Vote for Iran a yes for Khan

(2)”In order to help the Director General to resolve outstanding questions and provide the necessary assurances, urges Iran to implement transparency measures as requested by the Director General in this report which extend beyond the formal requirements of the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol and include access to individuals, documentation relating to procurement, dual use equipment, certain military owned workshops and research and development locations.”

The Iranian equipment under investigation did not fall from the skies but were supplied by what the IAEA calls an “intermediary” from another country. Therefore, in the spirit of the above provision of the resolution, the IAEA has a right to have access to documentation relating to procurement, of the supplier’s side and to individuals who negotiated the deal for two instalments of supplies to Iran of 2000 and 500 centrifuges which facts have so far been established by the IAEA in its investigation.

All members of the IAEA are obligated to cooperate with its investigation. The conduct of any member who refuses to cooperate with the IAEA can be considered to give rise to questions that are within the competence of the Security Council as the organ bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. While Iran, as a member of the NPT, is obligated to convince IAEA that it does not intend to violate the NPT, in this case the country (Pakistan) which harbours the ‘intermediary’ (Dr A.Q. Khan) and is a member of IAEA has an obligation to facilitate access to Dr Khan by IAEA and all documentation in its possession on the deal. Otherwise to accept Pakistan’s verbal declarations on Dr Khan but not accept Iranian statements that it does not intend to produce nuclear weapons will constitute blatant double standards.

The resolution rightly focuses attention on the history of concealment — from 1987-2003. But this concealment was practiced not only by the receiver of centrifuges but also by the supplier. This calls into question the folk tale of authorities in Pakistan and US not being in the picture and coming to know about Dr Khan’s activities only in the late ’90s. Former US assistant secretaries of state, Henri Sokolski and Harry Rowen, have disclosed that they were informed by General Beg of Pakistan in ’90 that if Pakistan did not get adequate support from the US, then it might be forced to share nuclear technology with Iran. Further, Dr Ruud Lubbers, the former Dutch prime minister, has disclosed that the CIA had intervened to save Dr Khan from prosecution by Dutch authorities in ’75 and ’86, with the promise that they would be following him and watching him. Presuming that they did so, then Dr Khan’s dealings with Iran could not have come as a surprise to President George Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair in 2003. Nor could the former CIA Director George Tenet be right in his claim that the agency came to know about Dr Khan’s dealings only in late ’90s.

On the other hand, Dr Khan went public with Pakistan having made the bomb in January ’87 when he disclosed it to the Indian journalist, Kuldip Nayar. At that time presumably CIA had certain directives about Dr Khan and the Pakistani bomb. The CIA operative, Richard Barlow stationed in Islamabad who reported in 1987 of Pakistan having assembled the bomb, was transferred and punished by the agency. As mentioned earlier, former assistant secretaries Rowen and Sokolski presumably did not bother with General Beg’s threat to share nuclear technology with Iran. Recently, General Musharraf disclosed in an interview to the New York Times that Dr Khan was only a metallurgist who specialised in centrifuge technology and was not a bomb maker. This was demonstrated clearly when Pakistani nuclear tests at Chagai in ’98 were conducted not by Dr Khan but Dr Samar Mubarak Mund. However, the Chinese design of the bomb was recovered from Dr Khan’s supplies to Libya. If Dr Khan was operating alone and was dealing only with centrifuges, how could he supply the Chinese bomb design? That would indicate General Musharraf is being economical with the truth when he pretends that Pakistani military had nothing to do with supplies to Iran. CIA directors and Pentagon officials are practicing even greater economy with the truth when they tell the world they came to know about Pakistan-Iran proliferation only in late ’90s.

India at this stage would do well to inform EU-3 and US that unless a compromise is reached with Iran and the resolution in November is adopted by consensus, India will — in all fairness — be compelled to move a resolution to ask the IAEA to seek the cooperation of Pakistan and US in investigating the extent of Dr Khan’s proliferation activities in Iran as an essential part of investigation against Iran. It would at this stage be perhaps useful to solicit the cooperation of the NRI community to enlighten the US public of the known facts about Pakistani government’s proliferation to Iran and the US looking away from it, including the CIA-Khan contacts going back to ’75 as revealed by Dr Lubbers.

In India both our left and right should be asked to explain their stakes in shielding Dr Khan, Pakistan, CIA, China and US in respect of this issue.