‘Humid conditions sapping,it gets tiring to trek’

The most recent case is that of the strike on a group of 50 CRPF and police personnel travelling in a truck and a jeep. They had deviated from the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs),which required them to walk or take two-wheelers to avoid landmines. A landmine explosion killed 11 of the personnel.

“There are clear instructions to security personnel that they should only move on foot to avoid landmine attacks. But the personnel,who wear heavy bullet proof vests and carry weapons,get exhausted very fast because of excessive sweating in the humid climatic conditions of Bastar,forcing them to board vehicles after long treks in the forests,” a senior police officer engaged in anti-Naxalite operations said.

“Ninety per cent of the causalities of security personnel in Bastar are due to landmine blasts,” he said,adding that strictly following the rules can help reduce damage if not prevent it. Over the past two years,close to 200 securitymen have died in the region in Maoist attacks.

Though security personnel are advised not to move in large groups and instead move in small groups in different directions,the forces tend to ignore these directions,he said. The other rules applicable here are with regard to ready reinforcement,use of local breeds of dogs trained in detection of IEDs and on movement of forces in the Naxalite area,he added.

Another recent example is the attack on a 40-member team of security personnel near Risgaon in Dhamtri district on May 10,in which 14 people died. The team,which was on an anti-Naxalite operation,was led by a head constable and no senior officer was present. There was no coordination between the police of two districts though these forces from Kanker district entered the neighbouring Dhamtri. They were travelling in three vehicles on the narrow forest road,making them vulnerable to a landmine attack.

After a landmine explosion,the group had no alternate plan in place for survival and for many hours there was no reinforcement available. The security forces reached the spot almost 12 hours after the incident — in fact a local television crew reached before they did.

Instead of simply following the SOPs,a CRPF Commandant felt that the state should raise their own specialised anti-Naxalite force. “Given the scale of the problem and the wide area we have to cover,we need more battalions. What can 40 or 50 jawans do when confronted with 300 Maoist guerrillas?”