Opinion C Raja Mohan writes on US elections: Contrary to popular belief, American power is not diminishing

Despite early 20th-century challenges, capitalism survived, evolving in the US during the inter-war years and post-World War II in Europe. However, the idea of the West’s inevitable collapse remained a keystone in the world view of communists, who maintained that capitalism was in a “terminal crisis”.

Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev asserted in 1955 that the socialist camp would outlast and surpass the capitalist West. Chinese leader Mao Zedong was more elegant than Khrushchev when he stated that the “East wind will prevail over the West wind”. More recently, in 2021, Xi Jinping declared that the West was in decline, and that a rejuvenated China will lead a post-Western world. However, with China experiencing an economic slowdown, the assumption that it will inevitably surpass the US is under doubt. As China’s population declines and its economic momentum stalls, it’s uncertain whether China can match the US, let alone overtake it.

Recent arguments about American decline focus on structural shifts in the international system, suggesting the rise of non-Western powers and the emergence of a “multipolar world” replacing the US-led unipolar order after the Soviet Union collapsed. Yet, the arrival of new influential actors doesn’t necessarily establish a multipolar world. Only China, with its current economic size of $18 trillion among the existing powers approximates a pole in the international system; but China’s deceleration complicates its status. Other nations, including India, are far from achieving true pole position.

It is also impossible to bridge the differences within the emerging powers and unite them against the US, despite their shared resentment against American power. As we know from the “collective action problem”, each member of the anti-American coalition is open to a separate deal with Washington.

Differentiating between Western and American decline is crucial. Non-Western actors are rising at Europe and Japan’s expense, which face economic slowdowns and demographic declines. Meanwhile, the US has long maintained its share of global GDP at about 26 per cent. The Eurozone, once seen as an economic peer to the US, has been steadily losing ground; its current GDP is about $15 trillion. Europe declines and China slows, while the US’s share of global GDP is likely to increase.

Another argument supporting American decline suggests the fragmentation of the US-backed “liberal international order” (LIO). However, LIO is an academic invention. The notion of a broad set of rules governing the post-Cold War world was never a reality.

The US has consistently improvised rules to suit its strategic aims, evident in how it transformed the “sacred” nuclear non-proliferation regime to forge a new strategic partnership with India (2005-08). Washington also violated an essential norm of the global financial order when it persuaded the reluctant G7 to seize Russian financial assets worth $300 billion in Western banks after Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine. Rules are important, but they are drafted and revised by those who dominate the power distribution.

Despite its numerous challenges, the US remains a superpower, thanks to its robust economy, formidable military, and a massive ecosystem of scientific research. The current phase of intense political polarisation and systemic dysfunction tend to mask the entrenched American capacity for self-renewal. As we look forward to the next administration, the issue isn’t so much American decline as it is the growing American temptation towards unilateralism. We have seen this under both Trump and Harris.

While Trump’s unilateral approach is well-documented and widely criticised, it’s noteworthy that President Biden’s Inflation Reduction Act, developed unilaterally, has been drawing European capital to the US. Biden has intensified the American weaponisation of the global financial system and the dollar’s role as a reserve currency to mount pressure on America’s adversaries. Its allies and partners get caught in the crossfire of secondary sanctions, but they have no option except to adapt. Together, Trump and Biden have broken away from the global trading order established by the US in the late 20th century.

As India prepares for the next administration, three major challenges stand out.

Under the last five presidents — Clinton, Bush, Obama, Trump, and Biden — the US has emerged as India’s most valued partner. Still, India cannot take Washington for granted. Delhi should focus on assessing the sources of structural change in the US polity and find ways to deal with them. Despite perceived ideological differences, both Trump and Harris will wield power decisively and unilaterally when needed. The liberal Harris administration might sugarcoat its exercise of power; but Trump is prone to the rough and ready.

It is hard to counter American power through countervailing coalitions like the BRICS or the mobilisation of the non-Western world. The focus instead must be on engaging the diverse actors within the American polity. America’s internal dynamics constitute the primary constraints on the unilateral exercise of American power. This demands investing more political energy and diplomatic effort into engaging domestic US constituencies to secure favourable outcomes for India’s interests with the upcoming administration.

An accurate assessment of global power distribution is a precondition for successful foreign policy. India’s national strategy must adapt to the reality of growing American power in relation to China, Russia, and Europe.

The writer is a contributing editor on international affairs for The Indian Express