dozen-odd intelligence agencies, works under the National Security Adviser who chairs the NSC Principals Committee composed of the Secretaries of Defence, State and other members of the NSC.

The book is full of details and analyses vital to the understanding of US national security policy-making apparatus and process. A careful reading of the book also makes it abundantly clear why an NSC is not feasible for a country like India. This is fundamentally due to the difference in the political system of a presidential form and a cabinet system of government. Unlike their American counterparts, Indian cabinet ministers must devote time and energy to their constituencies.

But what we need to adopt is the collegiate method and culture of decision-making based on committee system for national security that is the hallmark of the American system.