An Indian presence in Iraq is to India’s advantage. For too many years this country’s foreign policy has struggled with the mechanics of becoming a regional power. This cannot be done by diplomacy, because merely speaking at international fora like a regional power, as we have been doing these part fifty years only irritates everyone. Now there is a chance of being accepted as a regional power and it would be timid of Delhi if the opportunity is wasted. A number of arguments have been given against India’s participation in Iraq. These include the principle of not operating under US command, the fear of antagonising the Iraqis, the need to wait until a UN command is formed, and the lack of a domestic consensus on sending troops to Iraq. Some of these arguments are weighty, the others are frivolous. Lost somewhere in the chaos of accusations and abuse is India’s self interest, which above all is to be seen ‘‘in Iraq’’ as a just and reliable elder brother. Scratch an Iraqi and he will have nothing but good to say of Al-Hind and the Al-Hindis. This common Iraqi’s perception of India goes all the way back to the connections between the two pre-historic civilisations and the era of pre-European trade, when Basra was a major transshipment point for Indian goods going to Europe through the merchants of Venice. Iraqi financiers, mainly Jews and Christians in Baghdad (since Muslims were forbidden to loan money) drove the bill-discounting business that funded the Indo-European trade. Basra dates were an annual feature all along the West coast when the Arab sailing dhows brought them and took Alphonsos back to the Middle East. The Baathist regime (which later became corrupt) took India as a model in many cases, especially when it came to secularism in society, education for women and separating the church and state. An entire generation of Armed Forces officers remember having been part of the Iraq military training mission. To the Iraqi government the religion of their instructors was irrelevant. Most importantly, Iraq as a state was a creation of the old Indian army between 1919 and 1922. Every Iraqi government department has its origin in the efforts of the British and the Indians who set it up. Hundreds of them lie buried in Iraqi cemeteries. Until 1932 the Indian rupee was Iraq’s official currency. To take the arguments against going into Iraq until a UN command is set up — India participated in the coalition operations off Somalia, before a UN command was set up. Only last month a group from the Army Madras Engineering Group were in Sri Lanka for two months on a mercy mission after unprecedented floods in the Sri Lankan highlands. None of the post-IPKF withdrawal bitterness came in the way of the Sri Lankan expedition. Of course, it would be ideal to go into Iraq under a UN command. It matters a great deal that any Indian troop in Iraq are seen in the distinctive blue beret on the UN. The beret would be of great symbolic assistance. Without the beret, the Indian presence in Iraq would be a little more hazardous and difficult. But does that mean we don’t go? Being a regional player is not without its difficulties. In Somalia an Indian brigade operated successfully. In a large measure the success came from understanding African and Asian societal values. The Somalia brigade quickly established a rapport with the elders in Somalia society and operated, where possible, through them. This strategy was all the more important since there was no Somali government. Certainly, operating in Iraq will be a challenge and hopefully the contingent that goes there won’t consist merely of infantrymen, but a strong contingent of engineers, medical staff and best of all, a battalion of the Border Roads with the ability to restore Iraqi infrastructure. Certainly the hazards of operating in Iraq will be less than operating in Somalia, provided the composition of the contingent reflects the purpose for which they are being sent. The Congress opposition to a quick Indian participation is entirely misplaced. The Congress should not forget that it was in their time that Indo-Iraqi friendship was forged in modern times and it was the Congress that continued India’s military mission in Iraq when the country was fighting another old friend and neighbour — Iran. If this friendship was without costs, it would be understandable, but mixed up in the annals of the Indo-Iraqi assistance narrative during the Iran-Iraq war is the dubious statistic that the largest number of oil tankers hit by Iraqi Exocet missiles between 1983 and 1988 were Indian ships. If an Indian contingent goes to Iraq the BJP government would be doing no more than fulfilling the congress’ own foreign policy objectives in the Middle East. The argument that Indian troops should not be under US command comes obviously from a lack of communication between the ruling and opposition parties. The Americans have already made it plain that the command structure in Iraq would be such that the Indian contingent would not be seen to be operating under the Americans. Either the government has not conveyed this to the Congress or the Congress has not understood what was conveyed. The point is that India would look foolish, timid and indecisive if its contribution came to Iraq after everyone else had already arrived. In such a case the Iraqi would be unlikely to forgive Al-Hindi. The only apprehension is that the Indian contingent should be accompanied by a strong civil affairs section that includes administrators, diplomats and engineers. Operating in the Shia South will be different from operating in the Sunni North. Much before the contingent goes to Iraq, the civil affairs section should be active, having been deployed in Kuwait for the purpose. This has to be a politico-military effort with the ground work for the arrival of the contingent being laid by the civil affairs section long before they are actually inducted. Is this kind of co-ordination happening? Perhaps not, which would be sad, because time is required not for the government to make up its mind but to prepare the contingent and to lay the ground work for the men to operate successfully in Iraq. Whether the Indians are seen as Occupiers or as Administrators depends on how much preparatory work is done in Iraq. If the Indians are to be seen as being different from the Americans then there is much more to sending a brigade with the instructions to ‘carry on’. The advance party of the military and diplomats should already be in Kuwait smelling out the ground.
