C is big in Bric

mattered,many Western observers stuck to the renminbi revaluation cause and exclusively monitored Hu’s comments on China’s managed exchange rate.

Having failed on their own to compel China to halt manipulating its currency,the US and the EU are lobbying other emerging economies that are equally or worse affected by the undervalued yuan to come together and apply pressure on Beijing. The tactic seemed to pay off,with Brazilian finance minister Guido Mantega declaring on the eve of the Bric summit that China’s inflexible currency rate “harmed our manufacturing sector”. India,however,avoided openly criticising China on the renminbi and has been negotiating bilaterally to reduce the ballooning trade deficit that stands in the latter’s favour.

Contrary to Western expectations,whatever the individual grievances of Bric members against China’s unfair trade practices,the currency row was not made an agenda item at Brasília. Reuters reported that “the other three emerging economies did not wish to risk fraying ties with Beijing over the issue” and hence stuck to more consensual tracks like demanding greater voice and weight for large developing countries in international financial institutions.

The desire not to upset China,or to get branded as proxies of the US,was a powerful motivating factor for the rest of the bunch at this year’s Bric summit. South-South solidarity,which is traditionally based on closing ranks to defend a fellow developing country against former colonial and current neo-colonial forces,only partially explains this deferential attitude towards China. The bigger story is the disproportionate power that China is accumulating while the rest of the Bric members grow at a slower pace. The combined GDP of Brazil,Russia and India falls short of China’s GDP by a whopping one trillion dollars.

Objectively,though the rest of the Bric states may not find it palatable,China is the dominant card in the pack and is set to further stretch its lead through breathtaking economic growth this year.

Multilateral institutions in which one state forges ahead at top speed and leaves the others far behind carry inherent tensions,wherein the rhetoric of sovereign equality and brotherhood cannot mask a sense that the lead state is taking advantage of the others or benefiting more from the interaction.

What options do states like Brazil and India,which are powerhouses in their own right but which economically trail China by a yawning margin,have to rid themselves of the embarrassment of playing second fiddle to China in Bric? The formation of Ibsa Dialogue Forum in 2003 was a deus ex machina that left big brother-like China out and brought in a major economy from the African continent,South Africa,thus evening out the field at least in one institutional arena. Interestingly,Ibsa is similar in intent to the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO),which was designed by Russia in 2002 to create diplomatic spaces free of China’s overshadowing involvement.

That Ibsa continues to meet without admitting the Chinese,despite calls for extending Bric into Brics and reorganising the older forum that conjoins regional powers of Asia,Latin America and Africa,is a reflection of the China-wariness that is spreading like wild fire within the global South.

Apart from the quest to deflect Chinese domination,two other specific China-pertaining problems inform Ibsa’s durability. First,all three Ibsa members are veteran contenders to be admitted into the UN Security Council as permanent members and have been frustrated greatly by the closed doors. China is a stumbling block,along with the US,for democratising the Security Council. No amount of South-South homilies can move Beijing to unequivocally advocate support for New Delhi on Security Council expansion. Ibsa,therefore,becomes a rallying point for the rejects that have been left out in the cold by a China that does not wish to dilute its status as the sole Asian permanent member of the Security Council.

Second,Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh clarified at Brasília that Ibsa remains a valid and self-sufficient format because the trio shares common democratic political systems. This is a rebuff based on the notion of liberal camaraderie of states to the Chinese clamour to be included in Ibsa. The links between democratic political parties and civil societies of Ibsa members have historic origins,dating back to the anti-colonial liberation struggles. They are being further boosted in ways such that China’s autocratic system would be a misfit. Six groupings convened on the sidelines of the Ibsa summit last week to bring together parliamentarians,women,businesses,academicians and journalists of India,Brazil and South Africa for dialogue and mutual learning. Imagine what a hypothetical state-infiltrated Chinese delegation and its contribution to such a vibrant mix of empowered social actors would look like!

Thanks to Goldman Sachs’s prescient coinage of the term ‘Bric’ and China’s own economic dynamism,Beijing is already an ‘emerged’ and inevitable actor in international relations of the global South. But the ‘emerging’ powers need to hedge and innovate institutionally to counterbalance a new empire emanating from the ‘middle kingdom’.

The author is associate professor of world politics at the OP Jindal Global University