You may not like General but look who’s waiting in wings

with those subscribing to opposing opinions. The 1990s have been marked by the emergence of liberal/moderate, hawkish and Islamist groups on Pakistan’s foreign policy. These groups find a close link between Pakistan’s identity and its relations with the world and India. The liberals have talked of engaging India, but the other two groups have been reluctant to endorse such a policy due to their definition of Pakistani identity as either a ‘Muslim and not Hindu state’ or an ‘Islamic state’.

Musharraf may be weaker than he was in recent months but he’s still a safer choice than what may emerge if Pakistan and India keep on the levels of high tension

General Musharraf, despite being a hawk in the past, turned into a liberal/moderate after taking over in 1999. He attempted to rein in the Islamists present in the civil society courtesy of the Islamist elements in the government even prior to September 11, but failed due to the balance being in favour of the Islamists. In the post September 11 days, he managed to sideline the Islamists in the military regime and reverse Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy.

The change, however, needed to be made while keeping at least the other faction/group on side. Hence, from the very beginning of the counter-terrorism days, the General has refused to openly endorse a change or shelving of Pakistan’s Kashmir policy. But then, as the January 12 speech indicated, the commitment to the Kashmir policy had limits. The participation in the counter-terrorism alliance and the loss of training bases in Afghanistan has curtailed Pakistan’s ability to actively support Kashmiri ‘‘freedom fighters’’.

The speech, therefore, codified in a declared form what was already emerging as a reality. But a willingness to change a policy does not necessarily coincide with capability. And that has been the problem with General Musharraf throughout the current phase of intensified tension between India and Pakistan. India and the West expect him to deliver when his capability is not 100 %. This is not a question of his willingness but a matter of what a state which, until recently was being identified as a failed or failing state, can deliver. Musharraf, despite being head of the State, cannot guarantee that the elements in civil society would not benefit from and execute policies of the past. Nor can he guarantee that elements within the government would not undermine his position on foreign and domestic policies. He can merely try.

Against this background, and the continued Indian pressure which has succeeded in strengthening the hands and agenda of the hawkish elements, Musharraf could hardly give another moderate message on the lines of January 12. If anything, he had to and he has repeated his commitment to the Kashmiri issue to placate the hawks in the government. This is especially necessary as he needs to reclaim some of the lost ground after the ill-conceived and ill-managed referendum.

Does that mean that India cannot negotiate with a relatively weak leader? Not really. Musharraf may be weaker than he was in recent months, and he may have lost support from some of the ‘silent majority’ he counted upon during the US-attacks on Afghanistan. But he is a safer choice than what may emerge if Pakistan and India keep on the levels of high tension. There is no guarantee that if he is further weakened, and in the worst possible scenario deposed, the alternative leadership would not adopt even harsher policies. One needs to thank God for small mercies — even if they include much publicised speech that does not give a new message. Give him space so that hawks or Islamists do not take up the space. That definitely would not bode well for stability in the region.

Dr Samina Yasmeen is a Senior Lecturer at the Political Science School of Social and Cultural Studies, The University of Western Australia