Who did you say goofed up?

Only a very inept enemy would give indications of an impending operation on the radio net. As for tactical intelligence, it is largely restricted to thelimited space across the border or, during operations, across the `no-man’s land’. For operating in this shallow depth, only low grade sources are available — petty smugglers who often operate for both sides and are therefore not reliable. Shenoy is also misinformed about the presence of military intelligence personnel abroad. There are no such personnel. Indian military attaches are not mandated to work in the intelligence field.

What would have indicated the impending intrusion was the making of new tracks, helipads, the requisitioning of porters, the forward stocking of small arms ammunition and so on. The forward movement of a large number of infantry units and the deployment of artillery units along the entire front are the more definite indications of a possible large-scale ingress. The Kargil intrusion obviously involved all of these activities, which should have been picked up by the intelligence agency mandated to obtain such information. Had this information come in, winter conditions or no winter conditions, patrolling of the area would have been undertaken.

The KRC in its report has dealt with the most pertinent question of all: Was Kargil avoidable? It records, “A Kargil type situation could perhaps have been avoided had the Indian army followed a policy of Siachenisation to plug un-held gaps along the 168 km stretch from Kaobal Gali to Chorbat La.” But what does Siachenisation imply? As the KRC puts it,“This would have entailed establishing a series of winter cut-off posts with communications and other logistic support and especially equipped and trained troops to hold these positions…”

Siachen costs close to Rs 6 crore a day and the Kargil front would cost only a little less. The KRC also records that the post-Kargil deployment can only be a temporary measure at best. No army in the world has the resources to hold every inch of the border nor does it make tactical sense. The LOC along the stretch from Kaobal Gali to Chorbat La is recognised both by Pakistan and India in accordance with the Shimla Agreement as well as earlier ones. Any large-scale violation of this line would be an aggression.

There is no parallel between this area and Siachen. So Pakistan could not do a `Siachen’ at Kargil without committing an act of blatant aggression. This basic position has to be recognised to understand why the Army did not occupy this stretch.

Kargil had been the scene of massive artillery duels. So reports of dumping of artillery ammunition, Mr Shenoy, would by itself give no indication of a major ingress.

If we have not been able to effectively handle insurgency in J&K, it is more due to the absence of hard intelligence than lack of effort on the part of the Army. In the name of the dead of Kargil how much longer will this country suffer from intelligence goof-ups?

There were, of course, failures at Kargil, but of another nature. A few officers and the brigade commander got the sack as a result the GOC had his future sealed. Accountability does not come otherwise. After all, over 500 officers and men paid with their lives at Kargil. In contrast, the R&AW chief was made a governor. Where there is no accountability, organisations go to seed, Mr Shenoy.

The writer retired as Deputy Chief of Army Staff