General’s Knowledge

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General J.J. Singh has titled his autobiography A Soldier’s General. This phrase is used in military circles to describe a general who leads his men by example. Such generals are known as much for their operational skills as for the care they devote for the safety of their men. In other words,they have their feet on the ground and are guided by military prudence. J.J. Singh’s book sheds useful light on the nooks and crannies of soldiering in modern India. One wishes there were more such attempts that show the social as well as policy-making dimensions of the army,navy and the air force and their interactions with the political and bureaucratic leadership. Imagine if Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw,General K. Sundarji or Lieutenant General Jagjit Singh Aurora had penned their stories!

The chiefs of the army,navy and the air force in India perform unique roles,unlike their counterparts in other democracies. They are simultaneously role models for soldiers and officers,responsible for leading them in wars,and are also advisers on national security and defence matters to the cabinet through the defence minister. A service chief who commands the respect of the prime minister and the cabinet can add great value to national security. The chief has the formal role of the head of a service,but his judgement adds special meaning to the cabinet’s decisions. No civil servant,however experienced and skilful,can perform that role. India’s national security management structures and processes have,however,kept most service chiefs busy in negotiating the byzantine byways of the defence ministry. A national defence management system,created by colonial rulers to meet their imperial ends,and discarded in their own country,still remains the preferred choice of India’s political leaders and civil service. That service chiefs have to get their work done through an outmoded structure detracts greatly from the efficiency of the national security system. It also adds incalculable costs as in 1962 and Kargil,and can be ruinous in future.

The book’s great merit rests in the many descriptive sketches J.J. Singh draws of the way the Indian Army changed from the time he joined in 1964. His stories,which relate to every rank he held,also convey the human interest aspect of soldiering in India. The way leadership foundations are laid in the National Defence Academy and the Indian Military Academy,the manner in which the regimental system grooms officers for leading men in battle and later to plan and conduct them,will make fascinating reading for officers of all ranks and to civilians and analysts in and outside India. J.J. Singh was fortuitously in operational situations most of his life,requiring both combat acumen and planning skills. The way he coped with cantankerous commanders,sensitive soldiers and inconsiderate civil servants will offer lessons to those in service and for future leaders.

The Indian Army’s complex role in counter-insurgency operations have in many ways become the case study for other armies. Whether in the Northeast or in J&K,the politico-military nature of these operations has demanded from soldiers,officers and senior commanders sustained and long years of effort as well as personal leadership qualities of a unique kind. J.J. Singh’s descriptions of handling the combat and politico-military challenges as a brigadier in J&K are both intensely evocative of combat scenes — where he was targeted and wounded — and full of insights into how our officers and commanders lead from the front to fulfil their responsibilities. In this context,planted stories of a false encounter about the current army chief,who stopped a bullet in that combat action,or the civil society and media campaign to blame the army for the Chittisinghpura killings,where,it is now confirmed,innocent Sikhs were shot down in cold blood by terrorists,should leave no one in doubt of the anti-national campaign waged in J&K.

J.J. Singh’s description of the Kargil episode and its control from the Military Operations Directorate in the Army Headquarters provides a fine insider’s view of operational direction and policy-making in modern short campaigns. This account,combined with General V.P. Malik’s candid description (Kargil: From Surprise to Victory) of policy meetings in the cabinet led by the sagacious A.B. Vajpayee as the prime minister,comes closest to a first-hand account of that operation’s handling at the highest levels. That searing national experience had led to the famous Kargil Report,followed by a Group of Ministers’ recommendations. Neither the government then,nor those which followed,have yet implemented the major recommendations. Recently,a committee led by Naresh Chandra has once again made a set of recommendations on restructuring the national security apparatus. It is to be hoped that like J.J. Singh and others,future chiefs do not have to labour under an outmoded defence management system.

J.J. Singh provides his side of the story on General V.K. Singh’s date of birth debate,and insinuations of succession planning by which the current chief General Bikram Singh was elevated. This subject will remain the bone of contention for a long time to come,since there is not enough conclusive evidence that can bring closure to the debate. That six decades after Independence,Indian democracy has not been able to find processes to settle such issues firmly and transparently,is another proof of an inadequate politico-civil service-defence services coordination structure.

How does J.J. Singh’s autobiography contribute to a better understanding of India’s defence management process? His own views are frankly stated on the need for a chief of defence staff and theatre commands for India. That these are bridges too far is recognised by him. To his credit,he points towards interim measures,which can lay the foundation for major changes that are required. This book lays out the ground and the state of play clearly and unambiguously. That General J.J. Singh and his predecessors produced favourable strategic and operational outcomes for India,despite the defence ministry’s inertia,is the implied tribute which this elegantly written personal history offers.

V.R. Raghavan,retired lieutenant general,is president of the Centre for Security Analysis,Chennai