Toothless watchdogs can only watch, not act

The institution of the CAG, created under the Constitution, was envisaged to constitute a vital link in the process of shaping public accountability, for ensuring that the people entrusted with public revenues remain answerable for physical, managerial and programme responsibilities conferred on them. CAG possesses these responsibilities through audit reports, which are presented to the Parliament and are examined by its Public Accounts Committees (PAC). There are frequent complaints of wastage, fraud, costly delays, allegations of inefficiency, bureaucratic interference and corruption, which are highlighted in the reports brought out by CAG.

There is, however, the inescapable feeling that the facts brought out in these reports do not lead to any effective and timely action. Reports are commented upon by the PAC, audit paras contained in these reports inviting more paragraphs. These are sent again to the concerned departments and organisations, and they get submerged under exchange of correspondence, seldom leading to any positive action.

On an average, CAG issues 100 reports every year. It has 15 audit offices dealing with the central government and 31 offices dealing with states. In all, there are about 100 offices, including accounting and entitlement regulation functions. The staff strength is about 35,000 persons on audit side and 25,000 on accounts and entitlement side. The annual budget is over Rs 300 crore. The general impression is that in spite of immense powers of the Auditor General, and despite the numerous staff and funds utilised for the purpose, there is a continuing breakdown of accountability and wastage, and that fraud and misuse of public resources are not effectively checked.

CAG also oversees the accounts of the PSUs and highlights the cases of lapses, including their implementation of loss-making orders. Instances have been brought out such as the Bharat Electricals Limited (BHEL) losing Rs 52 crore on sale of shells for TV tubes, General Insurance Corporation (GIC) losing Rs 330 crore in their investments on occasions. CAG reports brought out instances of wastage and frauds of appalling proportions, but in spite of immense powers and constitutional status as well as independence conferred on CAG, it has not been possible to secure any satisfactory solution to curbing corruption, misuse and frauds, and to control financial indiscipline.

There are allegations that out of the total expenditure of the central government, at least Rs 20,000 crore goes down the drain every year due to corruption, besides involving inefficiency and apathy at various levels. It has been estimated that almost 10 per cent of budgetary allocations actually reach unauthorised hands. Despite the power and efforts of CAG, corruption, fraud, misuse and mismanagement of public funds are generally reported to go unchecked and unabated.

It has been voiced that the institution of CAG has been reduced to impotence and the role of Audit has been undermined by inept and corrupt executive. Thousands of paras of misuse and abuse of public funds are recorded every year by the audit staff of CAG and Accountant Generals of the States which owe allegiance to the CAG, but these paras are brushed aside at various levels. The role of the CAG reports under the present system is believed to have been reduced merely to the business of pinpointing instances of deficiency, inefficiency and misuse. It possesses no power to effectively pursue the instances leading to punitive action against the unscrupulous persons.

Recommendations of the CAG are not yielding any tangible results, and there is now a feeling emerging that there is no reason why the audit paras which disclose wrongdoing should not be registered as FIRs and pursued for investigation by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) or the Anti-Corruption Branch (ACB).

Central Vigilance Commission (CVC)

The CVC is another organisation which shoulders the responsibility of exercising vigilance for avoiding misuse of authority and curbing corruption. It was set up in 1964, as a watchdog mechanism against corruption. It is an independent and neutral body to advise the government in matters of corruption, misconduct, allegations relating to integrity and other malpractices on the part of public servants under the control of the central government, including PSUs and banks.

The machinery of vigilance has been set up also in departments and ministries as well as in PSUs and in some States, for facilitating and conducting enquiries. The commission has the status of independence and autonomy. Its annual reports are placed before the Parliament. The observations, findings and recommendations of the commission are confined to the concerned departments of the government and the PSUs.

Legally, however, the commission is only an advisory body. This fact inevitably handicaps its functioning, including the main objective of curbing corruption. It is restricting its operations only to cases of defaults committed by government servants, and that too limiting itself to the operation of senior gazetted officers. Although the political appointees apparently come within its purview in their capacity as public servants, the CVC has never dealt with exposure of misdeeds of non-government servants or launched persecution for any misdeeds of political figures. It has to depend upon the CBI for conducting investigations in cases involving non-government servants or examination of unofficial documents.

The CVC is under obligation to submit all cases to the home ministry. The strength of staff of the CVC is over 200. In one year, it receives as many as 4000-5000 complaints, including cases referred to it for advice. As an institution for checking corruption, the CVC has actually not come up to the expectations and does not appear to have felt it competent to exercise authority to investigate cases of corruption relating to senior bureaucrats or political figures. Its functioning gives the impression of its being only another branch of the ministry of home affairs.

Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI)

The CBI is an institution which is charged directly with the responsibility of conducting and investigating organised crime and corruption. Its investigations cover all, including political figures as well as government servants. Its operations range over departments and organisations of the government, PSUs and banks. It has a staff of about 35,000 persons, including 650 investigating officials. Its operations cover the entire country. It has offices in all the States.

It makes secret enquiries where any cases of crime or corruption are referred to it, collects all the relevant facts including information about assets disproportionate to the normal source of income. On the basis of its findings, FIRs are registered and prosecutions are followed up. It has a branch specifically charged with the responsibility of investigating cases of corruption.

There have been cases, though very rare, where political figures have been subjected to investigation by the CBI, though there are quite a number of cases where it has initiated action against officials including senior bureaucrats. It does operate under the handicap that it cannot initiate action against any official or political figure of the state government without permission of that government, which may not be easily forthcoming.

Grievances machinery

There is a Department of Public Grievances under the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions. There is also a Grievances Cell in the Cabinet Secretariat. A large number of grievances are addressed by the people to these, but the general impression is that these operate mostly as post offices for passing on to the concerned organisations or departments.

These grievances are seldom followed up. A similar position prevails in most the States too, where such machinery for receiving public grievances exist but where the same impression prevails about their functioning as mere intermediaries for passing on the complaints to the concerned departments.

Prevention of Corruption Act

The Prevention of Corruption Act was enacted as long ago as 1947. It has no doubt been amended from time to time but there is a general feeling that it does not meet the present day requirements of effectively curbing and punishing corruption. Objects and Reasons forming part of this Act are indicative of its inadequate approach to the problems of curbing and punishing corruption. It, at most, serves to strengthen the provisions of Sections 161 and 165 of the Indian Penal Code prescribing that offence under this Act will be deemed to be a cognisable offence, and laying down the criteria and circumstances for pursuing the persecution of guilt of the person accused of the offence.

There are instructions laid down in this Act regarding officers who are authorised to conduct investigations of corruption, and permission that the authorised officers have to take before they can embark upon any investigation. This Act enables action to be taken against the ‘‘government servant’’ and the ‘‘public servant’’ for the purpose as defined in the Indian Penal Code, which includes also political functionary besides ‘‘government servant’’. But it is seldom that in actual practice, this enactment is used for launching prosecutions against any political appointees and functionaries.

Important requirements

Against this entire background of the departments and functionaries appointed for curbing corruption, one feels that there are certain important steps which need to be taken for achieving the objective of curbing corruption. One major step that was considered necessary and which has not hitherto been taken is that of the establishment of the institution of Lokpal, which was conceived in 1964 and was strongly supported by the Administrative Reforms Commission in 1966. It was recommended that the Lokpal, in the shape of an ombudsman, will be established at the Centre and that similar arrangements would be made in the States by establishment of Lokayukta, these persons to be equated respectfully to the Chief Justice of India and the Chief Justices of High Courts.

Bills for the implementation of these recommendations, in particular for the establishment of the Lokpal at the Centre, were prepared and introduced in the Parliament on five different occasions — in 1968, 1971, 1977, 1985 and 1989. It was conceived that the offices of Prime Minister and Central Ministers would also be brought within the purview of the Lokpal, whereas the offices of the chief ministers and ministers of states would come under the ambit of operation of the Lokayuktas.

Despite every possible effort, it is unfortunate that till now, no legislation has been enacted to implement recommendations of appointment of Lokpal in the last 40 years. Lokayuktas have been established in certain States. These include Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and Rajasthan. In some states, Up-Lokayuktas have also been set up.

In certain states, Lokayuktas have been able to deal with allegations against corrupt senior political functionaries, in others the position is not clear.

Concluded.

The writer is director, Common Cause

PART I

PART II