Your Q, His A

by some strategists in the West, like Kenneth Waltz, who have argued in the past that larger number of nuclear weapon states would actually enhance security and stability in the world. Because of the dangers of the spread of nuclear weapons inherent in the existence of nuclear weapons, India has consistently pressed for universal abolition of nuclear weapons so that nuclear energy can be used for peaceful purposes with greater confidence and mutual cooperation against any proliferation trends. But the absence of nuclear disarmament on grounds of the needs of national security actually provides the incentive for acquiring nuclear weapons by others. Concurrently, clandestine nuclear programmes, especially those undertaken by those who have treaty obligations not to acquire the bomb, undermine the international order.

Secondly, there has been a widespread assumption in India and abroad that Pakistan’s nuclear weapon programme and weapons have been under tight control. This belief has been reinforced by the reality that Pakistan’s nuclear programme has been under the direct control of its army at least since the mid-1970s. And the army has ruled Pakistan directly and indirectly all these decades. Its intelligence agencies, who are responsible for the security and control of nuclear weapons, are essentially an extension of the army. Numerous chiefs have publicly stated in the past that their nuclear weapons have been under total control and there was no scope of their falling into the hands of anyone else. But now the ‘‘investigations’’ and conclusions undertaken by General Musharraf and his government are asserting that the spread of nuclear weapons technology and material was unauthorised and undertaken by a few ‘‘rogue’’ scientists! Pakistani leadership has been vociferous in its assertions that the government (or the army) did not ‘‘authorise’’ any transfers.

This makes the situation far more dangerous than any supply of nuclear knowhow by the army. If the establishment has not been able to control even the few key scientists or they did what they did for their personal gain or ideological aspirations, then you can never be sure how many ‘‘rogue’’ elements in the army, the ISI and/or the nuclear scientific community may have been motivated to (or may still be able to) supply nuclear materials or bomb-making wherewithal to other states and people. The worse case scenario, of course, is the possibility that nuclear weapon material may have been transferred to ‘‘non-state actors’’ like extremist jehadi groups and/or individuals of the Mast Gul/Salahuddin variety. Such material can be far more easily used to make a ‘‘dirty’’ nuclear bomb which can cause horrendous devastation. And such threats are far more difficult to deter than a nuclear weapon state as such.

The third implication is that the international community would have to rethink measures to strengthen non-proliferation beyond the current levels and regime. All past efforts have relied on denial of technology which has also adversely affected development in countries like ours. There can always be a risk that the non-proliferation ayatollahs may succeed in bringing forward measures that actually impact negatively on our interests and security, like the NPT did all along. It is therefore imperative that we engage the United States and other dominant powers to work together in evolving the rules and practices suitable for the future that curb proliferation but do not retard international cooperation in the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. This is why the recent agreement between the US and India for cooperation in nuclear energy, space, high-technology areas and discussions on missile defence assumes great importance. In essence, a fresh approach to non-proliferation would be needed to ensure that our core interests are not adversely affected by the fallout of Pakistan’s nuclear proliferation.

Air Commodore JASJIT SINGH, Editorial Advisor (Defence and Strategic Affairs) to The Indian Express, answers your questions on strategic issues. Singh, a former director of the Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis, can be reached at jasjitsingh@expressindia.com