
It is disappointing to find that the Sino-Indian Joint Working Group has not made more substantial progress on issues relating to the 4000-km Himalayan border between the two countries.
Following the steps taken after the last two rounds of official talks, it was thought further agreements on troop pullbacks and an exchange of maps on certain segments of the border would be possible during the 10th round held in New Delhi this week.
During President Jiang Zemin’s successful visit last year agreement was reached at the political level to accelerate border talks. This also helped to raise such expectations. In particular it was hoped both teams would be able to engage in discussion about their differing perceptions on parts of the boundary in the western sector which has not received as much attention in the past as the eastern and central sectors. In the event, the JWG appears to have gone no further than to agree about what was previously agreed.
No one can dispute the argument that putting in place and observing a clutch of confidence-building measures is essential for peace on the border. The evidence is there to be seen. But surely, just as essential is steady and definite progress towards resolving outstanding questions. If this has not occurred, it would be because mutual confidence is not of the order that both sides would wish it to be today. Qualms have been expressed in the Indian defence establishment about troop withdrawals in terrain where the Indian side would suffer a disadvantage. However, logistical problems are not, in essence, intractable and can be resolved given sufficient goodwill on both sides. Nor should heightened and justifiable concern over the well established fact of China’s nuclear and missile relationship with Pakistan be allowed to slow down the work of the JWG. If such factors and related domestic political considerations have indeed formed the backdrop to this year’s border negotiations, it would be most unfortunate.
Compartmentalisation of the border dispute, separating it from other areas of India’s China policy, has worked very well over the last decade. It has facilitated the normalisation of relations and the development of economic and other ties which in turn strengthen the political relationship.
Continuing this approach can only improve the prospects of a resolution of the long-standing border dispute. The nuclear question has been raised at political levels and will no doubt be raised again in the event of a prime ministerial visit to Beijing. Washington as is well known has been loath to act on Beijing’s violations of nuclear and missile treaties and agreements. Now with Beijing introducing a set of domestic nuclear export controls in order to facilitate US Congressional approval of nuclear trade between the two countries, Washington will have one more reason to fight shy of taking action against China. In short, it is imperative that the issue of Beijing’s on-going nuclear assistance to Pakistan be placed high on the bilateral Sino-Indian agenda but it should not be done by self-defeating linkages with border talks.


