‘US must help Pak counter Soviet arms to India’

In a 1973 classified memo, Kissinger wrote that it's in US interests to do 'what we can in response to ongoing Soviet supply to India'.

Pakistan could not be left at a disadvantageous position vis-a-vis India militarily and it was in US interests to counter Soviet defence supplies to New Delhi, a top Richard Nixon administration official had argued.

“The main threat to Pakistan at this point seems to be in terms of its own internal cohesiveness,” Henry Kissinger, the Assistant to the President for National Security, had told Nixon in a White House Memo dated March 7, 1973.

“Nevertheless, Pakistan must have a military force that can preserve internal integrity and permit President Z A Bhutto to negotiate with India from a basis that is as advantageous as the basic balance between the two countries permits,” Kissinger felt.

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“It is in the US interest to help in any way we can to thwart subversion in Pakistan, whoever supports it. And it is in our interest to do what we can in response to ongoing Soviet supply to India,” he wrote in the classified memo now been made public as part of an ongoing discussion of American foreign policy in South Asia from 1973 to 1976.

“We must, however, deal with the fact that resumption of full-scale military assistance would risk an almost certain congressionally imposed embargo. Thus it would seem to me that a return to our 1967-71 policy of limited supply is about as far as we can go. This would be a disappointment to President Bhutto, but it would be helpful,” he wrote.

Noting that the President has already made certain decisions on cleaning up past commitments to Pakistan, he said.

“You have approved releasing to Pakistan USD 1.1 million worth of equipment which Pakistan owned but was held up here on the docks in 1971 at the time of the war.”

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“The physical release of this equipment awaited only the opportunity to initiate general discussions on our relationship with the Indians, which you approved as part of the game plan,” Kissinger wrote.

“…I would not minimise the Indian reaction. However, I do not see how we can avoid going through with this earlier commitment. The Indians and those who support their case here will charge that this is just the beginning of a US effort to alter the military balance between India and Pakistan.”

However, the US would be doing no more than reverting to a limited arms supply policy that would not change the military balance that already leans in India’s direction, he asserted.

“It seems sensible to make this move now when you will want to be at least partially responsive to Bhutto’s need for reassurance and when India’s tolerance may be at its peak because of strong desire to improve relations with the US.”

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It will be possible to explain this to India in terms of clearing the books of old commitments, he said but added that “If we explain release of the armoured personnel carriers in terms of cleaning up past commitments, the question of the USD 87.6 million in old economic aid (to India) suspended in 1971 will come up. Without clearing away this element of the past, it will be difficult to normalise our relations.”

Kissinger made four recommendations, including reverting to the 1967-71 arms policy for South Asia of selling non-lethal equipment and spares for previously supplied lethal equipment. He also suggested the suspension of the pre-war loans to India be lifted but it must not be informed until after the Pakistanis are told of the US military aid policy.

Nixon, according to the memo, approved all the four recommendations.