Three can be company

For India, mentioning China in the same breath as J&K might amount to accepting third party intervention in what it sees as a bilateral problem. Pakistan, which always wanted a third party role in Kashmir, might find that having your prayers answered is not always a good thing. For Beijing now has every reason to prevent the emergence of even a semi-independent Kashmir that could become a haven for extremism and terrorism.

At the Shanghai conference, Chinese concerns on the growth of political Islam in J&K rang out loud and clear. Chinese apprehensions are no longer limited to the Muslim majority Xinjiang province bordering the Subcontinent. In recent weeks China has had to confront Muslim rioters in its heartland, the Hebei province.

As a rising power, China would want to play a larger role in South Asian affairs. But it doesn’t want to be seen as a part of the problem in J&K.

While the reservations of New Delhi, Islamabad and Beijing on the idea of triangular cooperation in J&K have some merit, their character changes when you take a closer look at the complexity of Jammu and Kashmir.

India, which insists on Indo-Pak bilateralism in Kashmir, also bitterly complains that Islamabad has ceded more than 5,000 sq km of the state to China as part of a Sino-Pak border settlement in 1963. New Delhi is displeased at Beijing’s reluctance to discuss that portion of the boundary in the western sector involving parts of J&K ceded by Islamabad.

China might want to be an influential “outsider” rather than an “insider” in J&K. It says territories under its control have never been part of J&K. But the Sino-Pak boundary agreement explicitly states that the arrangements under that treaty would be revisited when a final settlement of Kashmir is worked out by India and Pakistan.

Islamabad might find the Chinese position on J&K increasingly uncomfortable. From virulent support to the idea of self-determination in J&K during the ’60s and ’70s, China has steadily moved towards neutrality on the subject.

Forget the national positions for a moment. That the original state of J&K, as defined by New Delhi, is currently divided among India, China and Pakistan is a simple reality. Whichever way you look at the map, J&K shares a long border with Xinjiang and Tibet. Until now India has chosen to deal with its territorial disputes in J&K on separate bilateral tracks.

That is a sensible policy, and no one is making the case to merge them. The proposition here is different — take advantage of the geo-politics of J&K at the confluence of India, Pakistan and China. With the three countries now committed to a peaceful resolution of their problems in J&K, it is no longer outrageous to suggest regional economic cooperation beneficial to all three.

If India and Pakistan are discussing a bus service between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad, why not similar links between Ladakh in J&K and Lake Mansarovar in western Tibet? Or between Ladakh and Xinjiang through the Karakoram pass? Could we have a bus from Kargil to Skardu and beyond to Gilgit in Northern Areas which are under Pakistan’s occupation? Could Ladakh link up with the Tibet-Xinjiang highway that runs through Aksai Chin, disputed between India and China? Could Indian Kashmir access the Karakoram highway between Pakistan and China that runs through the Northern Areas?

In the past India strongly objected to these roads as infringements of its sovereignty in J&K. Without giving up that formal position, New Delhi can seek user rights over these roads as part of a triangular cooperation with Beijing and Islamabad. In return India could offer transit rights to Pakistan and China in the territory of J&K under its control.

A network of existing and new roads connecting the three nations would open up some of the most spectacular parts of the world to tourism with immense benefits to J&K, Xinjiang and Tibet. India has already proposed joint development of tourism in J&K with Pakistan. It makes even more sense to bring in China to create broader synergies.

Some even dream of oil and natural gas pipelines running from the Caspian Sea through Chinese Central Asia to J&K and on to the Subcontinent.

China says economic development must be the primary objective even in disputed areas among neighbours. It wants to promote economic integration among contiguous regions between China and the Subcontinent. It has proposed sub-regional engagement between southwestern China, eastern India, Myanmar and Bangladesh. It backs similar cooperation among India, China, Nepal as well as China, Pakistan and Afghanistan.

If we accept this pragmatic approach, it is but one short step more to trade and transport links in J&K between India, Pakistan and China.

Over the long-term, the revival of the historical silk roads between Kashmir, Tibet and Xinjiang could help generate new prosperity and anchor a final solution to J&K in a stable framework of regional cooperation. In the near term, developing all-weather transport links between India and J&K, connecting the divided parts of J&K, and initiating sub-regional integration with China could contribute significantly to the state’s economic fortunes.

Dr Singh, more than any one else, knows economic development in any region must begin with taking advantage of natural location. J&K was once part of the silk road. Tensions between India and Pakistan and those between India and China over the last six decades isolated J&K from its economic habitat.

Amidst the prevailing winds of globalisation and regional economic integration, the prime minister has the luxury of conceiving a different grand strategy for India in Jammu and Kashmir.