For many Indians who call themselves “progressives”, the choice in the American elections today is clear. They prefer the professed “multilateralism” of John Kerry to the presumed “unilateralism” of George W. Bush. The Kerry multilateralists, according to conventional wisdom, could make America less prone to war and aggression; the Bush unilateralists, in contrast, would make the world a more dangerous place. This apparently self-evident choice in favour of multilateralism completely misreads the current US foreign policy debate. The Indian enthusiasts for multilateralism are likely to be disappointed by a Kerry administration, should the senator from Massachusetts wins tonight. The simplification of the American foreign policy debate into a soundbite — “unilateralism versus multilateralism” — hides many shared assumptions on power and purpose in American foreign policy. Both Bush and Kerry underline the extraordinary nature of American power today. Never in the history of international relations has so much power been concentrated in the hands of one nation. There is no prospect that American preponderance will lessen significantly in the foreseeable future. The difficulty starts when judgments have to be made on how this power might be used. The so-called “neo-conservatives” in the Bush administration believe that the military might of the American state could be an instrument in transforming the world — say, in promoting democracy in the Middle East. Liberal internationalists populating a potential Kerry administration share this assumption about the utility of American power. Kerry might be criticising the conduct of the Iraq war after the American occupation ran into trouble; but his voting record in the Senate shows a consistent support to American interventions abroad including in Iraq. One real difference between Republicans and Democrats is on when to use force and not whether to use it. The Republicans, in general, tend to argue that America must use force only when its national security interests are threatened. Liberal Democrats, on the other hand, look beyond national security interests. They believe America must intervene to preserve global law and order, prevent ethnic cleansing within national borders, and rebuild failed nation-states across the world. The neo-conservatives are unique, for they combine the liberal enthusiasm for deploying the American might to change the world with the Republican will to use overwhelming power. The Republican realists have huge reservations against messianic foreign policy goals and prefer to manage the uncertain world through balance of power politics. If Bush does manage to squeak through, the debate between neo-conservatives and realists in the Republican party would shape US foreign policy in his second term. Returning to the Liberal Democrats, they tend to be far more interventionist than Republicans. Bill Clinton dispatched American troops abroad far more frequently than George Bush. A second difference between the unilateralists of the Bush administration and the multilateralists of a potential Kerry administration is on how to use force. Kerry criticises Bush for marginalising the United Nations, alienating the traditional allies in Europe, and reducing the worldwide respect for America in the war against Iraq. President Bush argues the US cannot let other countries define the limits on its use of force. He says he does not need a “permission slip” from the UN to defend US interests. In operational terms the liberals are no different. The Clinton administration went to war in Kosovo in the late 1990s without a reference to the UN; it knew Russia would have vetoed such a venture in the Security Council. The Europeans, who now lament the demise of multilateralism, vigorously backed this war without a UN mandate. When it came to use of force and UN, senior officials of the Clinton administration used to say “multilateralism when convenient and unilateralism where necessary”. In reality, there is no way the UN can constrain the world’s hyperpower when it chooses to use force. If there is a choice at all in the US elections, it is between the “unilateralism” of the Bush administration and the assertive multilateralism of a potential Kerry regime. Somewhat counter-intuitively, India might find it easier to deal with the unilateralists in the US than those who swear by the UN. In the name of multilateralism American and European liberals want to construct a UN that disregards national sovereignty. For India, this will be doubly harmful. For western liberals and post-modernists, sovereignty of non-western nations is inconvenient. For India, state sovereignty is central. No wonder India joined the Bush administration in rejecting excessive powers to the International Criminal Court. Also recall how strongly India reacted against the notion of UN’s “right to intervene” that was promoted by Secretary General Kofi Annan in 1999 with the blessing of the liberals in America and Europe. Second, an expansive role for the UN in international security could directly affect India’s interests. The UN has on its books resolutions on Jammu and Kashmir and South Asian nuclear weapons. Can India ever accept them? Could India countenance UN intervention in Nepal or Sri Lanka to promote peace there? Indian multilateralists are loath to admit it — India’s regional policy is similar to American unilateralism in seeking freedom from external constraints. The liberal emphasis on international law, too, will be problematic for India. If the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is legal tender, India is an outlaw. Should they come to power, Kerry liberals could take us back to the frustrating nuclear arguments with the US. More fundamentally, India, whether we say it loudly or not, is a revisionist power. India does not seek more territory. It needs a revision of global rules — the nuclear regime, security decision-making in the UN, economic policy-making at G-8 — in order to be seated at the high table. The realists of the Bush administration, focused on power politics, are prepared for interest-based bargaining with India. There is less room for conciliation with American liberals, who emphasise principles and the finality of international law. Should Kerry win, India should be looking for ways to wear down the liberal imperialists. If Bush retains the White House, New Delhi has a chance to press a new global order that transcends the Yalta system.
