In the past year, two reports by US study groups concerning the Indian sub-continent have been released. The first report, better known as the Haass Report, sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, was released in early 1997. A second report, more focused on the issue of Jammu and Kashmir, was released by the Kashmir Study Group (KSG) in October 1997. Put together, they encapsulate the sum and substance of US interests in the subcontinent.The two reports are mutually exclusive of each other in terms of the composition of the study groups with the exception of Robert Wirsing, who straddles both. Even the terms of reference for the reports are quite different. The Haass Report seeks to provide recommendation on evolving a new US policy towards India and Pakistan, while the mandate of the KSG is more limited to the issue of Jammu and Kashmir.What, however, is common to both reports, even at the risk of raising eyebrows amongst virtually all professional South Asian watchers comprising the two groups,is the pontificatory nature of their recommendations. In the context of Prime Minister I. K. Gujaral's firm rejection of third party mediation, much less any role for the US, such reports achieve very little in practical terms. In determining US policy towards India and Pakistan, the Haass Report appears more accommodative and seeks to urge the Clinton administration to undertake a carrot-and-stick policy for achieving some stability in the nuclear equation between India and Pakistan. For the Haass Report, Indo-US and Pak-US relations are underwritten by the nuclear question while in the KSG report, the recommendations made are entirely exclusive of the interwining realities that have sustained a very complex relationship between India and Pakistan and Washington's policies towards the region and its disputes.While the Haass Report does acknowledge that the US does ``not have a great deal of leverage on this issue'', the KSG is more pro-active in suggesting a series of measures which include involvement of ``the political representatives of the peoples of Jammu and Kashmir'' in the negotiations between India and Pakistan. In fact, the KSG wants the involvement of these representatives to be broader to include ``other major political, regional, ethnic and religious groups.'' This suggestion is a direct offshoot of the official US position that has always included in a nebulous form, the inclusion of ``true representatives of the Kashmiri people.''Perhaps another factor influencing the KSG's desire to give greater salience to participation by representatives from the former princely state is the understanding that the KSG received about Islamabad implicitly accepting the Third Option as a possible consideration to resolve the Kashmir issue. The report specifically notes that official interlocutors in Islamabad told the visiting KSG delegation that the proposal sent to India in February 1994 contained a flexible approach on the issue of plebiscite which was to mean a sort of commitment by Nawaz Sharif to explore the Third Option. These suggestions have caused immense apprehension amongst the hawkish lobby in Islamabad, which prompted General Karamat to pronounce a verdict even before Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has reacted to the proposals.Given Sharif's present position within the power structure, any attempt to strike an approach outside what the Establishment wants would run the risk of angering the armed forces, which rather reluctantly stayed in the barracks during the recent crisis.Despite Sharif's personal predilection to exploring the Third Option, the fact remains that such a proposal cannot be countenanced by the military. It leaves him with requiring some incremental advance on the Jammu and Kashmir issue, which can only come with Washington's intervention. The sudden spurt of articles in the Pakistani media by former Generals as well as analysts who tow the Establishment line criticising the Kashmir Study Group report is perhaps an indication that following Sharif's victory over the former President and the judiciary headed by Justice Sajjad Ali Shah, there is an element of unease that Sharif might be tempted to explore the Third Option.
