Opinion Is the BJP truly a dominant party?

Let us first look at electoral politics. The BJP has not only retained power for three parliamentary elections, it has also retained its vote share. The distance from its nearest competitor is huge — 15 percentage points. So, the minimal criterion of being a dominant player is easily fulfilled. But this all-India picture becomes complicated once we start looking at states. Over the past decade, in parliamentary elections, it has retained its hold over Gujarat, MP, Chhattisgarh and Assam. It has made significant gains in Odisha, Andhra and Telangana. But in 2024, the BJP faced setbacks in states that were on the verge of becoming its bastions — Karnataka, Maharashtra, Haryana, Rajasthan and UP — besides failing to expand in Jharkhand, Bihar and West Bengal. A few states continue to be out of bounds for the BJP after 10 years. These include Kerala (in terms of seats), Tamil Nadu, Punjab and practically the entire Northeast except Assam.

Moreover, its losses and limited successes in assemblies manifest an inconsistency in its dominance. Right after its handsome victory in 2014, the BJP failed in Delhi and Bihar; lost Rajasthan and Chhattisgarh; had to steal MP, Karnataka and later, Maharashtra; it lost Himachal, Karnataka and recently, could not win Jharkhand. West Bengal, too, has remained beyond its grip so far.

The weakness of the BJP’s dominance is more apparent in its voter pool. It has strengthened that pool since the 1990s, but not exactly diversified it. It continues to struggle to be a “dominant” party encompassing a cross-section of voters. The BJP appears dominant because under its Hindutva umbrella, it has attracted many from the backward castes and won sizeable support among Dalits and Adivasis. Its inability and unwillingness to cultivate the Muslim (and Christian) vote is a well-known limitation. Beyond this self-imposed limitation, the BJP’s voter umbrella is rather weak in accommodating most marginal sections of society.

While the party has expanded beyond the typical middle class, it is more acceptable among upper and middle castes and the rich/middle income voters than among Dalits, Adivasis and the poor. A study shows that the upper half of society, which has more access to caste-class privilege, tends to support the BJP more (Suhas Palshikar and Jyoti Mishra, Studies in Indian Politics, December 2023). It has been slightly more successful among urban constituencies than among rural. Even among women, while the BJP is about to neutralise the gender gap, it has yet to establish an advantage. The BJP’s relationship with citizens on the peripheries is tenuous. Its electoral dominance, thus, is crafted through an umbrella of the so-called heartland and the so-called mainstream.

Finally, the BJP’s politics has often been one of acrimony, deep divisions and consequent lack of smooth institutional functioning. The adversarial relationship between the ruling party and the Opposition can be compared only with the worst and weakest phase of Congress dominance — 1972 to 76. The frequency and vehemence with which the BJP has to resort to repression and use of state machinery against political opponents indicates its ruthless resolve to craft dominance as also the chinks in its armour. If in the Sixties, the sheer scale of electoral victories would demoralise the Opposition, today the Opposition is often physically tamed, caricatured through control of media and silenced through the use of presiding officers of the legislature.

The BJP’s ability to set an agenda is predicated on the exercise of governmental coercion resulting in projecting all dissent as anti-national and browbeating any social segment that may engage in protests and agitations. Besides an electoral upper hand, the long arm of the law and the still longer arm of misinformation and innuendo sustain the BJP’s pre-eminent position in competitive politics. This is not only because the BJP is weak in other respects but because in the BJP’s imagination of dominance, a certain intolerance and impatience with those who disagree is inherent.

Overall, today’s BJP is a case of truncated dominance. The limits to electoral successes, the narrowness of its voter umbrella and the compulsive resort to high-handed tactics coupled with suspicion of any dissent, point to a deficit in two qualities that shape robust dominance: Statesmanship and willingness on democratic accommodation. Instead, its dominance is woven through a maze of naked power, verbosity and chicanery.

The BJP may overcome some of the limitations in the electoral arena. But it is unlikely to easily overcome the limits imposed by its narrow Hindutva umbrella under which the socio-spatial peripheries or the less privileged sections will only have a cramped place. Having got into the habit of misusing governmental power, it is equally unlikely that the BJP will make itself a more legitimate player in democratic politics. The awkward militancy of BJP sympathisers notwithstanding, the BJP appears far away from robust dominance.

This leads to at least two strange paradoxes. Because of its truncated dominance there is space for a strong constellation against it in competitive politics and yet, precisely for that reason, a strong united opposition is not likely to take shape easily. Secondly, while its incomplete dominance compels it to indulge in shrill rhetoric, that same rhetoric easily offers itself as an agenda. Competitive politics in the phase of India’s second dominant party system, therefore, will unfold through these two paradoxes.

The writer, based in Pune, taught Political Science