Threat potential of Air Tigers

Other militant groups may try to emulate the Tigers and acquire some kind of air power. That should worry India

Nearly six years after it had first attacked the Kattunayake air base of the Sri Lanka Air Force (SLAF), the LTTE has again struck — in the early hours of March 26. Unlike the earlier ground attack, the Tigers have for the first time used their air wing, baffling everyone. It was a surprise, because two light aircraft flew all the way from Wanni and returned safely after inflicting sufficient damage on the air force fleet — and that at midnight. The Sri Lankan government has played down the attack, but it is pertinent to look at the air power of the LTTE: its intent, its strength, and threat potential.

The primary objective of the Vaanpuligal (‘Air Tigers’) is to counter the SLAF, which of late has been instrumental in the Tigers’ reverses in the East. The LTTE, in the early days, had used anti-aircraft guns to counter the SLAF. More recently, however, these guns have not been of much use because of SLAF’s advance fleet. The only option left for the LTTE, therefore, was to engage SLAF in the air. The LTTE also needed an air wing to demonstrate to its people and the world its capability of establishing a state structure. It now has air, sea, and land forces with intelligence, artillery, and commando wings. It is, significantly, the only militant group after the Nicaraguan ‘Contras’ to acquire air power but, unlike the Contras, it did this without any external state support. It had declared 2000 the ‘Year of Air Tigers’ and during the Heroes’ Week of November 2004, the Air Tigers, for the first time, displayed their newly acquired aircraft at Mulliyavalai in Mullaitivu district, by sprinkling flowers on the graves of dead LTTE cadre. The air wing is useful for emergencies: to get supplies from outside the region or evacuate critically wounded cadre. But its most important utility is to deter the Sri Lankan government from indiscriminate bombing on LTTE-controlled areas.

‘Col’ Shankar, once an aeronautical engineer with Air Canada, and later chief of the Air Tigers, had developed the air wing from scratch since 1995. Although he was assassinated in September 2001, Air Tigers continued to develop. The Tigers have an airstrip of about 1,200 meters southeast of the Iranamadu irrigation tank and at least two light fixed-wing aircraft with “the capability to fly for about 350 nautical miles at an average speed of 150 mph (240 kmph) and carry an ordinance load of 1,040 kilogrammes”. It is believed that a handful of LTTE cadres were trained in France and the UK as pilots. Interestingly, LTTE chief Prabhakaran’s son, Charles Anthony, who at present heads the IT wing of the LTTE, possesses a degree in aeronautical engineering .

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The LTTE is now in a position to attack any target in Sri Lanka. For the time being, it may not launch suicide attacks similar to 9/11 on Colombo high-rises or targets of economic and political significance, but such a possibility cannot be ruled out in the long term. Instead of politicising the issue to gain international sympathy, it is vital for the Sri Lankan government to identify the most likely high-risk targets on the island and find ways to defend them. The Palaly air base in the Jaffna peninsula is likely to be the next target. The SLAF must, therefore, strengthen its air defence systems on a priority basis. As the LTTE finds its supply routes choked due to increasing monitoring of the high seas by the countries around Sri Lanka, it may attempt to transport supplies through air. Colombo might consider cooperation from its neighbouring countries to monitor air space on the pattern of the existing naval cooperation against the Sea Tigers on the high seas.

India has to carefully weigh the threat to its own security from these developments. With its present range, Air Tigers can strike southern Tamil Nadu, especially oil refineries in Tuticorin. Such a possibility is remote for the moment, since the Tigers will be careful not to incur India’s wrath. However, given the web of linkages between the LTTE and many militant groups in India, the ‘Air Tigers’ do pose an indirect threat to Indian security for two reasons. One, they may encourage other militant groups to try and emulate the Tigers by acquiring some kind of air power. Second, although the LTTE has no history of hijacking, will it be in a position to resist a plane, hijacked by a friendly terrorist group, from landing on its air strip?

The writer is a senior fellow with the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi