What’s changed between US and us?

A central portion of this analysis was naturally focused on China which, the study noted, would emerge as a problem whether it got strengthened or weakened. Either it would challenge the status quo in Asia, or weak leaders might try to buttress their power with foreign military adventures.

Countering the Chinese threat, the Report argued, would include a strengthened Japan, theatre missile defence, and the emergence of India as a key counter-balancing force. As is now known, the encouragement of theatre missile defence proceeded apace, as did growing ties with India.

Meanwhile with the coming of Donald Rumsfeld, the hard-talking no-nonsense policy maker, the Office of Net Assessment was again tasked with updating the strategic picture.

In mid-2001, the classified “Defence Strategy Report” emerged which, while it concentrated on Asia, no longer talked of a weak China, but warned of the emergence of India and China as competing powers. With the CIA also noting that three-quarters of Middle Eastern oil was Asia-bound, it was apparent that the Indian Ocean and its choke points would emerge as significant conflict areas.

The paper also seemed to hint that Japan, with its energy lifeline through the South China Sea, threatened by an emerging China, would seek new allies in the region— which included India. Other smaller Southeast Asian powers might find it convenient to kow tow to China, and western navies would find their influence eroding as Indian and Chinese navies (with greater stakes involved) emerged as blue water forces. Again a relook at expensive basing options was recommended, as also the need to review defence programmes with a view to stressing long range power projection and strike missions.

Then came 9/11. Even as troops swung into action in Afghanistan, planning was already on for Iraq. Today, US troops are in Baghdad, Karachi, and Uzbekistan and also creating small ‘readiness points’ in Central Asia. Reports indicate that troops are also planning to move out of traditional areas like Germany and South Korea, and reorient plans towards Australia, Vietnam and Philippines.

Not surprisingly, Vietnam is a key country along the South China sea coast as is the Philippines. Indonesia and Malaysia are likely to be more friendly towards China. And, then, of course comes India, sitting astride the Indian Ocean.

How does India fit into this process of chop and change? The era of large bases spilling over with beer and brawny US marines has, by and large, given place to ‘engaging’ with possible partners by means of joint exercises, mil-to-mil talks and strategy sessions.

This approach gives the US an insight into the way India thinks, its capabilities and shortcomings. What is also likely is cooperation in providing the most important link—that of logistics—that tiresome job of ensuring that fuel, ammunition, stores and thousands of other aspects, literally the nuts and bolts of any operation, are made available quickly within a given operational theatre.

This, too, needs more bilateral understanding of how to make things work during crises. Most important, it needs a change in attitude on both sides, especially among Indians used to regarding any US military professional with hauteur.

Of course, the future contours of the India-US engagement depends on our own actions. Forward planning is something the defence ministry needs to concentrate on.

Economic performance is another. Being hailed by the Americans as the most populous democracy has its strong points, but barring a rush across the Chinese border by our unemployed millions, our defence can only be strengthened by a strong economy that can seek cooperation with China and the US. Seeking new threats can remain the business of the US. Let’s do business with our existing ones.

The writer is research fellow, Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis