Your Q, His A

Secondly, the Group of Ministers justified the creation of a CDS on the grounds that the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC), composed of the top three military leaders of the country, has ‘‘not been effective in fulfilling its mandate.’’ This was surprising, to say the least. The mandate clearly lays down that the Chiefs of Staff Committee (especially as a committee of three Commanders-in-Chief of the three forces) was to advise the Defence Minister, and normally through him, the Defence Committee of the Cabinet. But the Defence Committee of the Cabinet has not been functioning at least since 1962. We have a Cabinet committee for accommodation, but not for defence! Often enough we have had no full-time Defence Minister and the Prime Minister has held charge. So whom does the COSC advise? But the three Chiefs of Staff are also Commanders-in-Chief (C-in-C) of their respective services although the designation was removed in 1955.

There is no evidence, at least in the public domain, of the Chiefs, especially as a collective body of COSC, of having failed to lead the defence forces to successful defence of the country even against heavy odds as we saw in the last war in Kargil sector. The third reason advanced is that a CDS is necessary to provide a ‘‘single point of advice’’ to the political executive. This approach is diametrically opposite to the principle of corporate decision-making in large organisations especially when they are to also manage expenditures of around 2.5 per cent of national GDP and create credible effective defence capabilities for the future.

Building and using military forces is too complex, too extensive and far too important to be left to the judgement of one senapati. It is interesting, however, that the government having argued for a CDS on the need for single point of advice, has gone ahead with reforms that establish more than one point of advice. The CDS is to be the ‘‘principal military adviser’’ and the Defence Secretary as the ‘‘principal defence adviser’’ to the Defence Minister. At the same time the individual Chief would have the ‘‘right’’ to present his case to the political authority if he disagrees with the views of the CDS, thus undermining the single-point-advice logic. Unfortunately the real issues remain unresolved. Would the CDS be a super-commander above the three Chiefs who by law and constitution are commanders-in-chief of their respective Services? Or would he be responsible only for staff advice on future programmes, procurement and perspective planning? Obviously, if we have to have a CDS, his charter should pertain to the latter rather than the former. And it is essential that the two major responsibilities, that of operational command of current forces (the statutory responsibility of the Chief as the C-in-C of the force), and that of shaping future military capabilities (under a CDS assisted by the Chiefs of Staff) should be separated. The important thing is that we should have a CDS, but not for the wrong reasons and not in a wrong way. Integrated Ministry of Defence is crucial for a CDS to be what the title says: the chief of the ‘‘staff’’ of the defence establishment, insulated from command responsibilities and authority.