September 11, 2001, demonstrated the reach of global terrorism and its ability to bridge the asymmetry in power and strength between the terrorist and his victims. The coalition, formed to fight this scourge, achieved its immediate purpose of restoring a popular government in Afghanistan, but its composition does not enable it to tackle global terrorism comprehensively since not all its members have a firm commitment to this objective. The military action in Iraq involved another ‘‘coalition of the willing’’, and in the process opened up divisions within the UN Security Council, European Union and NATO. Today, we hear two prognostications of the evolving new world order. The first is of a unipolar world with the US taking the principal decisions on international political and economic issues. According to this theory, the dominance of US power would drive the impulse to unilaterally shape the world in its image, brushing aside any dissenting opinion. The other model is one of a world comprising multiple political poles, suggesting that a certain level of tension between the poles will maintain an equilibrium in which the dominant pole can be kept in some check. While pondering on the viability of the model of a unipolar world, we need to recognise that the post-Cold War order has been profoundly influenced by globalisation. Inspired by — and now itself driving — the technologies of the information age, it affects every aspect of human and group activity. No country or society has remained immune from this phenomenon. The consequences of globalisation cannot be localised within national boundaries. Even States with the most advanced technical means are increasingly unable to fully control international flows of disease, illicit drugs, funds and weapons. The international information networks of terrorism and the proliferation of WMDs among its state and non-state practitioners can only be countered by cooperation between democratic societies through information exchanges and intelligence sharing. Today, a regional epidemic like SARS becomes a global problem overnight. The ongoing arguments about whether more real-time information might have halted its spread prove the point of global interdependence. Such global interdependence means that even a unipolar power needs cooperative action in pursuit of its various objectives. The current crisis over North Korea is an example. The question is also one of resources. If a terrorist network is smashed in a failed or failing state — as Afghanistan was under the Taliban — there would obviously be costs for the reconstruction of the state. The external assistance for Afghanistan’s reconstruction is now about $250 million a year; it would need to be increased and sustained over many years. The cost of restoration after the last Gulf War was higher, and that of Iraq’s reconstruction is expected to be much, much higher. No single world power, however rich, would want to take on this kind of financial burden, at the expense of its taxpayers. On the second model, we should realise that in the real world, an arrangement not in conformity with geopolitical realities cannot be sustained. It is an unquestionable fact that USA is the pre-eminent power in the world today.It would make poor political or economic sense for a country — or a group of countries — to set itself up as an alternate pole in opposition to USA. Most countries advocating a multipolar world also affirm that they attach great importance to relations with USA. What they seek is an ethic of plurality and consensus which would ensure that collective decisions give due weightage to their legitimate interests and concerns. Nearly sixty years ago, after the end of World War II, America was in a similar position of political, military and economic pre-eminence. Then, a mature American communitarian impulse inspired the creation of a multilateral global architecture. The UN, the WTO, the World Bank and the IMF are all products of this internationalism. The challenge today is not to demolish these edifices, but to address their shortcomings, some of which are serious. Deterrence, prevention and defence are accepted elements of a national security strategy. But today, the international terrorist is often an irrational individual, ready to sacrifice his and innocent lives for an extremist cause, acquiring WMDs and using unorthodox techniques to overcome asymmetries of strength. There can be no deterrence against irrational behaviour. Prevention and defence are also almost impossible. In such cases, extraordinary measures have to be taken in the interests of security. This is where a smoothly operating world order with a functioning consultative mechanism can help to provide legitimacy. It is from these strands that a new world order would be woven. What we need is a constructive and continuing dialogue on the management of global interdependence. In the world order defined by the Cold War, India and US were not really allies though, to be fair, nor were they enemies. India-US relations reflected a lack of engagement, coupled with wariness and a periodically recurring suspicion whenever the shadow of the Cold War fell over our region. In the post-Cold War world (and even in the post-9/11 world order), the situation is dramatically different. We have shared geo-political interests and economic opportunities, which can bind an enduring partnership. This was the perception that led PM Vajpayee to declare, nearly five years ago, that the two countries could be ‘‘natural allies’’, which have yet to fulfil the promise of their cooperation. We know that President Bush fully shares this vision for an enduring India-US partnership. The US National Security Strategy states, ‘‘The US has undertaken a transformation in its bilateral relationship with India based on a conviction that US interests require a strong relationship with India. We are the two largest democracies, committed to political freedom protected by representative governments. India is moving towards greater economic freedom as well. We have a common interest in the free flow of commerce, including through the sea-lanes of the Indian Ocean. Finally, we share an interest in fighting terrorism and in creating a strategically stable Asia.’’ This is a succinct statement of our complementarities and convergences. It is particularly refreshing that our two countries are now looking at the full scope of the Indo-US relationship. To speak very frankly, what really stunted the growth of our bilateral relations in past years was the tendency to look at India’s role only within a South Asian canvas and to see South Asia solely as the theatre of an India-Pakistan zero sum game. India has broken free of these limiting confines, which the Cold War ideologies sought to impose. It has land borders of well over 3000 km with China and Southeast Asia. It has maritime borders with Indonesia and Thailand. Its exclusive economic zone spans the waters almost from the Persian Gulf to the Straits of Malacca. As your National Security Strategy recognises, it straddles the commercial sealanes and oil routes from the West to East Asia. .I have set out these facts in some detail, illustrating India’s wider political, economic, security and strategic interests, to reiterate that to view India solely through a South Asian prism would be an analytical error. In our view, the world made this mistake in May 1998, in its reactions to India’s nuclear tests. Our security concerns, which prompted that decision, are better understood today. Given its history, Indo-US relationship needs to liberate itself from a number of misconceptions and prejudices of past years. I think we have made considerable headway on this path with good impact on our relations. Our leaders are in regular touch with each other on the phone and through letters. Regular exchanges of visits at the political and senior official levels have resulted in a harmonisation of our position on a number of issues. Nowhere is this engagement more visible than in defence and security.On a diverse range of other subjects, India’s interactions with USA and its reactions to US statements or actions have been governed by a pragmatic understanding of realities, rather than doctrinaire ideologies. This does not imply that there are no longer any differences between our two countries, but there is certainly a realisation that there is far more that unites us than divides us. We have had differences including over issues like our nuclear programmes, but a sustained bilateral dialogue with a frank exchange of concerns has led to a far better mutual understanding on these issues. I have been saying very candidly that a trinity of issues — high technology commerce, civilian nuclear energy cooperation and collaboration in space can take the Indo-US relationship to a qualitatively new level of partnership. India has consistently followed responsible policies on non-proliferation of nuclear and missile technologies and has strict export control regimes for dual-use technologies. The sharp contrast with others in our near and extended neighbourhood is evident for all to see. We believe that our discussions with our American partners on this subject are on the right path and hope that the road to free high technology commerce will be cleared of the hurdles of misconceptions. We have to cover the same path for civilian nuclear cooperation and collaboration in space. Here again, I have to say that the obstacles come from remnants of Cold War thinking and are not in consonance with our mutual interests. India has repeatedly asserted — and this is acknowledged internationally — that its nuclear and missile development programmes are entirely indigenous. We have not violated any of our bilateral commitments or international obligations. We will continue to restrict the development of these programmes to the minimum levels required for our national security. IN sum, therefore, the political leadership in both countries sees value in building upon the natural links between our two democracies in a globalising world. The India-US relationship is not a single-issue relationship. Our friendship is based on a broad range of shared values. Societies of this size and complexity, by their very nature, cannot agree on all issues. Our disagreements are now increasingly discussed with the candour and confidence injected by the recent transformation of our bilateral relationship. Both combating terrorism and forging a new world order demand close and solid partnerships among democratic societies, which value freedom, pluralism and entrepreneurship. These are the values that unite India and the US. To fulfil this potential, we have to ensure that the firm broom of cold logic decisively sweeps out the cobwebs of Cold War misconceptions and blinkered mindsets. We are working hard at it.
