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This is an archive article published on June 2, 2000

Two swords in one scabbard

General Vijay Jetley, Force Commander of the seven-nation UN peacekeeping troops in Sierra Leone, faces a situation on the ground much mor...

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General Vijay Jetley, Force Commander of the seven-nation UN peacekeeping troops in Sierra Leone, faces a situation on the ground much more complicated than the one he had set out to manage. At stake is also the fate of 3,000 Indian troops in the contingent.

Gen. Jetley’s job, as mandated by the UN, is to implement the Lome peace agr-eement, brokered, among others by Bri-tain. The agreement brought into the government in Freetown, capital of Sierra Le- one, Foday Sankoh, leader of the Revolutionary United Front, as a vice-president. Just as Sankoh has his detractors, he also has his supporters, the principal among them being President Charles Taylor of Liberia, bordering Sierra Leone on the east. Sankoh has also been given charge of the ministry which looks after the diamond mines around Koidu, the eastern town not far from the Liberian border. Liberia is the conduit for diamond smuggling.

On May 1, about 500 UN troops were captured and detained allegedly by the RUF, which claims to be waging a war on behalf of the dispossessed in the countryside against the city dwellers. Why did the RUF detain peacekeepers? It transpires that 10 RUF soldiers ca-me to an arms-surrender-camp set up by the UN at Makeni, a key town on the nor-thern road that links Freetown to the diamond mines in Koidu. Zambian peacekeepers in charge of this camp were su- ddenly surrounded by an RUF army. Not only did the Zambians surrender their ar-ms but also parted with their uniforms.

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In a comical twist to the proceedings, the RUF troops are now floating aro-und parts of Sierra Leone looking like a posse of the Zambian army. Since communications are a problem in the country, it appears the surrender of the 10 RUF soldiers was seen by the leadership as a unilateral action, a sort of mutiny. Orders we-re hurriedly issued to surround the camp and take the Zambians hostage. In other words, lack of communication within the RUF precipitated the crisis.

The second explanation is that the RUF is not a cohesive force and that bands of armed units are roaming the countryside with their own agendas.The third and the most plausible explanation was given to me by UN secretary-general Kofi Annan. "When Gen. Jetley and his men took over, he was able to deploy troops in areas the earlier regional forces had never been deployed. And obviously Foday Sankoh’s strategy was to become president through the bullet or the ballot. That being the strategy, he was not going to give up his weapons, nor the diamond mines that fund the war and his men.

So we (Gen Jetley) were moving close to the bone, moving in where it hurts." RUF’s action aga-inst the peacekeepers was, therefore, a preemptive move because Jetlie was implementing the disarmament of ar-med brigands.

This accompli-shed, the Lome Pe-ace Accord of July 1999 also seeks ot-her steps: for inst-ance, the restructuring and training of the Sierra Leone ar-my. Since it is the mandate of the UN peacekeeping troops to help implement the Lome Accord, it is taken for granted that the training mission too will be the task in which Gen Jetley will be involved.

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This precisely is where complications have arisen. Indeed key permanent me-mbers of the Security Council, like the US and Britain, are already exploring ways of revising Lome. This means that Gen Jetley and the 3,000 Indian troops may have gone into Sierra Leone to implement one mandate. But once there, they may be in for a surprise revision of that mandate, endangering the accord and the lives of the peacekeepers.

The British are key players because, having been the former colonial masters, they know the turf and have deep interests in the country. They are divided on what ought to be done to contain the situation.

Sandline, the British mercenary company, which was responsible for the coup in Sierra Leone, had to be withdrawn when the scandal erupted in London that Lt. Col. Tim Spicer, boss of Sandline, had actually been given the green signal by the British foreign office. This, despite an arms embargo against Sierra Leone. Foreign Secretary Robin Cook, taking a more ethical line, suspended the Sandline operations and supported the Lome Accord.

Earlier, President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah was keeping the peace with the support of the South African mercenary outfit Executive Outcomes. According to Ricco Visser, an Executive Outcomes official, "Britain and the US pressured Kabbah through the World Bank to remove Executive Outcomes."

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Once the peacekeepers were ta-ken hostage, the mercenaries were lobbying again. But, instead of intervening through mercenaries, on this occasion Britain intervened directly sending in 500 paratroopers, aircraft, ostensibly to evacuate 600 British citizens, NGO’s and to secure the Lungi airport. Now it transpires that 800 British troops, under Brig. David Richards, are to stay on to train the Sierra Leone army. The army has taken Foday Sankoh captive. But if the Sierra Leone government is now proceeding against Sankoh, what happens to Lome which seeks reconciliation? And since the British troops are operating outside the UN, the situation in the troubled country is clearly a case of two swords in one scabbard.

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