Opinion After Pahalgam, is there a path to long-term peace?

After 2014, India’s approach has been a more aggressive mixture of counter-terrorism operations and heavy, disproportionate and unpredictable firing across the LoC, coupled with diplomatic initiatives, including at the UNSC and Financial Action Task Force (FATF). At the same time, like the prime ministers before him, Prime Minister Narendra Modi made a strong effort for an end to terrorism through dialogue.

The attack in Pathankot followed his spontaneous stopover in Lahore. With Uri and Pulwama, India once again took the usual diplomatic measures. But its military response demonstrated its willingness to retaliate beyond the boundaries of anticipated war-gamed steps.

The global context and international responses also changed over time. It was not until the Kargil and the Chittisinghpura massacre in 2000 that the US and others began to accept the existence of cross-border “militancy” from Pakistan. It took the Srinagar Assembly attack in October 2001 and the Parliament attack to acknowledge the reality of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. Engaged in a war in Afghanistan through Pakistan, the US’s priority was to do enough to pressure Pakistan, assuage India and prevent a war that would derail its own Afghan war. For much of that decade, including after the Mumbai attack, Pakistan used this leverage to insulate its India policy from larger punitive Western measures.

The US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, Pakistan’s rapidly diminishing strategic value and the weariness of Gulf countries facing their own terror threats from radical Islamist groups have reduced tolerance for Pakistan. China remains its principal external lifeline. The world, preoccupied with geopolitical shifts, has low patience for the dangerous distraction of cross-border terrorism. On the other hand, India’s global stature has risen. International support for India after Pahalgam has been the strongest ever.

India is at a moment of reckoning again. The obvious measures to further downgrade an already low-level of contact with Pakistan were announced immediately. The major escalation is the decision to keep the Indus Water Treaty in abeyance. That is not a surprise. India had already called for its review. Globally, many transboundary rivers have no arrangements or have non-treaty-based mechanisms under international conventions, including in the Brahmaputra basin from the Tibetan plateau in China to South Asia.

India will also mount a massive diplomatic outreach to a receptive world to take concrete steps, such as cutting off military assistance to Pakistan, including the US F-16 upgrade programme, and supplies of spares and components; the curtailment of non-humanitarian assistance; a review of multilateral funding; a freeze on projects in POK; a fresh listing in the UNSC sanctions committee; the extradition of wanted Pakistani terrorists; a demand for effective dismantling of terrorism infrastructure in Pakistan; and renewed FATF strictures. Modi has signalled to Pakistan and the world the security response with a twofold objective: To bring the perpetrators to justice and to go after the terrorism network.

The first order of business will be to pursue the terrorists in J&K while protecting the civilian population. The timing, target and method of a response to Pakistan will be carefully thought through and may not be as speculated. It will take into account our preparedness and Pakistan’s capabilities, avoid repetition, contain an element of surprise, draw intelligence support from some of our partners and, at its most expansive level, include a comprehensive set of military and non-conventional measures. We have learnt lessons from the past and are better equipped. Our immediate achievements may be short-term, tactical and publicly visible, but the long-term objective will be pursued relentlessly.

Pakistan’s withdrawal from the Simla Agreement follows decades of disregard for its provisions and LOC violations. Pakistan will make a big mistake if it seeks to change the status quo on the ground. As for nuclear threats, as seen in the Ukraine war, nuclear weapons are normally not instruments of war, but guarantors of state survival. Global eyes and ears will track any movements for preventive steps. Pakistan is aware of possible responses to even the limited use of tactical nuclear weapons, let alone a strategic one.

In response to any Indian action, Pakistan may not want a long-drawn full-scale war. Pakistan’s war objective, given its constraints, may be to trigger a limited conventional war that would invite international mediation, re-hyphenate Pakistan and India and re-internationalise the Kashmir issue. As has happened in the past, at a difficult time internally, the army will use this crisis to shore up its image as the only guarantor of Pakistan’s security.

But we must not let Kashmir’s quest for peace and progress, or the kindness of its people, be a victim of the Pakistan military’s design, nor fall for its enduring objective of lighting the communal fire. More than military force, eliminating terrorism from Pakistan would require the world to come together to strengthen democratic forces and loosen the military’s grip and militants’ sway over it.

Meanwhile, an honest appraisal should be followed by enhanced security presence in J&K. As the dust settles on this brutal tragedy, the much-needed security, defence and military upgrade, including on technology and equipment, should not be lost in bureaucratic confusion and paralysis.

Nor should the passage of time lead us to stop reflecting on a long-term solution or on the destiny of South Asia, to which our own fortunes are linked. The region needs more attention than we have been giving it.

The writer is a retired Indian ambassador